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ABSTRACT  
 
This dissertation analysed the outcome of the adoption and implementation of 
privatisation by Nigeria, of which a legal framework has been put in place by the 
government to legalise the process of transferring the ownership and/or control of 
public enterprises to private entrepreneurs with a view to facilitating economic 
development in the country. Many other African countries have pursued similar reform 
paths with similar objectives and the thesis undertakes a general analysis of the outcome 
of adopting and implementing privatisation within the continent. Within Nigeria, the 
proposed power sector privatisation is specifically analysed. The dissertation focuses on 
the economic development outcome of privatisation, which encompasses key benefits 
that have been attributed to privatisation including the beneficial impact of privatisation 
on the public sector as well as the privatised enterprises, privatisation’s contribution to 
overall private sector development, the benefit of privatisation to the citizens of the 
country and finally privatisation’s usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign 
investment inflow to the country. These benefits are viewed collectively, of which 
achieving some of them at the expense of others may not augur well for broad based 
economic development in Nigeria specifically or Africa in general.  
 
Using the analytical framework created in the thesis, various issues that have adversely 
affected the full realisation of these key economic development benefits and created a 
gap between the policy objectives behind privatisation law and the reality of 
implementation were analysed. The approach of International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) (specifically the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to 
privatisation was also considered in the thesis owing to the fact that they have had some 
influence in its adoption and implementation in Nigeria, and Africa more broadly.  
 
Privatisation entails more than just legal reform, thus, the research is interdisciplinary in 
nature and principally touches on legal issues, public policy issues and issues pertaining 
to economic development, including social issues.   
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ACTUALISING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PRIVATISATION 
LEGAL REFORM: A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF PRIVATISATION IN 
AFRICA WITH A SPECIFIC CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA AND SUB FOCUS 
ON THE NIGERIAN ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation seeks to assess the extent to which privatisation legal reforms that have 
been implemented in Nigeria have facilitated or are likely to facilitate economic 
development in the country, and  it seeks to also identify and analyse key factors that 
could affect the realisation of this policy goal in Nigeria generally and the Nigerian 
electricity sector in particular. Before narrowing the discussion to Nigeria however, a 
broader examination of the outcome of privatisation legal reform in Africa is 
undertaken. It should be noted from the outset that viewing privatisation through 
economic development lens entails making a normative assumption about the goal of 
adopting and implementing privatisation in a country and while economic development 
may be the key goal in many African countries, there are bound to be instances both 
within Africa and beyond where this is not the primary goal of policy makers in a 
country. It is also imperative to clarify how the term ‘economic development’ is used in 
this dissertation since it could be open to different interpretations. In the quest to 
achieve economic development, many countries have amongst other things, sought to 
adopt policy measures that would lead to greater enterprise efficiency and the 
production of top quality goods and services, which would pave way for the attainment 
of rapid economic growth. In addition to these ends however, economic development 
also has a vital social component i.e. the realisation of social development objectives 
like poverty reduction or eradication, inequality reduction and middle class expansion, 
and increase in the employment and real income levels in the country aimed at 
achieving full and rewarding employment.1 As noted by Jeswald Salacuse:  
 
... The definition and focus of "development" has shifted and evolved 
over time. In the 1950s and 1960s, development meant simply economic 
growth as measured by gross national product per capita in individual 
developing countries. ... Later, concerns about the equitable distribution 
of the results of economic growth and the needs of the Third World's 
                                                             
1 JJ Sanders, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global Market’ (2000) 9 Currents 
Int’l Trade LJ 37, 40; F Stewart, ‘Are Adjustment Policies in Africa Consistent with Long-run 
Development Needs?’ (1991) 9 Development Policy Review 413, 415. 
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poor would gain an increasing place on the development agenda. ... In 
time, both policy makers and scholars came to see that development was 
not a purely economic phenomenon but that it also had social, political, 
and institutional dimensions, causes, and objectives. ...’2 (footnotes 
omitted) 
 
Broadly speaking, the African continent is facing a severe economic development crisis 
characterised by poor economic performance and very high level of poverty and 
inequality in many African countries, which has been prevalent for many years.3 Based 
on United Nations classification, of the 53 member states of the African Union4,  33 fall 
within the category of least developing countries out of a total of 48 least developing 
countries in the world.5 Going by the 2008 Human Development Index rankings of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), only 3 African countries fall within 
the category of High Human Development, 23 fall within the category of Medium 
Human Development while 25 fall within category of Low Human Development.6 In 
view of the economic development challenge facing the continent and the fact that 
poverty has continued to remain high even in some of the countries that have witnessed 
some economic growth7, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
which is the development policy framework adopted by the African Union in 2001, 
notes that:  
 
While growth rates are important, they are not by themselves sufficient 
to enable African countries to achieve the goal of poverty reduction. The 
                                                             
2 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third 
World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 875. 
 
3 Bryan Mercurio, ‘Growth and Development: Economic and Legal Conditions’ (2007) 30 UNSWLJ 437, 
438; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? (World Bank, Washington DC 2000) 83; NJ 
Udombana, ‘The Summer Has Ended and We Are Not Saved - Towards a Transformative Agenda for 
Africa's Development’ (2005-2006) 7 San Diego Int’l LJ 5, 11-13.   
 
4 African Union, ‘African Union: Member States’ <http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/memberstates/map.htm> accessed 3 March 2009. Note that Chad is not a member of the 
African Union. 
 
5 UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS), ‘Least Developed Countries: Country 
profiles’ <http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/> accessed 3 March 2009.  
 
6 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update 2008 - 
HDI Rankings’ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> accessed 3 March 2009. Note that Somalia and 
Zimbabwe were not classified. 
 
7 Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2005: Meeting the Challenges of 
Unemployment and Poverty in Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa 2005) 57, 61, 70, 
91-92. 
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challenge for Africa, therefore, is to develop the capacity to sustain 
growth at levels required to achieve poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. ... The strategy has the following expected outcomes: 
economic growth and development and increased employment; reduction 
in poverty and inequality... 8 
 
Achieving economic development would require massive investment in the 
development of a country’s productive capacity for various goods and services 
including utility/infrastuctural services like electricity. However, whether the public or 
the private sector should spearhead such economic development efforts in a country is 
an argument that has been going on for several decades, as well as the role of law or 
legal reform in the development process. With a view to facilitating economic 
development, many developing countries, including African countries have in the past 3 
decades, adopted the policy of privatising public enterprises and assets and have enacted 
laws to give effect to the policy, thus paving way for the legal transfer of ownership 
and/or control of public enterprises to private entrepreneurs.9 Many of them had earlier 
adopted national policies and enacted laws to pave the way for the state to play a 
leading role in facilitating economic development.10 This owed a lot to the effort in the 
1960s and 1970s to utilise laws as a means of influencing or facilitating economic 
development, which was the key driving force behind the ‘Law and Development’ 
movement.11 The movement itself was inspired by contending development theories of 
                                                             
8 Organization of African Unity, ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2001) 
<http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf> accessed 10 January 2005 paras 64, 69. This 
policy framework derives its authority from the Declaration on the New Common Initiative (MAP AND 
OMEGA) AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII), adopted by the Thirty-seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, Lusaka, Zambia, 9 – 11 July 2001. 
Initially titled ‘The New Africa Initiative’, it was renamed ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development’ in October 2001. Also see I Taylor and P Nel, ‘”New Africa”, Globalisation and the 
Confines of Elite Reformism: “Getting the Rhetoric Right”, Getting the Strategy Wrong’ (2002) 23 TWQ 
163, 163, 173. Subsequent citations of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in this thesis shall 
refer to it as ‘NEPAD 2001.’  
 
9 Note for instance EM Filippozzi, ‘Brazil - Privatisation Programme and Foreign Capital’ (1994) 5 
ICCLR C8, C8; JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for 
Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 884. 
 
10 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 877-882 
 
11 DM Trubek and M Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States [1974] Wis L Rev 1062, 1073-1074: ‘"Law" was seen as 
both a necessary element in "development," and a useful instrument to achieve it. ... "Law" was thus 
"potent," and because legal development would foster social development and improve human welfare it 
was also "good." ... law was also associated with rational, instrumental action to secure greater material 
well-being and other developmental goals. Law was one of the tools that could be used by planners 
consciously seeking to enhance human welfare.’ (footnote omitted) Also see 1095; JW Salacuse, ‘From 
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the time including the Modernisation Theory and the Dependency Theory which had 
differing views of the causes of underdevelopment and the nature of laws needed to 
advance development in a country.12 In many of the developing countries that followed 
the path of state-led development, laws were enacted to implement nationalisation, to 
regulate and place various restrictions on private local and foreign enterprises, to 
establish new enterprises in various business sectors and generally to control the 
ownership and use of private property.13  The economic development objectives sought 
to be achieved were eclectic and included job creation, provision of various goods to the 
citizens, extension of utilty/infrastructural services to as many as posible and general 
improvement in living standards. Regarding the public enterprises, many of them were 
not very effective in achieving these objectives and faced a barrage of criticisms 
particularly from the standpoint that public ownership and operation of the enterprises 
ultimately affected the poor adversely and also adversely impacted on the investment 
climate in some of these countries.14 The research identified several of the problems that 
plagued them, which were formidable obstacles that obstructed the realization of their 
objectives, including inefficiency, and over-reliance on the government for budgetary 
support.15 This situation gave rise to concerns about whether the state should continue 
to play a direct and leading role in efforts to actualise economic development in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 
Int’l L 875, 876, 882: ‘Legal practitioners and scholars working in development have also been concerned 
primarily with the development process-specifically how law helps or hinders, fosters or hobbles, the 
attainment of increased productivity, better health, and higher standards of living in developing countries. 
... Their efforts gave birth to a new field of legal inquiry and action, "law and development," whose aim 
was to determine how law might contribute to the processes of economic and social development in the 
Third World.’ Also see PC Hunt, ‘Statutory Framework for State Economic Development Programs’ 
(1973-1974) 11 Harv J on Legis 703, 703: ‘A governmental structure is needed that can plan for and 
guide economic development.’ 
 
12 KE Davis and MJ Trebilcock, ‘Legal Reforms and Development’ (2001) 22 TWQ 21, 21-23. 
 
13 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 876-882; DM Trubek ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on 
the Study of Law and Development ‘ (1972-1973) 82 Yale LJ  1, 36-37; KD Ewing, ‘The Politics of the 
British Constitution’ [2000] PL 405, 418; R Pritchard, ‘The Transformation in Foreign Investment Law - 
more than a Pendulum Swing?’ (1997) 8 ICCLR 233, 233; K Appiah-Kubi, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and 
Privatisation in Ghana’ (2001) 39 J Mod Afr Stud 197, 199. 
 
14 MM Shirley, ‘The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective’ (1991-1992) 60 
Fordham L Rev S23, S32; World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of 
Government Ownership - A World Bank Policy Research Report (OUP, New York 1995) 1-2, 32-35; 
World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (OUP, New 
York 2004) 29. 
 
15 See for instance K Appiah-Kubi, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation in Ghana’ (2001) 39 J 
Mod Afr Stud 197, 200; JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing 
Role for Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 882. 
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country or whether this role should be ceded to the private sector functioning in a 
market economy, with the government only playing an indirect and supportive role. 
Privatisation favours the latter approach, however, the key question is - if public 
enterprises have failed to meaningfully contribute to national economic development 
and have been ineffective instruments in the actualisation of the social objectives of the 
government, will changing their legal ownership and/or control from public to private 
by enacting privatisation law make any real difference? This question could be re-
phrased in another way - if the various laws enacted to facilitate state-led development, 
including state ownership of enterprises did not result in successful economic 
development in many countries that undertook such measures in the 1970s and 1980s, is 
there any reason to believe that the privatisation laws and associated regulations that 
have now been enacted by many of these countries will lead them down the economic 
development path?  
 
In addressing the above questions, it should be noted that the achilles heel of the ‘Law 
and Develoment’ movement was that it appeared to put too much faith in the ability of 
laws and legal institutions to facilitate development, without adequately factoring in 
other issues besides laws that could impact on development efforts in a state, and the 
persistence of various development challenges in many of the countries that had 
undergone formal legal reforms largely undermined the legitimacy of the movement.16 
In some cases, these laws were instruments for pursuing negative ends and advancing 
the narrow economic or political interests of sub-groups within a country rather than 
broad-based societal interests.17 In this regard, concern has been voiced that the quest to 
introduce new legal reforms in various developing countries in order to facilitate market 
reforms and advance economic development through measures like privatisation, runs 
the risk of not adequately factoring in the pitfalls of the earlier ‘Law and Development’ 
movement including inadequate consideration of the socio-cultural and political context 
                                                             
16 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 882. DM Trubek and M Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: 
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States [1974] Wis L Rev 
1062, 1080, 1101. Also see B Metzger, ‘Law and Development: An Essential Dimension of Governance’ 
(1998) 26 Int’l Bus Law 294, 295. 
 
17 MO Chibundu, ‘Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and Serving Palm-Wine’ (1997) 29 Case 
W Res J Int’l L 167, 195-197; DM Trubek and M Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States [1974] Wis L Rev 1062, 
1083-1084. 
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of the countries enacting these laws, and accordingly being unduly ambitious about 
what laws and legal insttutions can achieve.18        
 
With a view to addressing the issues raised above, the research examined the case for 
privatisation as a national economic development tool. PP Craig notes the eclectic 
nature of the reasons for privatisation19, accordingly, to facilitate the examination, an 
analytical framework was created in the dissertation in order to clarify the basis for 
assessing the economic development impact of privatisation in this dissertation. The 
research focuses on certain benefits attributed to privatisation such as its benefit to the 
public sector of the implementing country, its benefit to the privatised enterprises, its 
contribution to overall private sector development, its benefit to the citizens and finally, 
its usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign investment inflow. Each of these 
benefits embodies arguments that have been advanced regarding privatisation in some 
scholarly writings20, and also articulated by the IFIs that have financially supported the 
development efforts of many developing countries.21 Some national governments have 
                                                             
18 KE Davis and MJ Trebilcock, ‘Legal Reforms and Development’ (2001) 22 TWQ 21, 25-33 pp 32-33; 
JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third 
World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 889. 
 
19 PP Craig, ‘Constitutions, Property and Regulation’ [1991] PL 538, 551-552:’ The reasons for this 
programme were eclectic, and included: the improvement of efficiency; the widening of share ownership; 
the reduction of governmental involvement in industry; the alleviation of the public sector borrowing 
requirement; and the encouragement of share ownership.’ Also see C Cramer, ‘Privatisation and 
Adjustment in Mozambique: A “Hospital Pass”?’ (2001) 27 J S Afr Stud 79, 82, 87: ‘Privatisation is 
often applied as a kind of 'omnibus policy' or panacea.' ... The policy is associated with a whole host of 
objectives, economic, political and social. ... Mozambique is a particularly good example of the multiple 
objectives associated with privatisation programmes.’ (footnote omitted) 
 
20 See for instance W Megginson, ‘Privatization’  [2000] 118 Foreign Pol’y 14, 14-27; P Morgan, ‘The 
Privatization and the Welfare State: A Case of Back to the Future?’ in P Morgan (ed), Privatization and 
the Welfare State: Implications for Consumers and the Workforce (Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Hants 
1995) 10; H Sarie-Eldin, ‘Private Sector Participation in the Supply of Infrastructural Services: An 
Evaluation (Specific Focus on Egypt and North Africa’ in J Faundez, ME Footer and JJ Norton (eds), 
Governance, Development and Globalization: A Tribute to Lawrence Tshuma (Blackstone Press Limited, 
London 2000) 334 – 336; JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing 
Role for Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 884. 
 
21 IN Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition - A World Bank 
Policy Research Report (World Bank, Washington DC 2004) 3-4; World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business: 
The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership - A World Bank Policy Research Report (OUP, 
New York 1995) 8-9. As used in this dissertation, the phrase IFIs refers to the World Bank Group and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). References to the World Bank in this thesis primarily relate to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and to some extent the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC).  
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also based their decision to embark on privatisation  on some of these benefits.22 They 
collectively constitute the yardstick for assessing the success or otherwise of the 
adoption and implementation of privatisation law for the purposes of this research, and 
premised on the analytical standpoint of the research, which is the economic 
development impact of privatisation, where the privatisation programme of a country 
fails to deliver on any of these benefits, it would undermine the argument that 
privatisation legal reform is instrumental to the attainment of economic development.  
 
It should be noted that these benefits broadly focus on both the economic and social 
impact of privatisation - while the economic impact considers the effect of privatisation 
on enterprise performance, public sector financial health and effectiveness, and national 
economic growth, the social impact considers the distributive effect of privatisation on 
the citizens and its effectiveness in meeting the social concerns that initially informed 
the establishment of public enterprises in various countries. This is a pragmatic mixed 
bag that comprises aspects of the privatisation viewpoints from the right and left of the 
political spectrum and enables a more holistic, balanced and nuanced analysis of 
privatisation outcome as opposed to a simplistic or ideological analysis. As has been 
noted, privatisation, especially when undertaken on a large scale ‘is not merely the 
transfer of economic control from the state to private concerns but is fundamentally a 
political act with profound social, economic and cultural implications.’23   
 
The hypothesis or central argument of this research is that the replacement of the policy 
and legal framework for public ownership of enterprises with the new policy and legal 
framework for their private ownership and/or control as a result of privatisation is not 
sufficient in itself to deliver the above economic development benefits of privatisation 
in many African countries including Nigeria, when the benefits are viewed collectively. 
Essentially, the undertaking of privatisation legal reforms in these countries has not 
always led to the take over of enterprises by qualitative private investors and subsequent 
improvement in enterprise performance or led to a massive influx of qualitative foreign 
investors or aided broader development of the private sector or enhanced the financial 
health and effectiveness of the public sector or facilitated the realisation of social 
                                                             
22 See for instance O Obasanjo (President of Nigeria), ‘Statement on the Occasion of the Inauguration of 
the National Council on Privatisation’ in National Council on Privatisation, Nigeria, Privatisation 
Handbook (3rd edn BPE, Abuja 2001) 4-5. 
 
23 G Gluck, ‘Privatisation: The Hungarian Example’ (1993) 4 ICCLR 286, 287.  
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benefits for the citizens such as poverty and inequality reduction and qualitative job 
creation. Sometimes some of these goals have been achieved at the expense of others 
and the economic objectives of privatisation have often conflicted with the social 
objectives. This is the conundrum that privatisation often presents and the real challenge 
from the economic development perspective is to be able to harness the benefits of 
privatisation whilst avoiding the social pitfalls associated with it24, failing which the 
legal reform  that ushered it in could face the sort of legimacy questions that attended 
the earlier ‘Law and Development’ movement. Commenting on the move from the 
development model that ushered in state ownership and state-led development (Model 
1) to the later one that ushered in privatisation and markets (Model 2), Jeswald Salacuse 
notes that:  
 
The shift from Model I to Model II among developing countries is not 
necessarily permanent. Just as the failure of Model I led to change, the 
same fate may happen to Model II. While Model II may indeed bring 
about increased productivity, it may do so at a cost that Third World 
societies ultimately judge unacceptable. What are those costs? They may 
be considerable. First, Model II, with its emphasis upon markets, may 
allocate social resources to areas which society ultimately judges 
inappropriate. Second, it may create unacceptable divisions between rich 
and poor and among classes and castes in societies that are politically 
explosive because of their social and ethnic pluralism. Third, corruption 
may grow to the point that markets are distorted and the public 
determines Model II to have created a system that is fundamentally 
unfair. Fourth, it may facilitate through market transactions the 
exploitation of the weak by the strong, the poor by the rich. ... The 
important task of the law in this new era must be to create a framework 
that will minimize the costs of Model II while maximizing its benefits. 
The failure to do so may mean a drift back toward Development Model I 
or perhaps a search for Development Model III.25 
  
 
The key issue to bear in mind from the economic development analytical standpoint is 
that  privatisation has different stakeholders whose interests are not perfectly aligned. 
For instance, profit-driven private investors seek to earn profits on their investment 
through higher tariffs and prices failing which they are less likely to enter into 
                                                             
24 K Appiah-Kubi, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation in Ghana’ (2001) 39 J Mod Afr Stud 197, 
224-225. Also see JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for 
Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 889-890.  
 
25 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
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contractual agreements to make long term investments26 On the other hand the citizens 
of the privatising country also have various expectations from privatisation, including 
having acess to better and more affordable goods and services, jobs and a host of other 
benefits failing which they will be less supportive of private sector takeover of the 
delivery of various goods and services.  With reference to water utilities privatisation in 
sub-Saharan Africa for instance, it has been noted that, 
 
... governments face considerable difficulties in attracting investors and 
regulating private utilities. Furthermore, privatisation fails to address 
some of the fundamental constraints affecting water utilities in SSA, 
such as finance, the politicised nature of service delivery, and lack of 
access for the poor. ... in much of SSA it has been difficult to rouse 
investor interest. This is in part because of the problem of reconciling the 
conflict between the profit motive and the provision of a social service. 
... private firms will only be interested in profitable investments, where 
either the government or consumers can pay enough to generate a 
commercial return. ... it is not clear that privatisation has improved the 
access of the poor to safe water.27 
 
Given the absence of adequate social safety nets, alternative jobs, alternative product/ 
service providers and adequate regulation in some developing countries including those 
in Africa, privatisation, even if it results in some economic growth which is not 
guaranteed, may usher in greater poverty, inequality and unemployment, social 
deprivation and socio-political instability, with adverse impact on national economic 
development.28 On this, it has been noted that:  
                                                             
26 I Oboarenegbe, ‘What is the Justification for the Proposed Renegotiations of Deep Offshore 
Production-Sharing Contracts in Nigeria?’ [2008] IELR 196, 201: ‘Securing long-term fiscal stability is a 
key priority to any international investor. This strategy would enable the investor to determine the 
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27 K Bayliss, ‘Utility Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Water’ (2003) 41 J Mod Afr 
Stud 507, 507, 527-529. See also B Tsie, ‘States and Markets in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC): Beyond the Neo-Liberal Paradigm’ (1996) 22 J S Afr Stud 75, 91: ‘privatisation of 
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28 K Pfeifer, ‘Parameters of Economic Reform in North Africa’ (1999) 26 Rev African Polit Economy 
441, 444; E Harsch, ‘Burkina Faso in the Winds of Liberalisation’ (1998) 25 Rev African Polit Economy 
625, 640; JLP Lugalla, ‘Development, Change, and Poverty in the Informal Sector during the Era of 
Structural Adjustments in Tanzania’ (1997) 31 Can J Afr Stud 424, 435, 441; J Stiglitz, Globalization and 
its Discontents (Norton and Company, New York 2003) 56. 
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Economic development activities ...  must take adequate account of the 
need to ... address the social consequences of such economic pursuit on 
the host population. A failure to do so will certainly have adverse 
consequences on the investors and the host state.29 
 
The NEPAD policy framework of the African Union refered to earlier is aimed at 
achieving both economic growth and the social ends of development30, and it places 
strong emphasis on the importance of public-private partnerships and foreign 
investments in achieving these objectives, of which public-private partnerships fall 
within the scope of privatisation as discussed in this thesis.31 NEPAD projects that the 
attainment of economic growth rate of 7 percent per annum will be vital in reducing 
African poverty by half by the year 2015.32 Essentially, NEPAD anticipates that 
privatisation and the foreign investment it is expected to attract will be key in achieving 
economic development on the continent. While it is virtually impossible to achieve the 
social ends of development like poverty and inequality reduction without economic 
growth, it is quite possible to attain economic growth while neglecting social 
development, although such economic progress as indicated by Jeswald Salacuse could 
be unsustainable in the long run.33 Economic growth achieved under such circumstances 
may not be sustainable in the long run owing to the fact that it concentrates wealth in 
few hands and the benefits have not trickled down to the majority of the citizens.34 In 
this regard it has been noted that in the implementation of public sector reforms, 
‘considerations of public policy and public interest tend to be marginalised by 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
29 GS Akpan, ‘The Failure of Environmental Governance and Implications for Foreign Investors and Host 
States - A Study of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ [2006] IELTR 1, 12. Also see NJ Udombana, ‘The 
Summer Has Ended and We Are Not Saved - Towards a Transformative Agenda for Africa's 
Development’ (2005-2006) 7 San Diego Int’l LJ 5, 57-58.   
 
30 NEPAD 2001 paras 64, 69. 
 
31 Ibid paras  100-103, 112, 150-152, 163. 
 
32 Ibid para 144.  
 
33 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
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Problems’ (1998) 24 Popul Dev Rev 411, 414; J Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Norton and 
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commercial and competitive considerations.’35 Commenting on the adoption of 
economic policies like privatisation in post-apartheid South Africa, Dennis Davis notes 
that:   
 
… economic growth has been preferred over social reconstruction as a 
central policy objective. ... a dichotomy has begun to emerge between 
growth via the market-oriented policies adopted by the government and 
the constitutional vision of a democratic society based on a set of social 
democratic values.36 
 
In some jurisdictions the social ends of development have been codified as enforceable 
rights under the constitution, obligating the government to accord respect to 
employment rights and ensure provision of certain basic goods and services crucial to a 
minimum standard of living such as healthcare services, housing, adequate food and 
water and adequate social security benefits.37 In this regard, it has been noted that,  
 
Market principles such as liberalization, privatization, and deregulation 
often conflict with socio-economic rights and have in a wide variety of 
contexts been criticized for accentuating poverty in poor countries.38 
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that curbing private profits through regulation 
constitutes an encroachment on private property rights given that it places constraints on 
the full realisation of the benefits of private property ownership resulting from 
privatisation.39 However in the context of privatisation, given that the private property 
in question used to belong to the state, regulation is vital in the public interest, 
particularly where a private monoply succeeds a public one and need exists to protect 
consumers and promote competition.40  
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In the light of the above discussion, if privatisation is viewed from the economic 
development perspective utilised in this dissertation, the end result of its 
implementation should not just be the transfer of legal ownership and control of public 
enterprises to private entrepreneurs or the attainment of corporate efficiency and 
profitability, but rather the attainment of all the other economic development benefits of 
privatisation noted above. Privatisation law alone may not be sufficient to actualise 
economic development due to various issues that arise within the social context of its 
implementation. John Williamson notes that, ‘The impact of privatisation depends very 
much on how it is done.’41 For the policy and legal framework for privatisation to be 
effective in facilitating economic development and in order to minimise the pitfalls 
associated with privatisation, careful attention has to be paid to the process of putting in 
place the framework and subsequently implementing the programme and the research 
considered the views of various scholars, development experts and other commentators 
on this issue. Essentially, effective privatisation outcomes require the observance of 
certain prerequisites, which the analytical framework of the thesis broadly classifies into 
2 categories namely, designing an effective policy and legal framework  and secondly, 
ensuring proper implementation of privatisation.  
 
On the issue of law and policymaking, the focus of the thesis is on whether the choice 
of privatisation was informed by conviction that it was the best reform option for the 
country and whether the privatisation law and other supportive laws are adequately 
structured to facilitate economic development.42 On the issue of implementation, it has 
been noted that:   
 
Economic policymaking is much more complicated than promulgating 
laws or regulations. While some major policies can be changed by the 
"stroke of a pen," most require a continuous and difficult period of 
implementation. Privatization and civil-service reform, for example, 
require high degrees of technical competence to go along with the 
required political will.43 
                                                             
41 J Williamson, ‘What should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus’ (2000) 15 World 
Bank Res Observer 251, 258. Also see MM Shirley, ‘The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World 
Bank Perspective’ (1991-1992) 60 Fordham L Rev S23, S32. 
 
42 On the key considerations in public policy-making, see D Wass, ‘Checks and Balances in Public Policy 
Making’ [1987] PL 181, 182.  
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Besides the above noted issue of technical competence, there are some other factors that 
could also affect the implementation outcome of privatisation law. Accordingly, the 
research frames and analyses four key implementation questions namely, is the national 
environment conducive to embarking on privatisation and attracting private 
investments?; secondly, is the institutional framework for implementing and monitoring 
the outcome of privatisation robust?; thirdly, will the strategic approach to the 
implementation of privatisation lead to the realisation of set policy objectives?; and 
finally, is the privatisation process accountable, transparent and free from corruption?  
 
To the extent that some developing African countries like Nigeria that have put in place 
the policy and legal framework for privatising public enterprises have not yet fully 
realised the key economic development benefits of privatisation, the position taken in 
the thesis is that their privatisation programmes are deficient in some respect regarding 
these prerequisites mentioned above. The existence, nature and extent of these 
deficiencies are analysed in this thesis with respect to African countries in general, 
Nigeria in particular and the Nigerian electricity reform programme in greater detail. It 
is important to note here that describing the policy, legal and implementation 
imperatives noted above as ‘prerequisites’ is not meant to suggest that once they are 
observed, then economic development is surely guaranteed. Asserting such causal link 
would likely give rise to the sort of problems encountered by the earlier ‘Law and 
Development’ movement since it is quite possible that the implementation of 
privatisation legal reform and the observance of the above pre-requisites may still fail to 
yeild the expected economic development outcomes, due to a host of other issues that 
could be peculiar to the implementing country. The research does not lay claim to 
understanding and addressing all the ingredients for successful economic development 
that must accompany privatisation legal reform in a country, and the designation of 
some issues as prerequisites is necessarily subjective of which some other scholars may 
view them differently. What is asserted however is that where they are not observed, 
privatisation will be less likely to yield expected economic development outcomes. It is 
also important to note that one must necessarily be modest about what law alone can 
achieve in the privatisation context given that it is only one of a number of other equally 
important determinants of privatisation outcomes. As noted by Kevin Davis and 
Michael Trebilcock:  
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... despite the resurgence of interest in reforming legal institutions as a 
means of pursuing development, there is a great deal of room for debate 
about the relationship between legal reforms and development.44 
 
 
1.1. BASIS FOR CHOICE OF REGION, COUNTRY AND SUB-SECTOR OF    
           CASE STUDY IN THE DISSERTATION 
 
  
The choice of Africa for analysing the economic development outcome of privatisation 
legal reform is primarily informed by three things namely, the fact that it is facing 
daunting economic development challenges perhaps more than any other region in the 
world45; secondly, the regional development policy views privatisation as a means of 
facilitating economic development46; and thirdly, privatisation has been or is being 
implemented in various African countries under the auspices of the IFIs with a view to 
actualising economic development in the continent.47 Currently, the continent lags far 
behind other continents as an investment destination due to various problems which are 
analysed in the thesis as part of the impediments to successful economic development 
outcome even after privatisation legal reforms have been undertaken, including 
infrastructural inadequacies, bureaucratic bottlenecks, corruption, limited access to 
credit and weak judiciaries.48  
 
Nigeria, which falls within the UNDP classification of medium human development49,  
is a developing African country facing severe economic development challenges 
evidenced by a low level of industrialisation, poor social infrastructure network, very 
high poverty and inequality rate, and high unemployment rate, which problems partly 
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influenced the decision to set up many of the public enterprises in the country.50 The 
fact that these public enterprises were largely ineffective in facilitating economic 
development due to various problems they faced formed part of the justification for 
embarking on privatisation.51 The electric power sector reform programme in Nigeria 
that places key emphasis on privatisation was selected for further analysis in this 
research owing to the vital role of electricity in national economic development. In 
many African countries in general, efficient delivery of utility/infrastructural services 
poses a big challenge. According to NEPAD,  
 
Infrastructure is one of the major parameters of economic growth ... If 
Africa had the same basic infrastructure as developed countries, it would 
be in a more favourable position to focus on production and on 
improving productivity for international competition. The structural gap 
in infrastructure constitutes a very serious handicap to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Improved infrastructure, including the cost and 
reliability of services, would benefit both Africa and the international 
community, which would be able to obtain African goods and services 
more cheaply.52 
 
Specifically regarding Nigeria, at least half of the country currently does not have 
access to power supply from the national grid especially rural dwellers53, and according 
to the Bureau of Public Enterprises, which is the Nigerian privatisation agency, the 
country’s per capita consumption of electricity is the lowest in the world.54 For those 
that do have access to electricity in Nigeria, the supply is very erratic, with homes and 
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businesses facing routine power blackouts and a host of other problems identified in the 
research.55  
 
Having enacted a general law to pave way for privatisation of various public enterprises 
and a sector-specific law to pave way for wide ranging reform of the electricity sector, 
including privatisation of the power utility, the key question for the purposes of the 
dissertation is whether these laws will yeild the expected economic development 
dividends that informed their enactment. Using the analytical framework of the 
dissertation, the research identifies key obstacles that stand in the way of these laws 
achieving intended ends. It should be noted that the thesis primarily focuses on the 
second privatisation programme currently being implemented in Nigeria, which 
effectively commenced in 1999, although some references are also made to the earlier 
privatisation that took place between 1988 and 1993.56 This is because the second 
programme, unlike the first, involves the privatisation of major public enterprises that 
have occupied the ‘commanding heights’ of the Nigerian economy and have huge 
developmental impact on the country and its citizens in terms of their products, services 
or employment capacity, including the electricity utility that forms part of the case study 
in the thesis. Also, the second programme, unlike the first, places strong emphasis on 
attracting foreign participation, which the government views as a key cornerstone of 
economic growth and economic development.  
 
A further reason for choosing Africa generally as well as Nigeria specifically for the 
research case study is that it provides an opportunity to examine the approach of the 
IFIs, specifically the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to 
privatisation, a key policy reform that both institutions have promoted for close to 3 
decades in many developing countries where they have had some measure of influence 
on economic policymaking and implementation.57 Both the World Bank and the IMF 
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have emphasized the need for poverty and inequality reduction to be the end result of 
the implementation of development strategies in Africa, besides the attainment of 
economic growth.58 Unlike the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
that has an explicit mandate to promote privatisation59, such explicit mandate is not 
contained in the Articles of Agreement of IFI or any of the organisations that form part 
of the World Bank Group. In the privatisation context however, while the World Bank 
is principally concerned with the impact of state ownership of inefficient enterprises on 
development and poverty reduction, the IMF is concerned about the fiscal impact of 
such enterprises on the country’s purse, which would ultimately affect the resources 
availably for addressing poverty-related issues.60  
 
Through loans, grants and reform suggestions made in the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
IFIs, alongside other official lenders like the Paris Club as well as private banks, 
encouraged the economic development initiatives of many developing countries, 
including African countries, leading to the establishment of many public enterprises and 
expansion of the supply of public services provided by the state.61 As earlier indicated, 
some strands of development thinking at the time favoured state economic intervention 
and deemphasized the role of markets, and many developing countries had self-
sufficiency as their industrial goal, with state industrial undertakings aiming to produce 
enough goods for the country’s needs while the state restricted the importation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Role of the IMF’ (Issues Brief) (December 2000) No 
00/09.   
 
58 I Bantekas, ‘Sociological Implications Arising from World Bank Projects and their Impact on Sub-
Saharan Indigenous Peoples’ (2005) 1 Int JLC 143, 144; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st 
Century? (World Bank, Washington DC 2000) 83-84; IMF, ‘Policies for Faster Growth and Poverty 
Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Role of the IMF’ (Issues Brief) (December 2000) No 00/09.   
 
59 Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1990 art 2; BB 
Palmer, ‘European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ (1991) 6 JIBL 204, 204, 207; SK 
Chatterjee, ‘The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ (1992) 7 JIBL 64, 65. 
 
60 JJ Sanders, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global Market’ (2000) 9 Currents 
Int’l Trade LJ 37, 42; MM Shirley, ‘The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank 
Perspective’ (1991-1992) 60 Fordham L Rev S23, S32; D Babai, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Rolling 
Back the State or Backing its Role?’ in R Vernon (ed), The Promise of Privatization: A Challenge for US 
Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1988) 266. 
 
61 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 876-880; JJ Sanders, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering 
Growth in the Global Market’ (2000) 9 Currents Int’l Trade LJ 37, 40; R Hunja, ‘Recent Revisions to the 
World Bank's Procurement and Consultants Selection Guidelines’ [1997] PPLR 217, 218; JM Wolgin, 
‘The Evolution of Economic Policymaking in Africa’ (1997) 87(2) Amer Econ Rev 54, 54; D Babai, ‘The 
World Bank and the IMF: Rolling Back the State or Backing its Role?’ in R Vernon (ed), The Promise of 
Privatization: A Challenge for US Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1988) 258, 260. 
 
40 
 
foreign goods.62 Since the 1980s however, the IFIs have urged many borrowing 
countries to undertake stabilisation and structural adjustment policy reforms with a view 
to revamping their national economies, improving the prospects for long-term economic 
efficiency and facilitating economic development.63 They have included privatisation as 
one of the conditionalities in their funding packages for many of these countries64, 
owing to the fact that they view it as being crucial for achieving lasting enterprise 
reform, facilitating economic growth and attaining the social objectives of economic 
development such as poverty and inequality reduction and enhanced employment rate in 
the country.65 There is also a legal reform component to the funding as the IFIs would 
often require borrowing countries to enact relevant laws or reform existing laws to give 
effect to privatisation and other market reforms.66 As Joseph Norton notes ‘Legal 
Reform Programmes are based on an assumption that sound economic development 
needs sound legal institutional infrastructure.’67 In the case of Nigeria, both the 
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privatisation programme in general and the electricity privatisation programme in 
particular have been endorsed and funded by the IFIs of which legal reforms have been 
undertaken within the context of the funding to pave the way for the privatisation, 
which is expected to yeild various economic develoment benefits for the country.68 
Barry Metzger notes that:  
 
The enactment of new legislation and regulations is, in some respects, 
the easiest part of donor-assisted law reform: it is often relatively short-
term work and inexpensive. Institutional reforms and the development of 
the necessary human resources within such institutions, however, require 
longer-term commitments and greater resources.69  
 
 
Having implemented the privatisation programme for close to 10 years, the research 
analysed the extent to which these laws have catalysed expected economic development 
dividends and whether the reality of privatisation’s adoption and implementation in the 
country corresponds with its economic development policy objective.70 In this regard, 
concern has been raised that:  
 
Notwithstanding the operatic "death" of the law and development 
movement twenty years ago, its central tenets remain the intellectual 
backbone of international development policy and practice.71 
 
 
 
It should be noted that this analyis and consequent critique of some aspects of the IFIs’ 
approach to the adoption and implementation of privatisation in Africa generally and 
Nigeria in particular, was not undertaken in a separate chapter but rather formed part of 
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the broader analysis undertaken in the chapters dealing with Africa, Nigeria and the 
Nigerian electricity reform programme respectively, due to the fact that the issues 
involved are all interwoven and accordingly not particularly amenable to 
compartmentalised analysis.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that where the implementation of privatisation does not 
deliver expected economic development dividends or it appears that some stakeholders 
may be advantaged at the expense of others or where the undertaking of privatisation-
related regulation does not adequately factor in the imterests of the wide public, the 
legitimacy of privatisation and regulation could be called into question.72 Equally where 
the implementation of privatisation gives rise to serious allegations of corruption and 
cronyism especially on the part of political leaders in a country, its legitimacy would 
also be called into question and this may give rise to clamour for reversal of concluded 
transactions perceived to be ‘formally legal, but morally odious.’73 If these issues that 
trigger legitimacy concerns are not safeguarded against and adequately addressed, 
privatisation, as the antidote to state ownership problems would remain on shaky 
grounds in many implementing countries even if some economic development benefits 
have been achieved.74   
 
 
1.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
As earlier stated, the hypothesis or central argument of this research is that the 
replacement of the policy and legal framework for public ownership of enterprises with 
the new policy and legal framework for their private ownership and/or control as a 
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result of privatisation is not sufficient in itself to deliver the economic development 
benefits of privatisation in many African countries including Nigeria, judged by 
reference to how privatisation is beneficial to the public sector and privatised 
enterprises, how it contributes to overall private sector development, how it benefits the 
citizens of the country and finally, its usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign 
investment inflow to the country.  
 
The adoption of a socio-legal methodological approach that deploys social scientific 
research methods would be effective in testing the above hypothesis and conducting an 
inquiry into the actual impact of privatisation law and policy in a country or region and 
formulating and addressing various research questions regarding the nature, purpose, 
effectiveness and implications or impact of privatisation.75 In this regard, a qualitative 
case study would be effective in undertaking an in-depth analysis of the Nigerian 
privatisation programme and resolving issues such as how and why privatisation policy 
was introduced in Nigeria, the extent to which the Nigerian privatisation laws and 
related regulations contain adequate provisions for actualising the policy goal of 
economic development and whether the government has been able to utilise these laws 
as effective tools in aiding national economic development and actualising the social 
objectives of economic development including the reduction of the poverty, inequality 
and unemployment levels in the country.76 The case study would prove vital in exposing 
any gaps or discrepancies that exist between the law and policy framework and actual 
verifiable reality of implementation in the country, identifying why these gaps exist and 
suggesting how to bridge them.77 As previously noted, the earlier ‘Law and 
Development’ movement appeared to place too much trust in the ability of laws and 
legal institutions to facilitate economic development without fully considering the 
practical limitations of laws and the social context of their impementation, which 
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considerations would be factored in if a sociolegal approach is adopted to privatisation 
research.  The point has been made that:  
 
... developing nations, like those of Sub-Saharan Africa, need lawyers to 
draft legislation, contracts and business ventures which will enable 
developing nations to avoid the confusion and inefficiency that may 
hinder their first institutional steps to economic development.78 
 
In this regard, it has been noted that: 
 
If law is instrumental - if it is a means to an end - then law needs help in 
designing its means and evaluating its effects. Given this view, the 
collaboration between law and social science is both obvious and 
necessary ... law schools seek to train practitioners and conduct research 
that improves the law, while the emerging field of socio-legal studies 
seeks to understand law as it is embedded in the larger society.79 
 
It was considered that a black-letter methodological approach would not be effective in 
dealing with many of the issues sought to be addressed in this research given that this is 
not intended to be a doctrinal legal research narrowly focused on a strict positivist legal 
analysis of privatisation legal provisions and the legal issues, rights, obligations and 
disputes arising from privatisation contracts, to the exclusion of other issues that may 
not be considered relevant to a law-centred research.80 An abstract or technical analysis 
of privatisation rules and associated legal issues would be inadequate for examining the 
policy rationale for privatisation, the social context for its adoption and implementation 
in the country, the practical operation or implementation process of privatisation law 
and policy and regulatory rules by relevant government institutions and their actual 
impact on the citizens of the country.81 From a normative viewpoint, the research 
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considered that privatisation means more than just an abstract legal concept to the 
citizens of a country that are affected by its implementation and that their welfare 
should be the central focus of such implementation. As earlier noted, a large scale 
privatisation programme ‘is not merely the transfer of economic control from the state 
to private concerns but is fundamentally a political act with profound social, economic 
and cultural implications.’82  
 
Further butressing the need for a non-black letter methodological approach to this 
research is the observation that the way laws and regulations appear in statute books 
could differ from the way they are interpreted or implemented in practice.83 Lech 
Biegunski notes that:  
 
Public administration ... business people and legal advisers are decisive 
to proper law enforcement. ... Even a properly constructed and clear ... 
law that is supported by explanatory documents, and is properly 
disseminated publicly, can suffer because it is not enforced in practice. ... 
some legal solutions that were at an early stage, spontaneously or 
mechanically adopted from other systems, can be too far from the 
realities of an adopting country and not properly executed in practice84  
 
In the case of anti-corruption legislation which could be effective in checking 
privatisation-related corruption, the enactment of such a law may not achieve the 
intended result if the institutional machinery for its implementation is weak or corrupt.85 
Regarding competition provisions which are also vital to the realisation of privatisation 
dividends, it has been noted that: 
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... a strong competition policy contributes substantially to successful 
economic development.  But the mere enactment of competition laws is 
not sufficient to achieve the benefits of enhanced competition.86   
 
It has also been noted that ineffective enforcement of competition law may be reflective 
of poor adoption of the law and policy framework in the implementing countries and 
mismatch betwen the law and policy and the local realities in the countries, of which 
their social, legal and political peculiarities needs to be factored in.87 In the same vein, 
Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave note the need for a holistic view of regulatory systems 
beyond just the legal provisions.88 In the case of regulatory bodies that have been set up 
as a result of privatisation, where they are not accountable for the power they exercise, 
they may not necessary exercise regulatory discretion in the public interest and may be 
inefective in regulating the activities of privatised enterprises and addressing citizens’ 
grievances even if there are good regulations in the statute books.89 Commenting on 
China for instance, Elizabeth Spahn notes that: 
 
China has a “favorable regulatory regime,” meaning if you ... bribe the 
relevant Chinese officials, there is no regulatory regime actually 
enforced. Legal rules on paper are systemically and routinely ignored 
with a little red envelope stuffed with cash. ... erratic and selective 
enforcement of laws on paper increases opportunity and market value for 
bribe takers.’90 
 
Specifically regarding Africa, sometimes there are political undercurrents that could 
adversely affect the functioning of law implementing institutions. In this regard, it has 
been noted that:  
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Not only do the holders of state power seek to validate their hold on 
power by means of patrimonial legitimacy, but they also consider that 
their prime responsibility lies more with the redistribution of resources to 
their clients than with the common good. Accordingly, the workings of 
the formal political institutions are undermined by the informal logic of 
clientelism.91  
 
In the case of Nigeria, Oluwole Obayomi points out that ‘Nigeria has had good laws and 
policies, the implementation of which went in the opposite direction’92  
 
It is because of this possible divergence between law in books and law in action that the 
analytical framework of the thesis considers both the adequacy of the law and policy 
framework for privatisation and the effectiveness of the implementation process. 
Viewed from the socio-legal perspective, privatisation law and policy and regulatory 
provisions are only indicative but not conclusive regarding the likely effect of 
privatisation in a country. Also, statutory safeguard provisions, procedural measures and 
policy stipulations that should ensure the proper conduct of privatisation transactions, 
guarantee the observance of rule of law in the privatisation process, safeguard the public 
interest and ensure the legitimacy of the privatisation programme, may not be effective 
in practice owing to a number of reasons. A case study would be able to reveal these 
discrepancies between what is contained in policy documents, procedural guidelines and 
statute books on the one hand, and what actually goes on in practice on the other hand, 
and give insight into the current and future impact of privatisation in the country. 
Adequately addressing issues like the inability or ineffectiveness of regulators in 
implementing regulations or lack of proper accountability for the exercise of regulatory 
powers may involve examining relevant legal provisions, but also looking beyond them 
to examine the social, political and cultural context within which regulators operate in a 
country, which would aid the design of effective measures for addressing the problem 
and  ensuring that regulators remain accountable for the power they exercise.93  
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A socio-legal methodology, would be suitable for addressing the above issues because 
socio-legal research adopts an interdisciplinary approach that broadens the scope of 
legal research, making it possible to examine other perspectives to privatisation 
including the economic and social perspectives relevant to economic development.94 On 
account of this broader perspective, the research is able to go beyond a critique of 
privatisation and regulatory law in Nigeria to examine the policy arguments of 
privatisation and investigate privatisation law in action or in the context of 
implementation, in order to get a more complete picture of the nature of privatisation 
and the practical effects of its adoption and implementation. The contextual variable 
factors examined in the research, which could affect the outcome of privatisation in a 
country include various peculiarities regarding the country and its citizens, the 
effectiveness of the institutional framework for executing the privatisation programme 
and undertaking post-privatisation regulation, and the motivations and extent of 
accountability of various public officials, regulators and political leaders involved in 
implementing the laws and regulations.  
 
Due to the broader interdisciplinary approach utilised in this socio-legal research and 
the analytical standpoint of the dissertation, the scope and source of research materials 
consulted was wider than what would have been required for a strict legalistic analysis 
of privatisation done within the framework of black letter research.95 The materials 
consulted in the course of seeking answers to various questions resulting from the 
research include some statutes, academic commentaries from legal and other disciplines, 
various policy documents including official government documents and various reports 
issued by the IFIs as well as some articles authored by their staff. Given the fact that the 
Nigerian privatisation programme is still on-going, the research also made extensive use 
of contemporaneous news reports from various journalistic sources on various 
privatisation transactions and the general conduct of the programme. In this regard, it 
has been noted that the Nigerian media has played a key role in covering the 
implementation of the privatisation programme.96  There was also extensive use of 
                                                             
94 DR Harris, ‘The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the United Kingdom’ (1983) 3 Legal Stud 
315, 319; M Salter and J Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of 
Legal Research (Pearson Longman, Essex 2007) 133-138. 
 
95 M Salter and J Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research (Pearson Longman, Essex 2007) 129-130. 
 
96 E Anaeto, ‘Privatisation – What Role for the Media?’ in E Onyekpere (ed), Readings on Privatisation 
(Socio-Economic Rights Initiative, Lagos 2003) 111. 
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various electronic databases for sourcing relevant articles, and the internet also proved 
particularly useful in accessing the websites of various Nigerian newspapers, which 
made it possible to follow the progress of the privatisation programme and monitor the 
conduct of various transactions as reported by the news media.   
 
Given the qualitative nature of this research, it does not involves a detailed statistical 
sampling, presentation and analysis of privatisation transactions and some aspects of the 
research, including policy appraisal necessarily entail subjective value judgments 
hinged on the economic development perspective of the research.97 Selective references 
are made in the dissertation to reports on various transactions and the conduct of 
privatisation in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular in order to highlight or 
illustrate specific issues relevant to the research narrative.98 It is also vital in this regard 
to point out the fact that one key criticism of privatisation in general and African 
privatisation in particular is the paucity of detailed broad-based empirical data on the 
outcome of privatisation especially regarding its impact on the citizens of various 
implementing countries. As one writer notes:  
 
A major constraint faced in trying to address privatization issues in 
Africa is the lack of adequate data on the quantitative impact of 
privatization. Several studies have been conducted but most of these 
cover developing countries in general with little specific emphasis on 
Africa. ... There appears to be very little research in identifying the direct 
impact of privatization on poverty in Africa and this is a crucial gap that 
needs to be filled through further research.99 
  
On acount of this, the research involved the collection and analysis of a large body of 
work from different sources noted above, covering different aspects of privatisation’s 
adoption and implementation in Nigeria and Africa so as to gain a broad understanding 
of the outcome of privatisation in various countries and be able to give a reasonably 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
97 T Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edn Lawbook Co, Pyrmont 2006) 95: ‘Qualitative 
research methodologies acknowledge that there is not one overriding reality, but that reality is situational 
and personal, and may vary between individuals and between situations. The outcomes can often not be 
reduced to valid statistical pictures or be generalised. Thus, quantitative methods are often directed 
towards ‘number crunching and the outcomes are statistics, whereas qualitative methods rarely have exact 
outcomes that can be generalised to other situations, although they may make use of statistics.’  
 
98 T Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edn Lawbook Co, Pyrmont 2006) 102-103. 
 
99 F Pamacheche and B Koma, ‘Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa - An Essential Route to Poverty 
Alleviation’ (2007) 1(2) African Integration Review 1, 4. 
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accurate assessment of whether the economic development objective of privatisation has 
been or is likely to be realised in the country and continent respectively.   
 
 
1.3. DEFINING THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE DISSERTATION AND 
     QUALIFYING THE ARGUMENTS  
 
It is necessary, on account of the broad scope of the research to define its boundaries 
and delimit what the dissertation intends to accomplish so as to keep the research within 
manageable proportions and also avoid the danger of unchecked generalisation.100 In the 
first place, as earlier noted, the research views privatisation from an economic 
development perspective premised on its potential for facilitating certain key benefits 
colectively considered (i.e. privatisation’s benefit to the public sector, its benefit to the 
privatised enterprises, its contribution to overall private sector development, its benefit 
to the citizens and finally, its usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign investment 
inflow). Analysing privatisation from other other perspectives could lead to other 
conclusions and judgments beyond the scope of this thesis101, and indeed, some 
privatisation programmes have been subject to conflicting evaluations depending on 
what the evaluator considers important.102 Where one, for instance, focuses on a strict 
positivist legal analysis of privatisation law and the legal rights arising from 
privatisation contracts, or undertakes an economic analysis that is limited to assessing 
whether privatisation leads to greater efficiency and profitability in privatised 
enterprises, or focuses on public sector fiscal gains from privatisation, or assesses 
privatisation success solely based on a numerical count of the enterprises that were 
privatised within a given timeframe and the timeliness of completing various 
transactions, the respective conclusions are likely to differ.  
 
Secondly, the framework for analysing the economic development impact of 
privatisation does not cover every single aspect of economic development in a country, 
but focuses on only some of these so as to keep the research within manageable 
                                                             
100 T Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (2nd edn Lawbook Co, Pyrmont 2006) 95, 102-104. 
 
101 C Cramer, ‘Privatisation and Adjustment in Mozambique: A “Hospital Pass”?’ (2001) 27 J S Afr Stud 
79, 88.  
 
102 M Szeftel, ‘Globalisation & African Responses’ (2000) 27 Rev African Polit Economy 353, 354; J 
Craig, ‘Evaluating Privatisation in Zambia: A Tale of Two Processes’ (2000) 27 Rev African Polit 
Economy 357, 359. 
 
51 
 
proportions. For instance environmental issues often come up in discussions about 
sustainable economic development103, however, the chapters on Nigeria limit the 
discussion on environmental issues in the privatisation context to how such issues could 
increase the host community hostility risk in some parts of Nigeria and adversely impact 
on the national investment climate, as well as how they could trigger unforseen legal 
liabilities for a privatisation investor.104 In  the same vein, the critique of some of the 
provisions relating to privatisation and regulation in Nigeria focuses on those aspects 
deemed relevant from the economic development standpoint, rather than a detailed 
critique of the entire statutory provisions, which would detract from the focus of the 
thesis.  
 
Thirdly, it is also instructive to note that the research does not view privatisation as the 
only policy that facilitates economic development in a country. Indeed as has been 
noted, when states undertake privatisation, it is often part of a broader reform 
programme designed to enhance the way enterprises perform or the way services are 
delivered in the country.105 IFI funding packages for various countries usually include a 
number of other economic policy prescriptions and many states that implement 
privatisation may also implement a number of other related market reforms also aimed 
at facilitating economic development. Accordingly in some country contexts, it may be 
difficult to single out privatisation as the primary causal factor of economic 
development success or failure.106 The more manageable task undertaken in the thesis is 
to ascertain whether the adoption and implementation of privatisation has made a 
positive contribution to the attainment of economic development, or is likely to do so 
                                                             
103 JJ Sanders, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global Market’ (2000) 9 Currents 
Int’l Trade LJ 37, 40; JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role 
for Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 876, 890; SI Nchi, ‘The African Environment and 
Sustainable Development’ (1996) 1 JPPL 119, 119-129. 
 
104 GS Akpan, ‘The Failure of Environmental Governance and Implications for Foreign Investors and 
Host States - A Study of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’ [2006] IELTR 1, 8, 11; J Garbett, 
‘Contaminated Land - Liability for Historic Gas Contamination’ [2007] IELTR 122, 122-124.  
 
105 JJ Sanders, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global Market’ (2000) 9 Currents 
Int’l Trade LJ 37, 42; J Selvam, A Meenakshisundararajan and T Iyappan, ‘Privatisation and Capital 
Accumulation: Empirical Evidences from Ethiopia’ (2005) 12 AJEP 61, 82; K Bayliss, ‘Utility 
Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Water’ (2003) 41 J Mod Afr Stud 507, 509. 
 
106 C Cramer, ‘Privatisation and Adjustment in Mozambique: A “Hospital Pass”?’ (2001) 27 J S Afr Stud 
79, 81: ‘it is typically extremely hard to disentangle with any precision the effects of privatisation from 
the effects of general policy reform, specific circumstances, economic structure and external events. It 
follows that it is missing the point to isolate privatisation and to make sweeping claims for its success or 
failure as a discrete policy tool.’ 
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premised on its ability to yeild certain key benefits that have been attributed to it. The 
fact that privatisation could co-exist with other reform measures in a country buttresses 
the point earlier made about the need to recognise the practical limitations of 
privatisation law in itself and also factor in the contextual factors in the country of 
implementation that could affect its outcome positively or negatively.  
     
Fourthly, the analysis of privatisation in this research focuses primarily on for-profit 
provision, even though some authors include various forms of non-profit provision of 
goods and services in privatisation discussion. The research focus is partly because of 
the limits of space and also partly because policy documents of Nigeria as well as the 
IFIs place some emphasis on attracting privatisation investors by enhancing the 
prospects for reasonable investment earnings.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the critique of privatisation in this thesis should not be 
equated with querying whether privatisation is a useful reform measure or whether the 
private sector has a crucial role to play in actualising national economic development. 
However, in the same way some of the failings of state ownership in Africa and beyond 
have been extensively documented, it is important to identify some of the adoption and 
implementation issues that could undermine the effectiveness of privatisation in 
yeilding some of the key benefits attributed to it.   
 
 
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The work is divided into 6 chapters, of which this introduction constitutes the first 
chapter, the aim of which is to delineate the area of research and make it easier to follow 
the arguments advanced throughout the work. Chapter 2 examines the meaning of 
privatisation and the reasons why it has been adopted and implemented by various 
countries, including an examination of the key economic development benefits of 
privatisation. It ends by examining the prerequisites for effective privatisation outcome, 
which the analytical framework of the thesis as noted earlier, categorises into two, 
namely designing an effective policy and legal framework and secondly, ensuring 
proper implementation of privatisation. The intention of the analysis here is to flag up 
key issues and considerations in adopting and implementing privatisation, and the views 
of various scholars on these issues are explored, of which some of the views stem from 
perception of the outcome of privatisation in other jurisdictions. Examining these 
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prerequisites provides a platform for evaluating the adoption and implementation of 
privatisation in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. For clarity, the link between 
the key economic development benefits of privatisation noted for the purposes of this 
research and the 2 key prerequisites used in the analytical framework should be 
explained. Basically, in the dissertation, the two categories of pre-requisites are used to 
analyse the extent to which these benefits have been or are likely to be realised. The 
analysis however does not involve a separate examination of each benefit given that the 
issues involved are often interwoven and would not be easily amenable to 
compartmentalised analysis. For instance, where privatisation results in a private 
monopoly taking over from a public one, it would likely undermine the contribution of 
privatisation to overall private sector development and at the same time adversely affect 
privatisation’s benefit to the citizens especially where there is inadequate regulation. 
Thus within each sub-category of analysis, various issues that could affect the 
realisation of various benefits would be analysed of which the concluding chapter 
(Chapter 6) of the work wiill shed more light on how these issues have affected the 
realisation of the benefits.   
 
Chapter 3 situates privatisation in the African context and critically analyses the African 
privatisation agenda, again by reference to the 2 categories of prerequisites noted above. 
This is also the approach take in Chapters 4 and 5 dealing with the Nigerian 
privatisation programme and the Nigerian electricity reform programme respectively. 
As earlier noted, the critique of some aspects of the IFIs’ approach  in the adoption and 
implementation of privatisation in Africa and Nigeria was not undertaken in a separate 
chapter but rather formed part of the broader analysis undertaken in Chapters 3-5 in 
order to properly situate it in the specific contexts that gave rise to specific issues in the 
continent and country respectively.  
 
In Chapter 6, the various threads of analysis in the preceding chapters are pulled 
together and the key ideas that have been distilled from the implementation of 
privatisation in Nigeria and Africa will be explained. Suggestions are also made for 
future research.  
 
The term ‘public enterprise’ as used in this work is not limited to state industrial 
undertakings, but also includes public utilities/ infrastructural services. The term 
‘citizen’ as used in this work, except whether the context indicates otherwise, broadly 
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refers to the inhabitants of a country and not strictly those who are nationals of the 
country, sometimes other related terms like ‘consumers’ or ‘customers’ are also used. 
As earlier noted, the term ‘International Financial Institutions’ and the acronym ‘IFIs’ 
as used in this work, refer to both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), however, individual references to the World Bank or the IMF may also be used 
where appropriate. Privatisation is sometimes spelt as ‘privatization’, in the work owing 
to the American origin of some of the referred materials. The terms ‘electricity supply’ 
and ‘power supply’ are both used in this work and have the same meaning. Finally, the 
acronyms ‘NEPA’ and ‘PHCN’, which stand for the old and new names of the Nigerian 
public power utility respectively, are both used from time to time in Chapter 5 
depending on the context of the discussion.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
EXAMINING THE CASE FOR PRIVATISATION: ITS MEANING, 
OBJECTIVES AND PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This chapter examines the meaning of privatisation so as to explain how the term is 
used in this research given that the term is open to a number of different interpretations 
by different scholars. The quest to initiate legal reforms to pave way for privatisation is 
hinged on a number of key benefits expected to result from this, and given the economic 
development focus of the research, the chapter examines the key benefits that are 
collectively used in assessing the economic development impact of privatisation in this 
research. Following this, the chapter concludes by examining the prerequisites for 
effective privatisation outcome, of which the analytical framework of the dissertation is 
used to examine various issues that often arise in the privatisation context which could 
have impact on the realisation of the above benefits of privatisation legal reform, and 
which would be factored in analysing the outcome of privatisation in Africa generally 
and Nigeria specifically. .  
   
2.1. THE MEANING OF PRIVATISATION  
 
It has been noted that:   
 
The countries that have announced their intention of launching some 
kind of privatization program…allow for the possibility of private 
ownership of the means of production and for the operation of markets as 
an essential feature of the economy’s functioning.107  
 
 
The term, ‘privatisation’ is an omnibus word that is not often used in the same sense by 
different authorities and commentators on the subject and different classifications and 
categorisations of privatisation have been utilised by different authors.108 It is 
                                                             
107 R Vernon, ‘Introduction: The Promise and the Challenge’ in R Vernon (ed), The Promise of 
Privatization: A Challenge for US Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1988) 6. Also see J 
Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Norton and Company, New York 2003) 53.  
 
108 Note for instance the distinction drawn by Hans-Joachim Priess between material and formal 
privatisation. See H Priess, ‘Privatisations and the E.C. Public Procurement Rules’ [1998] PPLR 1, 1-2. 
Also see C Veljanovski, Selling the State: Privatisation in Britain (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 
1987) 1-2; LJ Lundqvist, ‘Privatization: Towards a Concept for Comparative Policy Analysis’ (1988) 8 
Jnl Publ Pol 1, 4-7, 10-12.    
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sometimes construed very narrowly to mean just the sale and legal transfer of the 
ownership of public enterprises to private entrepreneurs, and sometimes more broadly 
to include the legal transfer of just the control of public enterprises and services but not 
outright ownership. Jeswald Salacuse describes privatisation as the ‘... transfer of assets 
from the public sector to the private sector, from the domain of public ordering to that 
of private ordering’, which appears to fit more into the narrower view of the term.109 On 
the other hand, Paul Starr defines the term as ‘(1) Any shift of activities or functions 
from the state to the private sector; and more specifically, (2) any shift of the production 
of goods and services from public to private’110, which would fit more into the broader 
view of the term noted above. This is also the case with the definition by Stuart Butler 
who sees privatisation as ‘The shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the 
public sector to the private sector.’111  
 
 While the narrow perspective envisages a permanent transfer of full legal title via sale, 
the broader perspective could also include the dilution of the ownership structure of 
some enterprises by selling some stake to private investors or the general public, a 
temporary ceding of control through means such as management contracts, concessions, 
leases and other forms of partial privatisation, of which the government could still retain 
some ownership and/or control of the enterprise.112 Public procurement arrangements 
including public-private partnerships (PPPs) and private finance initiatives (PFIs) could 
also come within the broader perspective, of which the phrase ‘Private Sector 
                                                             
109 JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the 
Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 884. Also see N Boubakri, J Cosset and O Guedhami, ‘Privatisation 
in Developing Countries: Performance and Ownership Effects’ (2008) 26 Development Policy Review 
275, 275; FB Shu Acquaye, ‘Privatization as a Means of Corporate Governance; A Questionable Solution 
in Developing Countries: The Case of Cameroon’ (1998-1999) 7 Tilburg Foreign L Rev 119, 122. 
 
110 P Starr, ‘The Meaning of Privatisation’ (1988) 6(1) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 6, 14. 
 
111 S Butler, ‘Privatization for Public Purposes’ in WT Gormley Jr (ed), Privatization and its Alternatives 
(The University Of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin 1991) 17.  
 
112 K Reisman, ‘The World Bank And The IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation’ (1991-1992) 
60 Fordham L Rev S349, S357; J Adell, ‘Spain: Privatisation’ (1995) 6 ICCLR C107, 107-108; JMP 
Nelson, ‘Modernisation and Privatisation in Ecuador’ (1994) 5 ICCLR 289, 291; WD Stuber, 
‘Privatisation in Brazil’ (1991) 9 IBL 429, 430; Stroeter Trench and Veirano, ‘Brazilian Privatisation 
Plan’ (1991) 9 IBL 408, 409; H Priess, ‘Privatisations and the E.C. Public Procurement Rules’ [1998] 
PPLR 1, 2; KP Buschardt and WK Sievers, ‘Privatisation in Poland’ (1994) 5 ICCLR 128, 128-130; WG 
Frenkel, ‘New Developments in Russian Privatisation Law’ (1993) 4 ICCLR 28, 28; K Bayliss, ‘Utility 
Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Water’ (2003) 41 J Mod Afr Stud 507, 510; F 
Pamacheche and B Koma, ‘Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa - An Essential Route to Poverty 
Alleviation’ (2007) 1(2) African Integration Review 1. 
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Participation’ is sometimes utilised in describing these types of contractual 
arangements.113   
 
Further, while the narrow perspective of privatisation is sometimes limited to public 
enterprises that produce goods114, the broader perspective often includes enterprises that 
render services as seen in the definition by Paul Starr above.115 It should be noted 
however that this distinction betweeen the narrow and broader perspectives is by no 
means rigid because many scholars utilise definitions that cannot be adequately slotted 
into any of these pigeon holes.116 Nevertheless, the broader perspective is utilised in this 
research, of which the primary focus is not so much on the type of title granted to the 
private entrepreneur, but rather on the resultant effect of putting in place a policy and 
legal framework for privatisation in terms of whether it contributes to the attainment of 
economic development in the implementing country.  
 
It should be noted that some views of privatisation are so broad as to encompass 
deregulation/liberalisation as well as corporatisation and commercialisation of a public 
enterprise.117 For instance, Kay and Thompson regard privatisation as:  
 
A term, which is used to cover several distinct, and possibly alternative, 
means of changing the relationships between the government and the 
private sector. Among the most important of these are denationalisation 
(the sale of publicly owned assets), deregulation (the introduction of 
competition into statutory monopolies) and contracting out (the 
                                                             
113 M Freedland, ‘Public Law and Private Finance - Placing the Private Finance Initiative in a Public 
Frame’ [1998] PL 288, 289-290; P Badcoe, ‘Public Private Partnerships in Local Government: The Legal, 
Financial and Policy Framework’ [1999] PPLR 279, 279-280; J Auby, ‘Comparative Approaches to the 
Rise of Contract in the Public Sphere’ [2007] PL 40, 43; S Arrowsmith, ‘Deregulation of Utilities 
Procurement in the Changing Economy: Towards a Principled Approach?’ (1997) 18 ECLR 420, 421-
422; G Haley, ‘PFI Contractors: Some Emerging Principles’ (1999) 15 Const LJ 220, 220; K Bayliss, 
‘Utility Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Water’ (2003) 41 J Mod Afr Stud 507, 529.  
 
114 Note for instance J Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Norton and Company, New York 2003) 
53: ’Most countries would be better off with governments focusing on providing essential public services 
rather than running enterprises that would arguably perform better in the private sector, and so 
privatisation often makes sense.’ 
 
115 Also see GL Priest, ‘The Aims of Privatisation’ (1988) 6(1) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 1, 1: ‘Privatization 
refers to the shift from government provision of functions and services to provision by the private sector.’ 
 
116 Note for instance MR Freedland, ‘Government by Contract and Public Law’ [1994] PL 86, 87. 
 
117 RW Bauman ‘Foreword’ (2000) 63(4) Law & Contemp Probs 1, 2; C Graham and T Prosser, 
‘Privatising Nationalised Industries: Constitutional Issues and New Legal Techniques (1987)50 MLR 16, 
17: ‘... "privatisation" is in current usage a portmanteau term also covering the removal of restrictions on 
competition (liberalisation) ...’  
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franchising to private firms of the production of state financed goods and 
services).118  
 
 
In the same vein, Ralph Young notes that:  
 
... privatisation can also be understood in broader terms – as referring to 
a process by which the state's role within the economy is circumscribed 
while at the same time the scope for the operation of private capital is 
deliberately extended. Such a shift in the balance between the state and 
capital might be effected, for example, through the relaxation of state 
monopolies where these exist, through reducing the impact of 
governmental regulations upon the operation of the market economy, or 
through the requirement that public enterprises perform according to 
private sector criteria of efficiency and profitability.’119 
 
As used in this thesis however, the term privatisation is not extended to the above 
situations where the government merely liberalises or deregulates particular business or 
service sectors to allow private entrepreneurs to participate in them, but does not enter 
into contracts with them or transfer ownership or control of public enterprises or 
services to them. It also does not extend to situuations where the government merely 
commercialises the operations of a public enterprise, sometimes precedes by a change in 
its corporate structure, but still retains its full ownership and control. It should be noted 
however that sometimes the privatisation enabling law also contains express provisions 
for commercialisation of some enterprises either as the ultimate reform objective or as a 
prelude to eventual privatisation.120            
  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
118 JA Kay and DJ Thompson, ‘Privatisation: A Policy In Search of a Rationale’ in G Yarrow and P 
Jasinski (eds), Privatization: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, Vol IV (Routledge, London 
1996) 239. Also see R Vernon, ‘Introduction: The Promise And The Challenge’ in R Vernon (ed), The 
Promise of Privatization: A Challenge for US Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1988) 2; 
V Akpotaire, ‘The Legal Regime for Privatisation in Nigeria and the Crisis of Confidence’ (2004) 25 
BLR 200, 200; P Morgan, ‘The Privatization and the Welfare State: A Case of Back to the Future?’ in P 
Morgan (ed), Privatization and the Welfare State: Implications for Consumers and the Workforce 
(Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Hants 1995) 4. 
 
119 Note for instance RA Young, ‘Privatisation in Africa’ [1991] (51) Rev African Polit Economy 50, 50-
51.  
 
120 M Du Vall and J Barta, ‘Privatisation of State Enterprises in Poland’ (1991) 2 ICCLR 310, 311-312.  
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2.2. REASONS FOR EMBARKING ON PRIVATISATION: EXAMINATION OF  
       THE KEY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS OF  
       PRIVATISATION  
 
Privatisation law provides a legal basis for changing of the relationship between the 
state and the private sector, with the private sector assuming a greater role in the 
economic affairs of a country, of which some of the problems that have been associated 
with public ownership and control in some countries have been influencial in this 
shift.121  From the economic development perspective, the argument in favour of 
replacing legal framework for state ownership and control of some enterprises with a 
new legal framework for private ownership and control of the same enteprises is that 
privatisation would yeild a number of benefits that would facilitate economic 
development in the implementing country, while addressing some of the problems 
associated with state ownership and control. However Paul Craig notes the eclectic 
nature of the reasons for privatisation122, and these reasons which are wide ranging can 
be gleaned from different laws, policy documents, official documents of the IFIs and 
scholarly materials. To facilitate our analysis however, some key benefits were 
identified in Chapter 1 as having been attributed to privatisation including the benefit of 
privatisation to the public sector; secondly, its benefit to the privatised enterprises; 
thirdly, its contribution to overall private sector development; fourthly, its benefit to the 
citizens of the country; and finally, its usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign 
investment inflow. From the analytical standpoint of this research, if the implementation 
of privatisation law results in the actualisation of all of these benefits, it would be 
considered that the underlying policy objective of aiding economic development has 
been attained. While the laws and policy documents of some countries expressly note 
privatisation objectives that tally with these benefits123, in some other countries, the 
                                                             
121 Note for instance G Johnson, ‘Why Privatise?’ in JL Upper and GB Baldwin (eds), Public Enterprises: 
Restructuring and Privatization (International Law Institute, Washington DC 1995) 28-29; Kikeri S and 
Nellis J, ‘An Assessment of Privatization’ (2004) 19 World Bank Res Observer 87, 87. 
 
122 PP Craig, ‘Constitutions, Property and Regulation’ [1991] PL 538, 551-552:’ The reasons for this 
programme were eclectic, and included: the improvement of efficiency; the widening of share ownership; 
the reduction of governmental involvement in industry; the alleviation of the public sector borrowing 
requirement; and the encouragement of share ownership.’ Also see C Cramer, ‘Privatisation and 
Adjustment in Mozambique: A “Hospital Pass”?’ (2001) 27 J S Afr Stud 79, 82, 87: ‘Privatisation is 
often applied as a kind of 'omnibus policy' or panacea.' ... The policy is associated with a whole host of 
objectives, economic, political and social. ... Mozambique is a particularly good example of the multiple 
objectives associated with privatisation programmes.’ (footnote omitted).  
 
123 Note for instance Privatisation Act No 2 of 2005 (Kenya) s 18. 
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expected benefits of privatisation may not be fully set out from the beginning, but could 
be gleaned afterwards or in the course of implementing it.124  
 
2.2.1. BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
The argument here is that in many countries, the government is weighed down by too 
many tasks and privatisation will play a crucial role in reducing the government’s role 
in the economy and limiting the size and reach of the public sector, paving way for a 
smaller, leaner and more effective government that will be able to devote greater 
attention to deprived social sectors like education, health, housing, transportation, water, 
sanitation and rural infrastructure.125 In the new operational environment for privatised 
enterprises, direct public ownership and management would be replaced with regulatory 
oversight, especially for the utility/infrastructure enterprises.126 The fiscal gains that 
accrue from the privatisation programme will help in reducing the government’s budget 
deficits and provide it with much needed resources for use in addressing these social 
issues and also repaying its debts to various creditors, rather than continued reliance on 
increasing the general tax burden on the citizens.127 These fiscal gains would likely 
come from three key sources namely money saved from no longer investing in or 
                                                             
124 C Robinson, ‘Privatisation: Analysing the Beneftits’ in D Parker and D Sall (eds), International 
Handbook on Privatization (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2003) 51; C Veljanovski, Selling the State: 
Privatisation in Britain (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1987) 7-8.   . 
 
125 JJ Sanders, ‘The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global Market’ (2000) 9 Currents 
Int’l Trade LJ 37, 42; MM Shirley, ‘The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank 
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subsidising the public enterprises and paying the wages and pensions of the workers128; 
secondly, money saved through reduced public sector corruption owing to the fact that 
public enterprises that have been cesspits of corruption will now be under private 
ownership and/or control129; and thirdly, revenue realised from privatisation 
transactions130 and post-privatisation tax revenue that could accrue from the privatised 
enterprises.131  
 
2.2.2. BENEFIT TO THE ENTERPRISES 
 
The argument here is that privatisation would pave way for profit-driven private 
investors to takeover and significantly improve the performance of privatised 
enterprises. Under public ownership, public sector managers do not have necessary 
motivation to improve enterprise performance because any resulting cost savings or 
profits would go to the state while the managers would simply continue to earn their 
normal salaries.132 Further, they do not usually fear losing their jobs where the 
enterprises are sustaining growing losses, owing to the fact that public enterprises, 
unlike private ones, do not face the threat of corporate takeover133, and also the 
government would usually bail public enterprises out with budgetary allocations and 
subsidies of which the resulting moral hazard could make such managers to be even less 
cost conscious.134 The use of public enterprises to advance the personal and political 
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interests of political leaders in some countries has often undermined their efficient 
performance, and this political interference in their functioning has often led to the 
enterprises being used for corrupt wealth acquisition  and dispensing political favours 
such as giving jobs and contracts to political allies and other interest groups, and their 
products being sold to the general public at non-economic prices.135   
 
Privatisation would benefit the enterprises in a number of ways. It would galvanise 
private sector investments by competent local and foreign investors and irreversibly 
place the enterprises on the path of reform.136 Given the new ownership structure, 
improvements in enterprise performance would be more sustainable than was the case 
under public ownership when backsliding on such reforms could occur.137 Privatised 
enterprises would aim to be more cost conscious and efficient, given that they can no 
longer lean on the government for financial support, have fear of bankruptcy or takeover 
and rely on the capital market for funding.138 Owing to the fact that they own property 
rights in these enterprises and accordingly can retain the profits generated from their 
operations, privatisation investors would be motivated to make new capital investments 
in these enterprises including infrastructural investments, infuse new technology in 
them aimed at modernising their operations and ensure better billing and collection for 
utility/infrastructural services.139  
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Privatisation is expected to lead to improvement in enterprise management and given 
the need to attract customer patronage in a competitive product market, privatised 
enterprises would strive to improve product quality and deliver services more 
efficiently.140 Permanently changing the ownership structure of public enterprises would 
make reforms irreversible because the government would no longer be able to interfere 
in their operations as was the case prior to privatisation, which often had negative 
results.141 Freedom from bureaucratic control combined with the infusion of the profit 
incentive of private entrepreneurs into privatised enterprises would lead to the right-
pricing of privatized goods and services142, foster greater operational flexibility and 
innovativeness and play a key role in ensuring that the enterprises would now be 
subjected to the discipline of the market rather than the whims of politicians.143  
 
Depoliticising decision making in these enterprises would foster better corporate 
governance and pave way for economic forces to be the key influencing factor in 
corporate decisions144, and privatisation would also play a role in whittling down the 
power and influence of public sector labour unions.145  
 
These privatisation benefits would result in greater enterprise productivity, and would 
have positive impact on national economic growth and poverty reduction.   
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2.2.3. CONTRIBUTION TO OVERALL PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
The argument here is that privatisation is a key part of the package for achieving or 
enhancing a market-driven private sector-led economy with limited government 
interference. Implementing privatisation and consequently reducing the government’s 
role in the economy would send strong signals to private investors that the government 
is serious about pursuing market-oriented reforms and bringing them on board as 
economic development partners.146 Privatisation would be a strong catalyst for further 
developing the private sector147, deregulating the economy, strengthening and 
expanding the domestic capital markets148 and introducing competition to the economy 
in place of public sector monopoly.149 Its boost to the private sector would further 
position the sector to be the engine of economic growth in the country, with profit-
driven private firms increasingly playing a key role in job creation, provision of 
remuneration and pensions to workers and provision of various goods and services to 
the citizens.150   
 
 
2.2.4. BENEFIT TO THE CITIZENS 
 
The argument here, which follows the ones above, is that in the new economic terrain 
ushered in by privatisation, the citizens would increasingly become shareholders and 
employees of private companies as well as consumers of privately produced goods and 
services and their various economic expectations would be channelled more to the 
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private sector than the government.151 Profit-driven privatised enterprises that have 
become more efficient in a bid to stay competitive and increase their profit margins 
would be better positioned to provide goods and services of improved quality to these 
citizens thereby giving them greater value for money, extend essential public 
utilities/infrastructural services to as many people as possible, including vital 
infrastructural support to business undertakings in the country, and create qualitative 
employment opportunities, all of which would contribute to overall economic 
development.152 Sale of privatisation shares to the citizens, including workers would 
lead to the broadening of the ownership base of privatised enterprises and create popular 
capitalism in the country.153 As shareholders, the citizens would be able to exert some 
influence on managerial performance given that they could offload their shares and 
further reduce overall share value if market information regarding the firm reveals 
comparatively poor performance154  
 
As consumers, the citizens would be able to choose from among competing products 
owing to the product market competition ushered in by privatisation.155 In the case of 
privatised utility/infrastructural services, post-privatisation regulation aided by 
appropriate sanctions for breach and the challenge of operating in a competitive market  
would ensure that product prices would remain affordable and quality never 
compromised.156 As workers, the citizens would enjoy more employment oportunities, 
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improved working conditions in privatised enterprises, and and the opportunity to buy 
privatisation shares, while those that are retrenched as a result of privatisation would 
benefit from compensation packages (i.e. severance pay and other forms of income 
support) and job retraining programmes.157  
 
 
 
2.2.5. CONDUIT FOR BENEFICIAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT INFLOW  
 
From being initially hostile to foreign investments, many countries especially 
developing countries now see great merit in phasing out various legal control initially 
used to restrict such investments.158 In the privatisation context, the argument is that in a 
global economy where foreign investments play a key role in boosting national 
economies, privatisation offers a good opportunity to foreign investors that partake in 
privatisation transactions to bring much-needed resources to developing countries, 
sometimes under the framework of bilteral invesment treaties, which would greatly 
facilitate economic growth and economic development, boost the image of the recipient 
countries as investment destinations and help in integrating their national economies 
with the global economy.159 Such privatisation investors could attract new investment 
capital, technology and expertise to privatising countries.  
 
Finally, it should be reiterated that given the eclectic nature of the reasons for 
privatisation, all the above benefits may not neccesarily be seen in the privatisation 
programmes of all countries implementing privatisation and even where they are, the 
same emphasis may not be placed on all of them.  
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2.3. ANALYSIS OF THE PREREQUISITES FOR EFFECTIVE 
          PRIVATISATION   OUTCOME  
 
According to the IMF:  
 
Appropriately designed and regulated divestiture should improve 
efficiency, reduce burdens on the budget, eliminate political interference 
in decision-making, and provide incentives for more innovation and 
dynamism.160 (emphasis added) 
 
Having examined the various benefits that have come to be associated with 
privatisation, the next issue to consider is how they could be achieved because there are 
considerable caveats that could affect their realisation in any given country. The point 
was made in Chapter 1 that the privatisation process is is very important, and the 
prerequisites for effective privatisation outcome were identified, namely, designing an 
effective policy and legal framework  and ensuring proper implementation of 
privatisation. Essentially, to maximise the chances of realising the above economic 
development benefits of privatisation and minimise the gap between privatisation law 
and the economic development reality in an implementing country, careful attention 
must be paid to how privatisation is adopted and implemented in the country.161  
 
Accordingly, these prerequisites provide a viable framework for analysing various 
issues that could affect the outcome of privatisation in a country and create a gap 
between set objectives and outcomes if not adequately addressed, and the framework is 
also used in examining the views and arguments of various authorities on these issues. 
Subsequent chapters on Africa and Nigeria will analyse how these issues have 
manifested or been addressed in the continent and country respectively.  
 
It is important to note that in the same way privatisation has different meanings to 
different people, who also have different views regarding the benefits of privatisation, 
there would also be diferent views as to how to attain the ends of privatisation. 
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Accordingly, as noted in Chapter 1, the designation of some issues as prerequisites is 
necessarily subjective and some other scholars may view these issues differently.   
 
2.3.1. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK   
 
2.3.1.1. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OF PRIVATISATION 
 
The reason for embarking on privatisation often plays a key role in determining its 
eventual effectiveness. Essentially, what factors influenced the decision to jettison the 
policy of state ownership in favour of the policy of privatisation?162 If the aim of 
privatisation is to facilitate economic development in a country, it is important to 
ascertain whether the privatisation policy adequately reflects this policy objective and 
resolves its inherent conflicts. Commenting on privatisation, Douglas Wass notes that 
the key issues include: 
 
... whether the evidence and arguments for the policy ... were fully 
exposed to public examination, whether the objectives ... were clearly 
stated, whether alternative options for achieving those objectives were 
analysed and displayed, and whether the superiority of the policy ... over 
all alternatives was clearly brought out.163 
 
He further points out that some of the arguments advanced in favour of privatisation 
such as the attainment of greater efficiency, reduction of political interference and 
bureaucratic bottlenecks and the enhancement of market control of enterprises constitute 
a priori justification of privatisation that may not stand up to close scrutiny.164  In this 
regard, privatisation should not simply be viewed as a generic solution to public 
enterprises problems without full examination and understanding of these problems, and 
national policymakers should also critically appraise and have clear conviction about 
the appropriateness of the privatisation reform option for their respective countries and 
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clearly articulate the aims and objectives of the programme from the onset, which 
creates a benchmark for assessing whether or not the implementation of the programme 
has been successful.165 This buttresses the need for genuine reform ownership by a 
country seeking to implement key reforms like privatisation that has far reaching legal, 
economic, social, political and other implications for the implementing country.166 In 
deciding that privatisation is the most appropriate reform option, policymakers may 
well decide that certain public functions are not conducive to privatisation or private 
delivery and need to be undertaken by the government itself.167 Also, it is necessary to 
consider alternative policy options for achieving reform objectives regarding  particular 
enterprises.168 Alternative reform measures include corporatisation and operational 
autonomy for some enterprises169, setting operational and financial targets170, devising 
ways of compensating efficient managers and employees171, subjecting them to market 
discipline through deregulation of monopoly public sectors to pave way for competition 
from private entrepreneurs172, decentralising their operations173, and introducing 
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consumer oversight174 and legislative oversight.175 Regarding the potential effectiveness 
of other reform measures, the point has been made that in some countries, some public 
sector undertakings have performed as good if not better than private sector 
undertakings in the same industry.176 The good performance of some public utilities in 
some parts of Africa has also been noted.177 In the European Union energy sector, the 
focus has been on unbundling, achieving liberalisation and competition and enhancing 
consumer choice rather than privatisation, which is for individual countries to decide 
whether to pursue.178 Christopher Cramer points out that:   
 
Typically, the mainstream literature on privatisation assumes a stark 
contrast between the public and private sectors. Yet often - and most 
likely in varying degrees between countries and over time -the two 
'sectors' are affected by the same culture of interaction and decision 
making. ... In this context, it may be naive to expect that the key to 
unleashing production potential is simply cutting the 'umbilical cord' 
between the state and the private sector. ...179 
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Another key policy consideration is whether the privatisation policy, in the event of its 
adoption, factors in the peculiar needs and circumstances of the country, given that 
various countries have different economic, social, political, cultural or other 
peculairites, including different public enterprise or state ownership problems.180 
Different privatisation, competition and regulatory models have been adopted by 
different countries181, and there are also different corporate governance models.182 For 
this reason and also on account of the need for national ownership of the policy, 
excessive reliance on foreign advise and assistance in designing the policy and legal 
framework of the programme or designating specific enterprises for privatisation may 
give cause for concern given that such advice may not fully factor in local conditions in 
the implementing country or adequately reflect key public interest considerations in the 
programme.183 
 
 A further  issue that deserves consideration is the extent to which the privatisation 
policy of a country has broad-based local support in the country of implementation, 
which could affect its legitimacy and and long-term sustainability.184 Such support 
could depend on whether there is a mechanism for effective stakeholder consultation 
and participation in the decision-making process in the country right from the design 
stage of the policy, including representatives of various local business sectors, trade 
unions, community organisations and other civil society groups.185 This is a key part of 
the process of locally adapting privatisation to suit the peculiarities of an implementing 
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country and is important because major national reforms like privatisation often give 
rise to winners and losers, and from the economic development perspective, the 
economic gains that could result from it could be undermined where these dividends are 
not equitably distributed.186 Whereas private entrepreneurs may have a lot to gain from 
privatisation in terms of access to the future profit streams of various enterprises, the 
exercise could also impose huge adjustment costs on other stakeholders. Consultation 
and participation would provide avenues for understanding and reconciling the 
respective concerns of various stakeholders, and it may be unwise not to address such 
concerns while designing or implementing the programme given that it could pave way 
for avoidable crisis that could dampen the investment climate in the country.187 
According to Douglass Wass:  
 
... the process of open debate and discussion, of participation, would actually 
promote public acceptance of change and with it, change itself. Change that 
cannot survive public scrutiny is not worth having and is unlikely to endure. If 
reform and change are to last, then in a mature democracy the public must be 
convinced that they are desirable and rational. So at the end I rest my case on the 
test of the wider public good. It is after all the only test that can be applied to 
public reform.188  
 
Some of the suggestions that have been made for ensuring an adequately crated policy 
include  parliamentary deliberations on proposed policies, policy examination by 
officially recognised independent organisations with representative membership, and 
well publicised public hearings to hear the views of affected stakeholders, all of which 
could play key roles in identifying and addressing weaknesses in the policy and 
ensuring that the policy adequately reflects the underlying economic development 
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objective.189 However, even the best crafted policy could still be deviated from in 
practice of which a key consideration would be whether there could be an independent 
mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the policy, receiving feedback in this 
regard from various stakeholders and reporting on any observed deviations.190   
 
 
2.3.1.2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PRIVATISATION 
 
It has been noted that ‘privatization must in particular be accompanied by legal and 
regulatory reform.’191 It is necessary to consider whether the legal and regulatory 
framework put in place by the government is adequate to operationalise the policy, 
ensure that its objectives are met, safeguard against various implementation flaws that 
could impede the realisation of these objectives and define various rights, obligations 
and remedies relating to the privatisation programme. A defective legal and regulatory 
framework could compromise the long term sustainability of the privatisation 
programme, and the more stable it is, the lesser the need to provide extra guarantees to 
wary investors. Based on the suggestions that have been made on laws and regulations 
that are required in the privatisation context, two broad sets of laws and regulations 
appear necessary to provide a stable platform for implementation of the policy goals of 
privatisation.192 The first set is required to pave way for the privatisation programme 
and serves to legalise the privatisation process in order to protect investors, define the 
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proprietary or other investment  rights being granted to any privatisation investor and 
give legal backing to the institutions that will implement the policy.193 In enacting laws 
to pave way for the privatisation programme and define and protect investors rights, it 
should be noted that privatisation could have constitutional and administrative law 
implications.194  Part of the legal reform process would necessarily entail ensuring that 
there is no conflict between the privatisation enabling law and and other existing laws in 
the country including the constitution of the country195, because investors are usually 
wary about legal and regulatory uncertainties that could later lead to the nullification of 
various completed transactions premised on illegality or unconstitutionality. Equally of 
concern is whether the investor will face the risk of inconsistent laws at the federal and 
state or local government levels in a country that operates a federal system of 
government, for instance tax laws. 196  
 
Even where proprietary rights are well defined,  investors could remain wary where the 
privatisation law and other related laws do not contain sufficent safeguards to ensure a 
transparently implemented privatisation programme. Equally, such safeguard are vital 
for the government which seek to maintain the integrity of the privatisation process, 
maintain investor confidence and also maintain the citizens’ trust that privatisation is 
legitimate and in the public interest and . Safeguard measures include provisions for 
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proper valuation of the enterprises197, transparent accounting and management of 
privatisation proceeds198, public offering of shares on local and international capital 
markets where high standards of transparency and openness are maintained199, 
conducting privatisation auctions and public procurement using competitive bidding 
with safeguards measures aimed at preventing, detecting and punishing corruption, 
including collusion200 and stipulation of adequate criminal and civil penalties for 
corruption and disregard of procedural requirements for transparency.201   
 
The second set of laws and regulations would be those required to regulate the conduct 
of privatised companies in the market, ensure that the post-privatisation business 
environment is conducive to investment and productivity and also ensure that the policy 
objectives of the privatisation programme are still being met after the conclusion of the 
programme. Essentially, the privatisation enabling law and the successful conduct of 
privatisation transactions  may not be sufficient to resolve the problems of poorly 
performing public enterprises or deliver the economic development benefits of 
privatisation. Other supporting laws and regulations would also be required in a market 
economy to deliver the objectives of the privatisation programme and existing 
commercial/business laws may need to be reformed or strenghtened in the light of the 
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new business environment ushered in by privatisation. 202  In the light of problems that 
have often arisen in the privatisation context, a key consideration would be whether 
there are adequate laws for preventing poor corporate practices like insider trading, 
transfer pricing, price fixing, fraudulent accounting and tax evasion, preventing asset 
stripping of privatised enterprises, protecting minority shareholders and ultimately 
promoting investor confidence203 Administrative laws may need to be updated to reflect 
the shift of the state towards contracting and market regulation.204  
 
The twin issues of regulation and competition have considerable impact on the outcome 
of privatisation as an economic develoment tool and whether or not enterpries become 
more efficient after privatisation and lead to the actualisation of the privatisation’s states 
objectives will largely depend on how these issues are addressed, especially regarding 
utility/infrastructural enterprises.205 Thus regulatory and competition laws are 
complementary and are very crucial in the privatisation context and are mechanics for 
accountability in the post-privatisation era.206 Regarding regulation, it has been noted 
that: 
 
The functions of the regulatory framework include the harmonization of 
a number of different objectives concerning the profitability of the 
operator, the continuity and quality of the general interest services 
provided, compliance with commitments entered into, the 
implementation of the necessary infrastructure investment, the 
management of externalities and environmental concerns (pollution of 
                                                             
202 Note for instance C Tite, ‘Port Privatisation: Managing Change within the Right Legal Framework’ 
(1995) 6 ICCLR 166, 167; JW Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing 
Role for Law in the Third World’ (1999) 33 Int’l L 875, 887; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st 
Century? (World Bank, Washington DC 2000) 224.  
 
203  JC Coffee, Jr, ‘Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure’ 
(1999-2000) 25 J Corp L 1, 2-3, 33-38; B Black, R Kraakman and A Tarassova, ‘Russian Privatization 
and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? (1999-2000) 52 Stan L Rev 1731, 1752-1754. Also note 
the issue of providing for minority shareholders to have some say in the appointment of some members of 
the board of directors given that other investors with bigger stakes could edge then out of the running of 
the company. See J Laslett and M Franzosi, ‘Legal Aspects of Privatisation in Italy’ (1994) 5 ICCLR 425, 
427-428.    
 
204 MR Freedland, ‘Government by Contract and Public Law’ [1994] PL 86, 99-100. 
 
205 PP Craig, ‘Constitutions, Property and Regulation’ [1991] PL 538, 552.  
 
206 D Parker, ‘The Competition Act 1998: Change and Continuity in U.K. Competition Policy’ [2000] 
JBL 283, 283, 297-298; MB Hassan, ‘The Utilities Act 2000: Impact on the Electricity Industry’ [2000] 
IELTR 231; RJ Taylor, ‘UK Competition Law and Procedures - An Overview’ (1988) 9 ECLR 446, 451-
453.   
 
77 
 
water sources, over pumping of ground water, etc.) and the need for 
flexibility to allow adjustments to be made as and when required.207  
 
Given that privatisation could result in the government relinquishing its direct control 
over public enterprises208, regulation essentially operates to fill the void. Effectively 
harmonising the interests of investors and consumers and the different policy objectives 
of privatisation poses perhaps the greatest challenge to the realisation of the economic 
development objectives of privatisation. As noted above, privatisation often gives rise to 
winners and losers and the challenge facing the government is to be able to craft a 
regulatory policy and regulatory laws that ensure that privatisation is not a zero sum 
game in the implementing country. In this regard, both investors and consumers want 
adequate legal protection from uncertainty and arbitrariness, of which the principles of 
good regulation have been identified as ‘transparency, accountability, proportionality, 
consistency and targeting.’209  
 
On the one hand, investors need reasonable returns on investment otherwise they will 
not be inclined to invest and there is also concern about the extent and impact of 
regulatory burdens and associated compliance costs on privatised enterprises.210 A good 
legal and regulatory framework should clarify the rights and obligations of investors in 
the privatised service sectors, including investment obligations, which could have 
impact on their decision on whether to invest in the first place.  
 
On the other hand, consumers need good quality services that are efficiently delivered 
and for which the cost is affordable, of which the legal and regulatory framework 
should also assure them that privatisation is not something to be feared given that there 
is a mechanism for holding private investors accountable and ensuring that the 
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privatisation programme yields the expected economic development dividends for the 
country and its citizens.211 
 
Realising the economic development objectives of privatisation is hinged on 
implementing privatisation within a regulatory framework that recognises and addresses 
these challenges, keeping in mind the point noted in Chapter 1 that privatisation poses a 
challenge regarding how to accomplish its economic and social ends which are often in 
conflict. How possible is it to reconcile the competing interests of different stakeholders 
especially in a very poor country where a majority of the population may not be able to 
afford tariffs that barely cover the cost of service provision? Addressing this question 
underscores the need for factoring in the peculiar needs of the country and various 
public interest considerations in designing the laws, regulations and contractual 
arrangements that guide privatisation both generally and specifically relating to 
particular sectors212 Given the need for citizens of a country to have access to certain 
basic provisions if economic development is to have real meaning to them, it may be 
necessary to include enforceable social clauses or covenants in privatisation contracts to 
safeguard the public interest and ensure the continued provision of ‘certain services to 
less advantaged economic groups after the divestiture.’213 Some countries have also 
sought to define certain economic development imperatives of the state such as 
provision of social security, supply of basic utilitiy/infrastructural services and basic 
labour entitlements, as citizens’ rights and accord them constitutional protection, 
enabling citizens to have enforceable rights against the state.214 These rights could be 
utilised where the implementation of privatisation results in huge sections of the 
population being excluded from the supply of certain privately provided goods and 
services. However the bottomline remains that privatisation seeks to attract private 
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investors and as indicated above, where they are not sure of reasonable returns on their 
investments, they may decide not to invest, which may not be in the interest of the 
citizens given that the existing public provision may be very unsatisfactory. Equally, 
using the constitution or other laws to advance social policy may conflict with the  
privatisation law or contractual arrangements between the government and private 
investors.  It is also possible that the government, in seeking to constrain private 
investors, may be driven more by the politics of the day and the need to sustain political 
electablity rather than sound regulatory principles.215 
 
It bears pointing out however that although the preceding discussion is indicative of a 
government that is interested in advancing social welfare, this may not always be the 
case and the government’s interest may not always be perfectly aligned with the 
immediate needs of consumers, given that it could gain financially in terms of tax 
revenue where privatised enterprised post very high earnings and profits at the expense 
of lower charges or tariffs for consumers, and conflict of interests may also see 
government officals not acting in the public interest. Accordingly a key consideration is 
the extent to which regulatory laws provide for some measure of independence for 
sector regulators.216 This would be important for effectively and impartially reconciling 
the private economic interest of privatised enterprises with the need to safeguard the 
public interest, ensure that consumers get a fair deal, ensure that investors’ returns and 
management remuneration does not come at the expense of meeting performance 
standards and delivering value for money to consumers217 and ensure that other broader 
policy objectives of the government are met.  
 
Another key consideration in assessing the design of privatisation and regulatory laws is 
the issue of penalties for breach of contract or licence conditions and avenues for 
redress. In this regard, it would be prudent for the privatisation laws and regulations to 
clearly specify events and circumstances that could lead to contractual modification or 
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termination and clearly stipulate penalties and compensation for breach of clearly 
defined licence conditions and contractual obligations.218 For the government, this 
avoids unnecesary acrimony between it and the investor and could have a deterrent 
effect on potential breaches of regulatory provisions and licence conditions.219  For 
investors, this ensures regulatory certainty owing to the fact that they can adequately 
assess the regulatory risks in a particular country, and are also afforded some measure 
of protection against arbitrary government action especially where there is provision for 
independent review by way of an appeal process or judicial review of such regulatory 
decisions.220 For the consumers, this provides some assurance that their interests are 
safeguarded, that breaches of the law will not go unpunished and that the private 
investors will remain accountable.221 The reasonableness of financial penalities also 
deserves special consideration if it is intended that they should actually deter regulatory 
breaches given that regulated enterprises may consider it more cost effective from a 
business point of view to pay minor fines rather that comply with certain regulations.222 
The deterrent effect of penalties would also be enhanced where those affected by 
regulatory breaches can also claim compensation or sue for damages.223  
 
As earlier noted, regulatory and competition laws are complementary in the privatised 
sector, of which regulators are sometimes granted powers to promote competition in the 
provision of various utility/infrastrucutral services.224 Regarding competition, it has 
been noted that: 
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Successful competition policy ... has given developing countries and 
former state-controlled economies tools to prevent newly privatized 
firms from engaging in anticompetitive abuses that harm consumers and 
undermine innovation and economic growth. It has prevented substantial 
consumer injury due to harmful single firm conduct lacking in efficiency 
justifications. ... properly conceived and implemented competition law 
enforcement can bring significant benefits - enhanced efficiency, lower 
prices, greater product choice, more innovation, etc. - to developed and 
developing countries alike. ...225   
 
The task of reconciling the interests of various privatisation stakeholders is less 
daunting where competition complements regulation in a privatising country, 
particularly with regard to the utility/infrastructural service sectors, with regulatory 
bodies and competition authorities both working to protect consumers and ensure proper 
functioning of market competition.226  Private monopolies potentially close rather than 
open the market for particular products, do not have to respond to maket signals and 
tend to be inefficient, and often give rise to vested interests that have every incentive to 
subsquently frustrate further market expansion.227 They are also difficult to discipline, 
for instance, revocation of their licence where this is justifiable would mean the 
termination of the supply of a vital product or service for all the citizens/ consumers 
who rely on it given that there are no alternative suppliers in the market.228 The more 
competitive the market is, the lesser the need for price regulation and conversely, the 
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lesser the degree of competiton in the market, the more the need for such regulation.229 
This is because in a fully competitive market place, a privatised enterprise would need 
to be both productively and allocatively efficient in order to thrive and supply 
reasonably priced products and services of comparably good quality in order to attract 
and retain customers who have the choice of switching to alternative providers that offer 
better services or more competitive rates230 Effective competition is therefore an 
important corporate governance tool in the privatisation context, particularly where 
regulatory mechanisms have not yet matured, and helps to reduce the task of 
regulation.231 
 
 
2.3.2. ENSURING PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIVATISATION  
 
As earlier indicated, attaining the economic development policy objective of a 
privatisation programme and minimising its pitfalls or negative outcomes requires 
making sure that there is a clear nexus between the policy and legal framework of 
privatisation and its actual implementation in a country. As the saying goes, anything 
worth doing is worth doing well and the steps taken to implement privatisation are as 
important as the substantive legal provisions that authorise the programme. Four key 
questions were earlier noted in Chapter 1 as the reference points for analysing and 
accounting for potential implementation gaps namely, is the national environment 
conducive to embarking on privatisation and attracting private investments?; secondly, 
is the institutional framework for implementing and monitoring the outcome of 
privatisation robust?; thirdly, will the strategic approach to the implementation of 
privatisation lead to the realisation of set policy objectives?; and finally, is the 
privatisation process accountable, transparent and free from corruption? The essence of 
these issues will be discussed below.  
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2.3.2.1. IS THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO 
           EMBARKING ON PRIVATISATION AND ATTRACTING  
           PRIVATE INVESTMENTS? 
 
The key aim of privatisation is for private entrepreneurs to take over the ownership 
and/or control of public enterprises, however, the decision to make such long term 
direct investment in a country is not likely to be made in a vacuum, but would factor in 
various underlying problems or risks in the country that could affect successful 
participation in the privatisation programme or the profitability of such investments 
going forward.232 The fact that a country has enacted a foreign investment law, 
outlawed expropriation without adequate compensation, entered into bilateral and 
regional investment treaties with other countries, is willing to submit to international 
arbitration of investment disputes and is able to provide incentives like tax rebates may 
greatly improve its profile as an investment destination.233 However, the makeup of the 
national investment climate is much broader than laws and treaties can provide for and 
treaty commitments alone may still not persuade a reluctant investor to make a long 
term privatisation investment commiment, where the country for some other reasons, 
does not have comparative advantage over other competing investment destinations or 
still poses significant investment risks.234 For instance, it has been noted that  
 
Investors wishing to invest always look for a favourable trade and 
investment regimes, good infrastructure, property rights, economic and 
political stability and an educated and committed workforce.235 
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As noted in Chapter 1, various issues arising from the social, political and cultural 
context of implementation could qualify or limit the ability of privatisation legal 
reforms to facilitate economic development. The dissertation focuses on three of such 
issues namely socio-political concerns resulting from the implementation of 
privatisation, general socio-political instability in the country and pre-existing systemic 
problems affecting the private business sector in a country. This is merely illustrative 
and many countries are bound to have a host of other issues arising from the 
peculiarities of each country. The bottomline is that where these issues are not 
effectively addressed, they could dampen the national investment climate,  significantly 
drive up investment risk in the country and undermine the certainty and predictability 
that entrepreneurs often seek, which could affect participation in the privatisation 
programme especially in a competitive global economy where investors could choose 
other investment destinations. Ultimately, this could prevent the country from reaping 
the full economic development dividends of privatisation.  
 
On the issue of socio-political concerns resulting from the implementation of 
privatisation there are a host of issues stemming from the implementation of 
privatisation that could undermine investor confidence. For instance the point was 
earlier made about the need for adequate consultation of various stakeholders given that 
privatisation often gives rise to winners and losers.236 Where the implementation 
proceeds without adequate consultation and planning in advance for effacing or 
ameliorating the adjustment costs imposed on various stakeholders, the stakeholders 
that perceive that they have been given short shrift and not fully factored into the 
privatisation equation, including consumers or workers, could resort to riots, strikes, 
urban violence or general civil disobedience in order to register their displeasure, as has 
been witnessed in many countries.237 These protests frequently stem from privatisation-
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related job cuts without adequate provision for severance benefits or price hikes either 
before or after privatisation including the charges for basic utilities.238 As seen in the 
World Development Movement report, some governments resort to violent crackdown 
on protesters rather than initiating dialogue to peacefully address these grievances, of 
which a World Bank report states that:  
 
Leaders must have the means to implement change and to withstand 
opposition to reform ... the leadership must be able to withstand 
opposition to reform from potential losers, these may be SOE employees, 
especially when such groups are organized, numerous, and ready to 
engage in demonstrations, work stoppages in strategic industries, and 
other actions that might be costly to the government.239 
 
These issues could undermine the legitimacy and long-term sustainability of the entire 
privatisation programme and negatively impact on the investment climate in a country 
particularly where the government adopts a belligerent posture, and in the case of 
countries where there are pre-existing ethnic or other social divisions, any form of 
societal violence or unrest could be hijacked and utilised for venting pre-existing anger 
on perceived enemies.240 Some countries have sought to avoid clashes with various 
trade unions and rather devise ways of winning their support for the privatisation 
programme for instance making provisions for workers to be issued free or 
preferentially priced shares and requiring prospective investors to present a social plan 
that explains how they will deal with issues pertaining to workers’ employment and 
welfare, which would be factored into the investor’ selection process.241 Equally, some 
governnments have sought to win the support of the citizens through free or 
preferentially priced shares242, and where regulatory structures are already in place and 
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there is also adequate allocation of subsidies especially to key sectors that provide 
essential services coupled with a functional social security system, this could serve to 
reassure the citizens that private delivery of various goods and services is not a threat to 
their welfare. As shareholders, the citizens would also have the opportunity of earning 
dividends on their investments and also be able to have a voice in how the privatised 
companies are run.243  
 
Regarding general socio-political instability in the country, this could stem from a wide 
range of sources include very high levels of crime and random violence as well clashes 
by ethnic, religious or other groups in a country. On the issue of pre-existing systemic 
problems affecting the private business sector in a country. This includes issues like 
inadequate utility/infrastructural services and an unpredictable law and policy 
environment where taxes and regulations could suddenly change244 and bureaucratic 
bottlenecks and corruption that adversely affect the securing of vital approvals or 
authorisations from government departments.245 It is arguable that the more pervasive 
these problems are, the lesser the likelihood that the country will attract qualitative 
investors to the privatisation programme given that they drive up transaction costs and 
increase investment risk246, adversely impact on productivity and profitability and could 
possibly cripple a newly privatised enterprise from the onset. Such pre-existing 
problems may not only make a country less investment-friendly but could also severely 
undermine the capacity of privatisation to be a catalyst for private sector development, 
either by dissuading serious investors from coming into the country or subsequently 
frustrating their privatisation investments.   
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2.3.2.2. IS THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR  
          IMPLEMENTING AND MONITORING THE OUTCOME OF    
          PRIVATISATION ROBUST? 
 
According to Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock:    
 
... as far as legal reforms are concerned, developing countries should not 
focus exclusively on enacting or adopting appropriate substantive bodies 
of law or regulation designed to vindicate the particular conception of 
development that motivates them. Rather, the empirical evidence 
suggests that it is appropriate to emphasise reforms that enhance the 
quality of institutions charged with the responsibility for enacting laws 
and regulations, and institutions charged with the subsequent 
administration and/or enforcement of those laws or regulations.247 
 
Specifically, privatisation is quite institutionally demanding, given the need for a strong 
mechanism for implementing various laws and regulations enacted to pave the way for 
it.248 Key public institutions are required for implementing privatisation, undertaking 
post-privatisation monitoring or regulation and supervising the functioning of the 
market economy.249 John Nellis points out that:  
 
In an institutional vacuum, the chances are high that no one in or around 
a privatized firm (workers, managers, creditors, investment fund, 
shareholders, or civil servants managing the state’s residual share) will 
be interested in or capable of maintaining the long-run health of its 
assets.250 
  
Thus a key consideration in assessing whether privatisation law will facilitate economic 
deveopment is whether the implementing country has a robust institutional framework 
for undertaking privatisation and various privatisation-related tasks and ensuring that 
the policy objectives of the programme are met. These institutions compliment and 
implement the laws and regulations guiding the programme and essentially transform 
the privatisation policy from an abstract concept on the drawing board to actual reality 
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in the country.251 Given that these institutions are required to implement the 
privatisation policy, it is vital that institutional reform should precede policy reform in 
the privatisation context. Some of the institutions that are deemed vital include an 
administrative body that will actually implement the privatisation law252, statutory 
bodies that will implement various laws enacted for the supervision of the stock 
exchange and checking of corporate governance lapses253, a competition authority that 
will implement the competition law and supervise market competition and finally 
regulatory bodies for the different state sectors that will be ceded to the private sector, 
whose task it is to implement the regulatory laws that have been enacted.254 Even as the 
government aims to downsize the public sector as a result of privatisation, these public 
institutions are still deemed vital, given the importance of the tasks they are expected to 
undeertake. The extent to which they are adequately staffed and funded and attuned to 
the peculiarities of the social context in which they are expected to function will play a 
key role in determining their effectiveness.255    
 
Regarding the administrative body that will actually implement the privatisation 
programme, an inadequate administrative capacity could lead to botched transactions 
that undermine investor confidence, and excessive political interference in its 
functioning could adversely impact on its effectiveness. Although some sort of 
oversight may be required to keep it in check and ensure that the privatisation objectives 
are not being deviated from, this could also pave the way for the sort of political 
meddling that was identified as a key factor in the failure of many public enterprises in 
many countries. Although in some countries, the implementation of privatisation is not 
centralised under one department, such centralisation could be helpful as it could serve 
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as a time-saving one-stop shop for all potential investors and makes for greater clarity in 
the privatisation procedural requirements.  
 
The extent to which the institutional structure for monitoring corporte goverance 
especially in the capital market is robust, could determine whether corporate governance 
lapses are likely to florish in privatised enterprises including fraud and asset stripping 
after privatisation which not only defeats the economic development objective of 
privatisation but would inflict significant losses on minority shareholders and adversely 
impact on the secondary market for the shares of privatised enteprises.256 It has been 
noted that:  
 
Whether the capital market is able to attract foreign capital is to a large 
extent dependent on a number of matters rooted in ethical standards. 
Presenting a true and fair view, refraining from taking undue or unfair 
advantage, transparency, professionalism and the like are matters that go 
to determine whether there exists an enabling environment for a market 
that is internationally competitive.257 
 
As earlier noted however, national approaches to corporate governance regulation 
differ258, and a key issue to consider is the extent to which the specific corporate 
governance model chosen by a particular implementing country is suitable for its 
business environment. Although prospective investors may be concerned about 
regulatory compliance requirements that unduly consume business time and money, 
unduly scaling back such requirements could also dampen investor confidence, 
discourage small investors from investing and adversely affect capital market 
development.259 The government would need to strike the right balance based on the 
peculiarities of the national business environment.  
     
Regarding competition, a key issue is the extent to which competition authorities are 
actually effective in implementing competition policy and law, of which it has been 
noted that:  
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The widespread adoption of competition laws presents a series of 
challenges.  New agencies may not have the tools and resources to do 
their jobs.  Even if they do, the country's economic and legal 
infrastructure may be inadequate to enable sound implementation of 
competition law and policy.  The laws may not always be enforced in a 
manner that promotes efficiency and consumer welfare.  Different 
countries' laws may be construed in a conflicting manner, even as 
applied to a single transaction.  The sheer transaction costs of dealing 
with a multiplicity of regimes may seriously detract from or even 
outweigh the laws' purported benefits.260 
 
What is clear from the above is that laws alone are not enough to deliver the benefits of 
competition. Without an adequately staffed and funded competition authority that 
clearly understands the policy objectives of the privatisation programme and actually 
enforces competition provisions, the competition policy and law will fail to yield 
expected dividends.261 Where possible, they would need to monitor the privatisation 
process from the onset especially regarding state monopoly enterprises to ensure that 
key sectors do not end up under pervasive private monopolisitc or oligopolistic control 
due to the earlier noted problems associated with that.262 Obtaining vital market 
information needed for effectively regulating such enterprises and assessing their 
performance would be a challenge where this occurs.263 Competition authorities have a 
continuing role beyond the conclusion of privatisation, given the need to ensure that a 
level playing field always exists for current market participants and future market 
entrants, and also prevent market collusion and cartel behaviour, which vices could still 
thrive in competitive business sectors.   
                                                             
260 AF Abbott, ‘Competition Policy and its Convergence as Key Drivers of Economic Development’ 
(2008-2009) 28 Miss C L Rev 37, 42. 
 
261 I Dajkovic, ‘Competing to Reform: An Analysis of the New Competition Law in Albania’ (2004) 25 
ECLR 734, 735; L Biegunski, ‘Adoption of European Competition Law by Countries in Transition: 
Problems and Solutions’ (2007) 28 ECLR 501, 507.   
 
262 RD Anderson and WE Kovacic, ‘Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalisation: Essential 
Complements to Ensure Good Performance in Public Procurement Markets’ [2009] PPLR 67, 93-94; AF 
Abbott, ‘Competition Policy and its Convergence as Key Drivers of Economic Development’ (2008-
2009) 28 Miss C L Rev 37, 48-49. While the competition authority was legally authorised to oversee the 
implementation of privatisation in countries like Poland and Ukraine, discussion about the enactment of 
competition legislation in Argentina commenced several years after the commencement of the 
privatisation exercise when many firms already had substantial market power. See M Du Vall and J Barta, 
‘Privatisation of State Enterprises in Poland’ (1991) 2 ICCLR 310, 313; A Voroniuk, ‘Ukraine: Monetary 
Thresholds of Concentration: Creation of Competitive Environment during Privatisation’ (1995) 16 
ECLR R54, R54-R55; P De Rosso, ‘Argentina: Competition Law – Regulation’ (1997) 8 ICCLR C171.   
 
263 C Graham, ‘The Regulation of Privatised Enterprises’ [1991] PL 15, 15. 
 
91 
 
 
Regarding the privatised utility sectors, the need for effective regulatory bodies that 
would implement the regulatory laws should not be underestimated particularly those 
sectors that had been functioning as public monopolies.264 The sector regulatory bodies 
complement the competition authority265, and just like the latter, an important 
consideration is whether they are fully functional prior to rather than after privatisation 
to ensure that various obligations imposed on private utility providers under regulatory 
laws are enforced from the onset aimed at achieving both efficiency and equity.266 
Given the need for such full functionality and effectiveness, key issues to consider 
include whether sector regulatory bodies are properly staffed and whether they have the 
right incentive structures and safeguard measures to discourage corruption267, promote 
transparency and accountability and forestall regulatory capture, which could undermine 
regulatory legitimacy.268 Essentially, the interaction between regulators and regulated 
enterprises in the course of interpreting and implementing regulations could produce 
unintended negative results.269 Regulatory capture by vested interests could result in 
unnecessary regulatory forbearance or selective enforcement of regulatory 
requirements, which would undermine the attainment of privatisation objectives to the 
detriment of consumers.270 Given the possibility that these vices could occur, some 
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mechanism for post privatisation monitoring of regulatory bodies would appear vital.271 
Regulators are often political appointees rather than elected officials, and the regulatory 
laws as earlier noted often aim to grant them some level of independence given that they 
are not civil sevants stricto sensu. This creates a situation where, although they may be 
entrusted with considerable regulatory powers the exercise of which would considerably 
affect the outcome of privatisation,  they are neither directly accountable to the 
electorate nor under the direct control of the government.272 As much as possible, 
authority should be matched with responsibility and accountability and a monitoring 
mechanism could expose gaps between regulatory provisions and the actual functioning 
of regulators and could reveal that they are ineffective or have possibly been 
compromised. As noted by John Williamson ‘bad institutions can sabotage good 
policies.’273 Some suggested accountability mechanisms include legal provision for 
effective parliamentary oversight274 and requirement for transparency in the exercise of 
regulatory powers by publishing relevant information for the public to use in assessing 
their performance and the performance of regulated enterprises.275 Such disclose 
requirements could also apply to the regulated enterprises.276  
   
There are at least 3 other institutions that have been deemed important for effective 
privatisation outcomes and these are effective tax authorities, statutory consumer 
watchdogs, an independent and effective judiciary. In the case of the tax authorities, 
without a viable tax system to ensure the proper assessment and collection of taxes from 
privatised enterprises, it would be difficult to realise the post-privatisation tax revenue 
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that should accrue from the privatised enterprises, which is vital for addressing various 
social goals of the programme.277 In Russia for instance, despite concerns raised that 
privatisation would lead to the depletion of  revenue that accrued to the state from 
various enterprises278, the state nevertheless pressed on with the programme even 
though it did not yet have an efficient tax system for collecting taxes from privatised 
enterprises.279 According to Martin Weitzman:   
 
The inevitable inequality that arises as true capitalist development 
proceeds should be dealt with by …a broadly-based, well-designed, and 
well-administered progressive tax system, accompanied by a reasonable 
safety net program…It is important to have in place an operational 
reporting system for all forms of income, a good data base, good auditing 
system, competent and honest tax administrators ...280 
 
Further, the IMF notes that, 
 
Governments need to improve tax administration and enforcement in 
combination with steps to eliminate tax exemptions, resist pressures from 
special interest groups, and eliminate corrupt practices. By broadening 
the tax base, these steps should make it possible to raise revenue to 
support important expenditures, while lowering marginal tax rates.281 
 
Regarding the consumer watchdogs, they are part of the accountability devices in the 
privatised era, tasked with safeguarding the public interest by monitoring the 
performance of regulated enterprises, receiving complaints from the public and liaising 
with regulatory bodies and the government to ensure the effective discharge of assigned 
responsibilities by the enterprises and regulatory bodies.282 Such monitoring could be 
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vital for detecting post-privatisation malfeasance such as regulatory capture and 
corruption especially regarding utility/infrastructural services. Given that effective 
monitoring is hinged on access to information, a key consideration is whether 
privatisation and regulatory laws make provisions for statutory consumer organisations 
to have access to relevant information on the undertaking of regulatory functions and 
private operator’s attainment of performance standards and compliance with licence 
conditions, which information could be presented to the wider public.283 Audit and 
inspection requirements will also lead to greater access to vital information.284 Freedom 
of information laws and other similar transparency legislation including whistleblower 
protection legislation could also play a key role in ensuring that government decisions 
and decisionmaking process are scrutinised by the public and that the interaction 
between regulatory bodies and regulated enterprises is not strictly behind closed 
doors.285 Consumer bodies could also be empowered to directly pursue various channels 
of redress on behalf of consumers where the regulatory bodies fail to act.286 The 
existence of such consumer bodies may not displace the need for consumers to have 
direct acess to the courts given that these bodies could, for whatever reason also be 
ineffective in monitoring compliance and fail to intervene in deserving cases.287 This 
raises the issue of whether other public interest or non-governmental representative 
organisations could also be given legal authority to undertake some monitoring 
functions and pursue legal action on behalf of agreived persons.288  
 
Regarding the judiciary, courts may have a key role in providing an avenue for litigating 
various issues relating to the privatisation exercise or the subsequent functioning of 
privatized firms, including issues raised by minority shareholders, customers, 
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employees and investors. The extent to which the judical system in a country is robust 
enough to play such a role, thereby safeguarding the public interest and maintaining the 
integrity of the privatisation process, may need to be factored into an analysis of the 
outcome of privatisation legal reforms.289 In the first place, the confidence of the 
citizens as well as investors on judicial remedies and their view of courts as impartial 
arbiters of disputes may depend on whether the judicial system in a country is perceived 
to be independent290 and in some countries, judicial corruption could be a problem291 
Further, on the issue of regulation of privatized enterprises, there is no guarantee that 
the legal authority granted to private enterpreneurs to manage some enterprises or 
deliver some services wil always be used as intended or that relevant regulatory bodies 
will act in the public interest and hold them accountable or that regulatory decisions will 
always be in the public interest. Where regulatory bodies fail in the discharge their 
responsibilities to supervise privatised enterprises and the relevant political or 
administrative mechanisms of the state do not provide a remedy to aggreived persons, 
the judiciary could be the last bastion of hope.292 It has been noted that, ‘the 
requirements of legality, fairness and rationality in judicial review protect applicants 
from exercises of power that would be adverse to their interests--their security in the 
status quo, their status in society, their autonomy, dignity and respect.’293 However, it 
should be noted that in jurisdictions that allow for judicial review, there are some 
procedural hurdles that may need to be scaled before a litigant can get redress both 
generally as well as in the privatisation context and the range of available remedies may 
also be limited.294 Thus a key consideration in assessing judicial remedies is the extent 
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to which they are actually accessible, and whether there are other viable avenues for 
seeking judicial remedies in the light of the technical hurdles and limitations of judicial 
review, including statutory specification of specific circumstances that give rise to 
specific remedies or claim for damages295, or measures such as constitutional guarantees 
of certain basic rights and entitlements for the citizens, which can pursue 
independently.296  
 
Generally, the potential for judicial oversight in the public interest as well as entitlement 
to claim damages may help in making both the regulatory bodies and the regulated 
enterprises to be more accountable, committed to discharging their responsibilities and 
living up to their obligations.297 However, given the limited scope of judicial review, the 
discretionary nature of the remedy that could be obtained298 and the general stress and 
huge cost of pursuing legal action, it may be necessary for the state to establish 
administrative mechanisms to ensure that regulatory bodies and regulated enterprises 
remain accountable for the powers and responsibilities assigned to them under law and 
contract, thus reducing the need for aggrieved persons to seek judicial intervention.299 
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This of course is not an easy challenge since the government has to walk a thin line 
between respecting the continued independence of regulatory bodies and the contractual 
rights of privatized enterprises on the one hand and ensuring that they continue to 
remain accountable for the power they exercise on the other. To the extent that litigation 
may sometimes be inevitable, it is important to consider whether the state has a system 
for providing public financial support to individuals that have clearly meritorious 
cases.300 Apart from citizens or consumers that may need to seek judicial intervention as 
discussed above, investors may also need to resort to the courts where they are not 
satisfied by a measure adopted by a regulatory body which could adversely affect their 
operations or profits.301 Like consumers, they may also wish to utilize non-judicial 
avenues for redress in their dealings with regulatory bodies given the need to preserve 
their long term business relationship with regulators, which regulatory statutes could 
provide in addition to the judicial option.302  
 
 
2.3.2.3. WILL THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE  
          IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIVATISATION LEAD TO THE 
          REALISATION OF ITS SET POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
 
Carrying out a successful privatisation programme is by no means an easy task and a 
key step in realising the policy objectives of the programme requires the government to 
strategise well with regard to various transactions and maintain a bird’s eye view of the 
overall execution of the programme to ensure that implementation outcomes are in 
consonance with these objectives. Essentially even if privatisation legal reforms are 
flawless, adopting a poor startegy could still undermine the potential benefits that could 
be derived from these reforms. The research focus on 5 strategic issues that could affect 
privatisation outcomes namely the pace and sequencing of privatisation, the strategy for 
engaging foreign investors, the approach to socio-cultural issues in privatisation, 
weighing the cost of implementing privatisation against the expected benefits and 
finally, balancing the economic and social issues in privatisation in the interest of the 
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citizens. It is not however suggested that these are the only issues of strategic 
importance, but they have been addressed by many schloars concerned about the poor 
outcome of privatisation and other market reforms.  
 
First, proper pacing and sequencing has been recognised as an important component of 
policy and legal reforms including privatisation.303 Privatisation transactions are 
frequently complex and the failure of any transaction could have serious implications, 
especially transactions involving very large enterprises. It may be difficult to ensure 
transparency and wide diffusion of privatisation benefits and avoid costly and 
sometimes irreversible mistakes where the government fails to proceed with caution and 
carefully and gradually execute the privatisation programme.304 For instance, in the case 
of the Russian privatisation programme which was executed under the guidance of the 
IFIs, speedy implementation, arbitrary target setting and poor sequencing left 
insufficient time for proper institution building and the resulting negative outcomes that 
have been noted include undervaluation of assets, massive corruption, oppression of 
minority shareholders, asset stripping after privatisation and citizens’ impoverishment 
in the immediate aftermath of the exercise, which undermined the legitimacy of the 
programme.305 It should be noted however that some have expressed the view that 
unduly slowing down the privatisation process could also be a disincentive to investors 
and may reduce earnings from privatisation sales, and that speed may also sometimes be 
politically expedient depending on the peculiarities of national politics in a particular 
country.306 Accordingly, different countries may need longer or shorter periods of time 
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to adequately prepare for and undertake the privatisation of public enterprises and 
different enterprises may also require longer or shorter privatisation timeframes 
depending on their size  and other differentiating factors. Institutional capabilities may 
also differ amongst different countries. A developed country for instance may be better 
positioned to speedily implement privatisation than a developing country307  
 
Sequencing is very important where other economic development reform measures like 
regulatory reform, taxation reform, competition reform and trade liberalization are also 
being implemented, so that they can all complement each other and collectively 
promote economic development. For instance, where import liberalisation is not 
carefully sequenced and paced, it could pose serious problems to private and privatised 
enterprises that produce goods that are also imported into a country.308 While imported 
goods could introduce competitive discipline in product markets309, they could also 
drive locally produced goods out of the market and trigger the loss of local 
manufacturing jobs where newly privatised companies are not yet on sound footing to 
compete for market share owing to various operational challenges. In the case of 
competition and regulatory reform, where the relevant institutions are not set up prior to 
privatisation key economic development benefits for the citizens could be 
jeopardised.310 Such improper sequencing may make it more difficult to discipline or 
dislodge private monopolies, which, in a bid to protect their vested interests, would be 
opposed to both competition and regulation and may employ various tactics to frustrate 
both measures and keep off potential market participants.311 The stock market and 
market regulatory institutions need sufficient time to mature in order to be effective in 
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discharging their responsibilities and the recruitment and/or training of competent 
regulators for the daunting task of regulating key industrial sectors could take a lot of 
time.312 A key consideration would be whether it would be prudent for a country that 
intends to embark on privatisation, and has already undertaken relevant legal reforms as 
a result, to halt the implementation even if temporarily in order to avoid or rectify 
sequencing problems. For instance where market conditions are not favourable or the 
stock market is not yet deep or developed enough to accommodate the privatisation 
stocks that will be sold, the government may need to exercise patience to avoid selling 
public enterprises at massive discounts.313 Speedy privatisation in a weak institutional 
environment could put off qualitative investors given that procedural safeguards aimed 
at boosting investor confidence may be ignored in the rush to complete the 
programme.314 Sufficient time should also be given for the completion of all relevant 
pre-privatisation consultations with various stakeholders and resolution of their 
concerns, including the setting up of adequate social safety nets and it would be 
inadvisable for the government to short circuit the consultation process or make 
insufficient arrangements for social safety nets in its haste to complete the programme.  
 
Secondly, regarding the strategy for engaging foreign investors, as earlier noted, part of 
the logic of privatisation is that it is an avenue for attracting foreign investors that will 
bring new investment capital, technology and expertise to privatising countries.315 
Accordingly, many privatisation laws permit the participation of both local and foreign 
investors.316 Achieving these ends and deriving optimum benefits from foreign 
investments depends however on constructive engagement of foreign investors given 
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that the relationship is meant to be a symbiotic one in which these investors are also 
seeking to make as much profit as possible. It has been noted that:  
 
Foreign investment can perform a number of different functions in a 
national economy, and its functions will be determined largely by the 
context in which it operates: these functions will not be the same in a 
developed country as in an underdeveloped country.317  
 
It has also been noted that:  
 
... in the “third world” and developing countries ... multinational 
corporations have been traditionally welcome, through the passing of 
legislation that has benefited their entrance by mechanisms such as tax 
reductions. ...In addition, these countries often have poor national legal 
standards in terms of labour, environmental and social legislation ....318 
(footnotes omitted) 
 
Before handing over any enterprise to any investor, including foreign investors, it would 
appear prudent to establish criteria for assessing whether the potential investor 
possesses the technical, managerial and financial resources that the country is seeking 
and whether its business plan is in consonance with the wider social objectives of the 
privatisation programme, rather than focusing solely on who offers the highest bid 
unless the state is primarily interested in immediate revenue.319 and citizens’ welfare. 
Regarding water concessions for instance, it has been noted that: 
 
A concession contract will often contain minimum investment 
obligations, relating to the proportion of the population covered, the 
number of network connections, the types of connections that are to be 
made, as well as the geographic coverage of the network. ...320 (footnote 
omitted) 
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 Another relevant point is that if privatisation is to lead to the realisation of the objective 
of broad-based private sector development, it would be important to consider whether 
foreign investors may have unfair advantage over local investors operating in the same 
business sector or product market, sometimes aided by incentives and other special 
measures. This could crowd out local firms, with potentially adverse impact on net 
employment of which it has been noted that the employment creating potential of 
foreign investment is tied primarily to greenfield investments rather than acquisition of 
existing enterprises.321 In this regard, a key consideration would be whether it is 
necessay to introduce special safeguard measures for local investors' participation in 
privatisation.322 These were some of the concerns that earlier informed the 
indigenisation of enterprises in some developing countries323, and could could easily 
ignite nationalistic passions.324 How a country addressed this issue will largely depend 
on the extent to which the country requires foreign investment as a vital component of 
economic growth and development, and the extent of development of the indigenous 
private sector. For instance, in Brazil, domestic investors were accorded special 
constitutional protection, while foreign investments were initially restricted.325 Some 
European countries that have undertaken privatisation introduced measures such as 
golden or special shares as a devise for exercising control in the national interest over 
investment in designated privatised enterprises, particularly by foreigners.326 In many of 
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the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, initial retricitions placed on 
foreign investment were relaxed over time.327 Some other countries have also adopted 
restrictive measures for enterprises and sectors they considered strategic in the national 
interest328, while some did not place such restriction on foreign capital.329 Again, while 
some countries have successfully used special incentives like tax breaks to attract 
foreign investmests to their privatisation programmes330, some opted not to do so.331 
Whether or not various developing countries implementing privatisation need to 
adoption measures like golden shares should require careful reflection and conviction 
about the utility of such measures, also keeping in mind the issues of whether shielding 
local companies from external competition could promote national inefficiency and 
whether golden share devices could create fear in prospective investors about 
governemnt intervention in their investments. Also, granting of tax and other special 
incentives should require careful consideration of whether the quid pro quo is consistent 
with the policy goals of privatisation  and for how long such measures that could 
potentially distort competition will be deployed.332       
 
Regarding the third strategic issue of approach to socio-cultural issues in privatisation, 
issues pertaining to culture and ethnicity could affect the outcome of development 
efforts in a state333, and implementing a privatisation programme in a multicultural 
country requires the exercise of caution, especially where the country has a history of 
conflicts based on ethnicity, religion or other cultural issues and citizens regard 
themselves with a lot of suspicion.334 It has been noted that ‘deep-seated differences and 
                                                             
327 M Davies, ‘Foreign Investment Trends in Central and Eastern Europe’ (1992) 7 JIBL 163, 163-164.  
 
328 Stroeter Trench and Veirano, ‘Brazilian Privatisation Plan’ (1991) 9 IBL 408, 409; WD Stuber, 
‘Privatisation in Brazil’ (1991) 9 IBL 429, 431.   
 
329 JMP Nelson, ‘Modernisation and Privatisation in Ecuador’ (1994) 5 ICCLR 289, 291.  
 
330 G Gluck, ‘Privatisation: the Hungarian example’ (1993) 4 ICCLR 286, 286.  
 
331 JMP Nelson, ‘Modernisation and Privatisation in Ecuador’ (1994) 5 ICCLR 289, 292.  
 
332 M Davies, ‘Foreign Investment Trends in Central and Eastern Europe’ (1992) 7 JIBL 163, 163-164, 
166.  
 
333 RC Blake, ‘The World Bank’s Draft Comprehensive Development Framework and the Micro-
Paradigm of Law and Development’ (2000) 3 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 158, 166. 
 
334 G Gluck, ‘Privatisation: the Hungarian example’ (1993) 4 ICCLR 286, 286: ‘... foreigners perceived 
Hungary as having ... a homogeneous population relatively free of the ethnic tensions which prevailed in 
the region.’ 
 
104 
 
mutual suspicions among groups can ... delay reform.’335 Further, Amy Chuah notes that 
the omission of ethnic considerations in current attempts to actualise economic 
development through legal reforms like privatisation, which was also a key flaw in the 
earlier ‘Law and Development’ movement, could pave way for sociopolitical crisis that 
could undermine the entire reform agenda going forward.336 Thus a key consideration in 
assessing whether privatisation legal reform will be sustainable in the long run is 
whether it is culturally sensitive and whether the government has taken steps to obtain 
the political support of key demographic groups in the country, some of whom may  
feel alienated or feel that privatisation is being implemented to economically empower 
some favoured groups by transferring national assets to them. If these groups perceive 
the privatisation programme to be illegitimate, this may trigger a socio-political 
crisis.337 As Martin Weitzman observes, privatisation should meet the equitability 
requirement in order to be considered fair.338 The government may need to make special 
provisions for economically disadvantaged or marginalized groups in the country to be 
able to fully partake in the divestiture process.   
 
The fourth strategic issue is the issue of weighing the cost of implementing privatisation 
against its expected benefits. Given that the privatisation programme is aimed at 
yielding some economic benefits for the government, which could be used for 
addressing various social problems facing the citizens, it is imperative that the 
government should undertaking proper cost-benefit analysis both before and during the 
programme to ensure that the financial cost of executing it, including transaction costs 
for various deals, severance payments to workers and the cost of setting up adequate 
regulatory structures does not far outweigh the economic benefits to be derived from 
it.339 Specifically on the issue of conducting a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) prior 
to embarking on a major legal and regulatory reform, it has been noted that: 
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Sometimes, the vast size of transition costs may call into question the 
value of an entire reform. ... It is thus the possibility of transition costs 
associated with a legal reform that usually informs the desirability of 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed legislation that 
provides a framework for the reform. ...economic analysis, as an initial 
step to regulatory decision, is crucial for at least two reasons. ... First, 
'since regulation uses a sizeable amount of resources, it is reasonable to 
ask whether the benefits of regulation are worth the costs'. ... Secondly, 
'efficiency of the regulatory evaluation process itself is a key determinant 
of whether policy makers implement efficient regulations'. ... Principally, 
the focus of a RIA is to determine the possible costs of compliance with 
a regulation in relation to its benefits, to see what adjustments are needed 
to reduce the costs, and to consider alternative arrangements in case a 
regulation in its proposed form is determined to be too costly’340 
(footnotes omitted) 
  
In contracting with private entrepreneurs for the provision of public services, a vital 
consideration is whether there is proper risk allocation premised on which the earnings 
of private contractors are commensurate with their exposure to risk and ability to deliver 
greater efficiency.341 Sometimes there is a mismatch of risk and profits in privatisation 
contracts for a number of reasons including conflicting government policy objectives in 
promoting privatisation as a better alternative to public provision on the one hand and 
simultaneously highlighting and safeguarding against its financial pitfalls on the 
other.342 Also, primary or exclusive reliance on costly budget-draining incentives, 
subsidies and guarantees to attract investors could seriously drain government coffers, 
of which it appears prudent for a country to focus more on resolve underlying problems 
plaguing the business sector in the country and strive to ensure a stable investment 
cimate, which would be a more sustainable way of attracting investors.343  
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The final strategic consideration is the issue of balancing the economic and social issues 
in privatisation in the interest of the citizens, not just in the laws as earlier indicated by 
also in the actual implementation of privatisation,344 Viewing privatisation from the 
economic development perspective as done in this thesis, even as the government 
strives to achieve better enterprise management and efficiency by enacting laws that 
pave way for the ownership or control of public enterprises to be transfered to private 
entrepreneurs, this should not be viewed as an end in itself but rather as a means of 
actualising the full spectrum of the economic development ends of privatisation which 
would include facilitating job creation, actualising the widespread availability of 
affordable utility/infrastructural services and ultimately achieving poverty 
reduction/eradication, as noted in Chapter 1. Also as previously indicated, this would 
mean always seeking to strike an appropriate balance between the efficiency and equity 
goals of the programme, failing which the legitimacy of the programme could be called 
into question by the citizens. The citizens comprise a range of different stakeholder 
groups of which the thesis focuses on consumers and workers. Regarding consumers, 
strategic considerations in privatisation that could affect their welfare include whether 
enterprises are privatised as monoplies and whether adequate subsidies will be deployed 
to make certain basic utility/infrastructural services available to those that cannot meet 
the new commercial rates charged by private providers. On the issue of monopolies, 
privatisation laws have sometimes provided the legal framework for monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market conditions as was the case for instance with some of the utility 
enterprises in the United Kingdom (i.e. the telecommunications, gas, water and 
electricity sectors)345, despite the earlier noted benefits that could come from market 
competition. This is also the case with privatisation contractual agreements that provide 
for monopoly exclusivity periods346, which could adverse impact on network expansion, 
unduly limit the full benefits of privatisation for the citizens and also create the risk of 
legal action against the government for damages/compensation for contractual breach 
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where it later seeks to introduce competition in the interest of the citizens. A key 
consideration would be whether regulatory bodies together with the competition 
authorities are able to effectively prevent the abuse of such substantial market powers 
by private entrepreneurs, and strive to actualise full market competition as soon as 
possible given that regulation does not replace the need for competition.347 Ineffective 
regulation under such circumstances could adversely impact on the projected efficiency 
gains of privatisation as well as consumers’ welfare.348 But even before getting to the 
point of regulation, there are some strategies that could provide a semblance of 
competition even with monopoly provision, such as competitive bidding by private 
entrepreneurs prior to obtaining a franchise to render monopoly services349 and regional 
decentralisation of utility services to create benchmark competition350 
 
Preventing market abuse in the face of very limited consumer choice may entail 
imposing various licence conditions on private operators, undertaking price regulation 
that effectively limits private profits in the interest of consumers who would be 
protected from excessive rates as a result, and utilising relevant powers to investigate 
anti-competitive conduct and promote competition.351 Equally important is the ability of 
regulators to monitor service quality, aimed at protecting consumers that do not yet 
have effective choice of alternative suppliers owing to the fact that privatised firms may 
seek to reduce service quality as a way of making up for reduced charges and associated 
profits stemming from price regulation. Some countries have also sought to protect 
consumers by codifying certain obligations of privatised enterprises towards them and 
making provisions for consumers to be able to sue on these obligations or claim 
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compensation in the event of a breach given that regulatory bodies may not always 
function as effectively as designed due to whole host of reasons.352 Similarly as earlier 
noted, some countries have made provisions for constitutional protection of certain 
basic rights of the citizens, although what may be more important is whether these 
consitutional protections actually aid consumers in practice.353 
 
Another consumer protection strategy as noted earlier, is the deployment of adequate 
subsidies to make certain basic utility/infrastructural services available to those that 
cannot afford new commercial rates charged by private providers, who would face lack 
of connection to these services or disconnection if already connected, of which 
countries with huge population of poor and indigent people could witness massive 
exclusion of such people from basic services, further entrenching inequality if adequate 
measures are not taken. There are different forms of such subsidies of which the direct 
recipients could be the consumers themselves or the private service provider.354 
Regulations may also be required to regulate the issue of disconnection for non-
payment.355 
 
Workers constitute the second group of citizens stakeholders discussed in the thesis. 
Privatisation often triggers concerns about job security, the adequacy of remuneration 
paid by privatised enterprises, and the existence or adequacy of severance packages for 
those laid off.356 Privatisation contractual stipulations could be used as tools for 
advancing key aspects of the social development objectives that informed the 
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programme, including mimimum wage requirements for contract staff.357 In the United 
Kingdom for instance, privatisation (PPP/PFI) contractors may be legally required to 
retain the employment and employment terms of existing workers that used to perform 
the privatised function.358 In Poland, prospective privatisation investors were required to 
present a social plan to the government which was aimed at safeguarding the interests of 
employees of various enterprises, and covers issues like ‘employment levels, pay scale, 
financing of preferential shares for employees.’359, and the plan formed part of the 
consideration for short-listing investors.  
 
2.3.2.4. IS THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS ACCOUNTABLE,     
           TRANSPARENT AND FREE FROM CORRUPTION? 
 
The political will to enact and implement sound economic policy measures has been 
identified as a key factor in successful economic development360, and this includes the 
political will to curb corruption, which is tied to the broader issues of quality of 
governance in a country and the accountability of the institutions of governance.361 
Corruption could adversely affect economic development and has defied many attempts 
to curb it through national laws and international conventions362, of which it has been 
noted that the problem of widespread corruption ‘is not for lack of law on paper.’363 
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Such laws and regulations could be ‘deliberately ignored, set aside or by-passed to 
facilitate corrupt practices.’364 
 
Privatisation has often been presented as one of the key reforms that will help in 
reducing corruption in a country365, but it has also been associated with corruption 
itself366, thus a vital consideration in the implementation of privatisation is whether it 
could undermine economic development to the extent that corruption affects its 
implementation. Although some have opined that corruption could be economically 
beneficial to both investors and the countries where they invest, viewed from a broader 
perspective, systemic corruption of public officials by investors, which creates room for 
regulatory lapses could undermine the quality of goods and services produced by 
investors, and adversely impact on the welfare of the citizens including workers.367 The 
prevalence of corruption could also disuade foreign investors from investing in a 
country as it may make difficult to accurately assess investment risk.368 
 
Even the best crafted privatisation policy and law may still fail to yield expected 
economic development dividends where the political leaders do not have the political 
will to curb corruption and cronyism or have vested interest in encouraging such 
practices. This could have implications for the effectiveness of regulatory bodies set up 
to undertake post-privatisation regulation, giving that regulation have sometimes been 
associated with corruption.369 Public officers are sometimes faced with ethics issues in 
the discharge of their public duties, and where effective mechanisms are not in place for 
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holding them accountable and safeguarding the interest of the public, the projected 
benefits of privatisation may ultimately not be realised.370 Julia Black has emphasized:  
 
… the need for regulation to be responsive not just to wider interests in 
its formation and to the regulated in its operation, but to the claims of 
society as a whole in the integrity of its function.371  
 
Key considerations in assessing the effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms 
regarding privatisation include the nature of punishment stipulated for privatisation-
related corrruption372, the extent to which the institutions for preventing, investigating 
and punishing corruption in a country such as anti-corruption bodies and the courts 
discharge their responsibilities in practice373, and whether investors who feel adversely 
affected by privatisation-related corruption have any mechanism for challenging non-
transparent transactions.374          
 
2.4. EVALUATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter looked at the meaning of privatisation and case for its use as a policy tool 
for facilitating economic development in a country, and concluded by examining 
various prerequisites for an effective and successful privatisation programme. As in a 
production process, the quality of the input affects the quality of the output and how 
privatisation is designed and implemented in a country would likely affect its outcome. 
This however should not be taken to mean that compliance with these pre-requisites 
would automatically ensure the success of any privatisation programme but rather, not 
factoring them in would increase the likelihood that privatisation policy and law would 
not yield expected economic development dividends in a country. Where the law and 
policy framework is not carefully designed, all the 5 benefits of economic development 
used in this thesis may be undermined. Regarding the implementation, where the 
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national environment is not conducive for private investments, qualitative investors may 
not come, which means that the benefits for the citizens cannot be realised, the tax 
revenue for the government will not come, and the goal of overall private sector 
development may not be achieved. Where the institutional structure for implementing 
and monitoring the outcome of privatisation is not robust, all the benefits could be 
undermined. Where poor strategy is adopted, some benefits may be realised at the 
expense of others for instance, private investors may benefit at the expense of the 
consumers and foreign investors may benefit at the expense of local investors and 
overall private sector development. Finally, where corruption permeates the 
privatisation programme, all the benefits could be undermined.  
 
The next chapter examines how the African privatisation agenda has been implemented 
and analyses its potential for facilitating economic development in the continent.  
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CHAPTER   THREE  
 
 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PRIVATISATION IN AFRICA AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE PROCESS 
 
 
It has been noted that: 
 
Africa continues to face difficult socio-economic conditions and a 
number of challenges, among them, low level of human development, 
low levels of productivity, poor infrastructure and investment climate, 
will need to be addressed if the continent is to effectively integrate into 
the global economy, and achieve accelerated economic growth and 
sustainable development, and reduce poverty as desired. Achievement of 
poverty reduction targets requires sound macroeconomic policies, 
increased national savings, mobilization of resources for productive 
investment and employment creation as well as rationalizing 
expenditures so that priority areas such as infrastructure and education 
are given adequate attention. ... the effective implementation of 
privatization programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa could be key to 
increasing the region’s competitiveness, increased growth, higher income 
levels and hence, reduced poverty.375 
 
In the face of serious economic development challenges, many African countries have 
adopted the policy of privatising public enterprises and have put in place the legal, 
regulatory and institutional framework for implementing the legal transfer of the 
ownership and/or control of public enterprises to private entrepreneurs, and are 
currently at different stages of implementing the programme, of which they have sought 
to derive various economic development benefits associated with privatisation.376 At the 
regional level, NEPAD, the development policy framework of the African Union 
emphasizes the need for private sector participation in the economy through means such 
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as public-private partnerships and the need to increase foreign investment flow to key 
sectors in the continent, including utility/infrastuctural services.377  
 
It has been a massive turn around for many African countries that for many years 
following political independence sought to directly intervene in their economies and 
placed the state at the centre of efforts to bring about and shape the direction of national 
economic development. This was actualised through various means including the 
pursuit of policies aimed at indigenising the economy, nationalising foreign-owned 
enterprises and setting up new public enterprises, based on various political, economic 
and social considerations.378 Despite the factors that led to legal reforms that paved way 
for the implementation of statist development policies, expansion of the state sector and 
setting up of new public enterprises, by the early to mid 1980s, key indicators revealed 
that many African countries were experiencing an economic development crisis, with 
stunted economic growth and high incidence of poverty, and many public enterprises 
were plague by various problems including severe political interference and pervasive 
bureaucratic constraints, severe inefficiency, poor staffing, poor capitalisation, over 
dependence on the government for subsidies, high indebtedness and corruption.379  
 
For many of these countries, the adoption and implementation of privatisation has been 
part of a structural reform strategy aimed at dealing with the economic downturn, partly 
attributable to the poor performance and huge indebtedness of public enterprises facing 
the above-noted multifaceted and deep-rooted problems.380  The key question for the 
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purposes of this research is whether the new law and policy regime of private ownership 
and control of public enterprises has paved the way for the realisation of the economic 
development benefits often ascribed to privatisation, and if not, why?   
 
In Chapter 2, the key economic development benefits of privatisation as noted in this 
dissertation were examined namely, its benefit to the public sector, benefit to the 
enterprises, contribution to overall private sector development, benefit to the citizens 
and usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign investment inflow, and they form the 
basis for analysing the extent to which privatisation has benefited various African 
countries that have adopted the reform policy.381 Some of the benefits that have been 
attributed to privatisation in some African countries tally with these benefits.382  
 
A de facto examination of the implementation process shows that it has sometimes been 
credited with being beneficial to the public sector by helping to shrink its size in some 
countries to make it more manageable for the government, aiding the reduction of the 
government’s financial commitment to various enterprises thus playing a role in 
improving the fiscal condition of the state and enhancing macroeconomic stability, and 
also generating immedite earnings as well as tax revenue.383 In some cases, privatisation 
has also been credited with helping to attract new local and foreign private investments 
to some privatised enterprises, playing a role in improving quality of service delivery, 
improving the management, capacity utilisation, productivity, staffing and staff welfare 
of some privatised enterprises384, and helping to facilitate broader economic reforms 
beneficial to the private sector in general, including strenghtening of the capital market 
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and broadening of the product market thereby providing consumers a choice of 
competing products.385  
 
The first thing that should be pointed out about the above benefits credited to 
privatisation in some African countries is that the favourable verdict may not be 
extrapolated to all African countries that have implemented or are implementing 
privatisation, and while they may have been achieved in some of the countries, evidence 
indicates that many others that are also privatising still face significant economic 
development challenges which will be seen as the chapter progresses. Secondly, while it 
may be possible to point to some enterprises in some African countries where 
privatisation has been effective in bringing about much needed efficiency 
improvements, they may not be sufficiently representative of the overall situation with 
privatised enterprises in these countries; accordingly, there is need for closer scrutiny 
before a more representative verdict could be given.  
 
Thirdly, even where evidence suggests that most of the privatised enterprises in a 
country are now working efficiently or that the government has made some financial 
gains through privatisation, based on the analytical standpoint of the dissertation, the 
key question remains whether all the key economic development benefits of 
privatisation earlier noted, have been or are being realised in the implementing country. 
A limited consideration of the attainment of greater enterprise efficiency or the state’s 
realisation of some financial gains, which is the case with some of the favourable 
verdicts of privatisation in African countries, focuses on some but not all the benefits 
and therefore does not shed complete light on the full economic development effect of 
privatisation in a country, the verdict on which is often nuanced given that economic 
benefits are sometimes achieved at the expense of social ones.386 As earlier noted, the 
the key economic development benefits of privatisation as framed in this thesis 
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comprise both the economic and social impact of privatisation, of which the economic 
impact primarily focuses on the effect of privatisation on the efficiency, productivity 
and profitability of privatised enterprises and also its effect on national economic 
growth resulting in part from the state’s financial gains from the programme. On the 
other hand, the social impact primarily views privatisation from the perspective of the 
citizens of the country, including consumers and workers and considers how 
privatisation affects their welfare and whether privatisation legal reforms have paved 
the way for successfully addressing various social concerns that initially informed the 
establishment of many public enterprises.   
 
In Chapter 2, the prerequisites for effective privatisation outcome were examined, 
namely, designing an effective policy and legal framework  and secondly, ensuring 
proper implementation of privatisation.387 A critical appraisal of the design and 
implementation of privatisation in Africa will be undertaken below to ascertain the 
extent to which these prerequisites have been conformed with, and hence determine 
whether privatisation has contributed or is likely to contribute to economic development 
in the implementing countries.  
 
3.1.          DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK   
 
3.1.1.        THE PRIVATISATION POLICY FRAMEWORK IN AFRICA 
 
There is some concern that some of the negative outcomes associated with privatisation 
in Africa are traceable to the way the policy was adopted by many African countries. 
Essentially, as noted in Chapter 2, the motive for adopting privatisation as a national 
policy has considerable impact on whether the declared policy objectives could be 
realised.388 Many of these countries, as noted above had earlier pursued policies that 
placed the state at the centre of economic development efforts, and for a long time, both 
individually and under the auspices of African regional bodies like the Organisation of 
African Unity (the predecessor to the African Union), they expressed misgivings about 
the virtues of globalisation and opening up of national economies, and the dismantling 
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of barriers to foreign goods and investments.389  The key issue for the purposes of the 
research is what later led to the major policy shift towards privatisation and the decision 
to replace the policy and legal framework of public ownership of enterprises with a new 
policy and legal framework for the private ownership and/or control of the same 
enterprises. Was it a pragmatic reaction to the failure of these enterprises to deliver 
expected economic development dividends to these countries and thus, hinged on 
conviction that privatisation would be more effective in actualising these ends or were 
there other issues or motives at stake?  
 
An analysis of the factors that might have influenced policy makers and political leaders 
in African countries to ultimately decide to endorse the privatisation reform path reveals 
at last 3 viewpoints, first, the genuine conviction of national political leaders about the 
merits of privatisation; secondly, the financial pressure exerted by the IFIs on poor 
African countries using SAP loan conditionalities; and thirdly, the ulterior vested 
interest of political leaders that regard privatisation as an opportunity for graft. The 
discussion below will shed further light on these viewpoints. 
 
According to the first viewpoint, which could be termed the conviction viewpoint, some 
national governments in Africa warmed up to the idea of undertaking privatisation 
primarily because of their pragmatic approach to the reform measure and genuine 
conviction that it was meritorious. In some African countries for instance, there were 
domestic constituents including heads of state, opposition political parties, domestic 
entrepreneurs, and government officials that trained in the West or previously worked 
for the IFIs, who agreed with and promoted the virtues of the free market, linkage with 
the global economy and privatisation.390 Essentially, they viewed these reforms as the 
right strategy for sorting out national economic problems and uplift their citizens, of 
which increasing domestic complaints about economic hardship was also a political 
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concern for the government.391 Specifically regarding privatisation, there were some 
African countries that had conducted inquiries into the problems facing public 
enterprises and considered or tried other ways of dealing with these problems including 
rehabilitating and making new capital investments in them, enacting legislation to pave 
way for detaching them from the civil service to give them some level of autonomy or 
setting up an oversight mechanism for them, sometimes without achieving much 
success thus making them to seek reform advice from the IFIs, and become more 
receptive to the idea of privatisation.392 Many African countries were initially critical of 
the 1981 World Bank study (‘The Berg Report’) that largely blamed extensive state 
intervention for Africa’s economic problems393, but some later embraced some of the 
arguments in the report.394 While the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic 
Development of Africa 1980-2000 earlier adopted by African countries under the 
auspices of the Organisation of African Unity largely portrayed the state as a key 
facilitator of economic development in Africa, the NEPAD policy framework, which is 
more in line with the Berg Report, recognises the failings and limitations of the state in 
many African countries and rather emphasises the need for private entrepreneurs to 
partner with the state in actualising economic development.395 Thus, the fact that 
privatisation is stipulated in loan documentation as a loan conditionality does not 
necessarily undermine the fact that the political leaders in the country could be 
genuinely convinced about its effectiveness as a reform tool and hence could claim 
ownership of the reforms, or that some domestic constituents including the local 
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business class and consumers perceive it as being potentially beneficial to their 
interests.396  
 
According to the second viewpoint however, which could be termed the coercion 
viewpoint, the decision of many African countries to adopt and implement privatisation 
owes more to financial coercion by the IFIs rather than genuine conviction about its 
merits.397 Viewed from this perspective, privatisation is principally an externally-driven 
policy prescription and many developing countries including those in Africa, in the face 
of dire economic circumstances and mounting debts, undertook to privatise primarily 
because the IFIs and other creditors had made it clear that further financial assistance 
including debt relief was conditional on implementing privatisation and other Structural 
Adjustment Programme reforms, and alternative funding sources were not available.398 
According to this viewpoint, due to the fact that the IFIs regarded privatisation as a 
means of promoting private entrepreneurship and achieving some of the benefits 
examined in Chapter 2, they have often exerted all sorts of pressure on countries 
needing their financial assistance, to secure their commitment to privatise, including 
delaying debt relief, not approving loans or not releasing tranches of funds already 
approved, of which many of these countries did not have viable alternative funding 
sources to turn to.399 Thus regardless of the potential merits of privatisation the decision 
to privatise was basically a Hobson’s choice for many African countries and their 
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growing financial difficulties appeared to be the key deciding factor, and the poorer the 
country, the greater its dependence on the IFIs for financial support and the greater the 
likelihood that it would have to privatise.400 Privatisation under such circumstances 
would lack genuine national ownership which as noted in Chapter 2 is vital for reform 
success.401 In this regard, it should be noted that the IMF emphasises the importance of 
national ownership of, and responsibility for economic and financial policies and notes 
that conditionality will be ‘formulated through a mutually acceptable process led by the 
member.’402 The IMF has also indicated its commitment to ‘respecting country 
ownership by basing the IMF's financial support on country strategies, and recognizing 
the benefits of country ownership by showing more flexibility with regard to the content 
of programs.’403 However, the point has been made that lending documents such as the 
Letter of Intent and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which in principle 
should be prepared by the borrowing country and should reflect home-grown policy 
measures that it intends to implement with the aid of borrowed funds, are usually 
prepared within very narrow confines to tally with IFI pre-endorsed policies, failing 
which lending would not be forthcoming.404 In this regard, the IMF notes that: 
 
A member’s request to use Fund resources will be approved only if the 
Fund is satisfied that the member’s program is consistent with the Fund’s 
provisions and policies and that it will be carried out, and in particular 
that the member is sufficiently committed to implement the program.405 
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Such external veto power over nationally implemented policies detracts from the 
national ownership of such policies and could render national ownership nominal.406   
 
This second viewpoint of privatisation however needs to be weighed against the fact 
that the NEPAD policy framework endorses privatisation by way of public private 
partnerships, emphasises the need for close collaboration and partnership with the IFIs 
and expresses support for the use of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.407 It is also 
arguable that if a country decides to seek financial aid from a lender, of which it is not 
obligated to do so, a prudent lender should stipulate conditions to ensure that the money 
will not be misused and will ultimately be repaid.408 
 
The third viewpoint on why African countries decided to pursue the privatisation reform 
path, which could be termed the vested interest viewpoint, is that some of the national 
political leaders in African countries, rather than being primarily driven by conviction 
about the economic development benefits associated with privatisation, or being driven 
by the financial coercion of the IFIs to implement privatisation, may have endorsed the 
policy reform because of the rent seeking and patronage opportunities it often presents. 
In the same vein, privatisation has also been viewed as a strategy sometimes utilised to 
illegitimately transfer national wealth to privileged ethnic, religious or other groups in a 
country or maintaining political patronage networks.409 Privatisation under these 
circumstances may primarily be driven by the incentive to advance the vested interest of 
those implementing it.410 These issues will be elaborated on later in the chapter.  
 
The above three viewpoints it should be noted, are not in clearly distinct or rigid 
compartments and it is possible that different combinations of elements of conviction, 
                                                             
406 T Mckinley, ‘MDG-Based PRSPs Need More Ambitious Economic Policies’ (2005) United Nations 
Development Programme Policy Discussion Paper <http://www.undp.org/poverty/publications.htm> 
accessed 24 October 2005 7-8. 
 
407 NEPAD 2001 paras 8, 103, 112, 115-116, 148-149, 151-152, 183-184. Also see P Young,’ 
Privatization around the World’ (1987) 36(3) Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 190, 201. 
 
408 JW Head, ‘For Richer or For Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms Directed at the Multilateral 
Development Banks’ (2003-2004) 52 U Kan L Rev 241, 280; JD Fearon, ‘International Financial 
Institutions and Economic Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1988) 26 J Mod Afr Stud 113, 114. 
 
409 JD Fearon, ‘International Financial Institutions and Economic Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(1988) 26 J Mod Afr Stud 113, 114-115. 
 
410 J Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (Norton and Company, New York 2003) 144.  
 
123 
 
coercion and/or vested interest could be distilled to varying degrees from the 
privatisation programmes of some African countries.411 This is the most probable case 
with Nigeria, the subject of the research case study in the next chapter. The position 
taken in the dissertation is that for the adoption and implementation of privatisation 
policy and law to be effective in revamping the operations of public enterprises facing 
multifaceted and deep-rooted problems and tacking the economic development 
challenges facing many African countries, the decision to so has to be well thought out 
and primarily borne out of genuine conviction about its merits. However, where the 
decision to privatise owes primarily to the second and third viewpoints rather than the 
first one above, it is less likely to be well thought out. Where the policymaking or 
lawmaking process is seriously constrained or shaped by external financial pressure or 
the internal illicit calculations of self interested political leaders, it is likey that there 
could be absence of critical appraisal of the potential benefits and drawbacks of the 
privatisation reform measure, and privatisation adopted under these circumstances is 
unlikely to be an effective economic development policy tool. This is not to suggest that 
privatisation must necessarily succeed once it is driven by conviction, because as will 
be seen later, various implementation problems could still frustrate the expected 
positive outcomes of privatisation in a country, thus conviction merely increases the 
probability of success of privatisation but does not guarantee it.    
 
A vital point made in Chapter 2 on the issue of policy making is that the concept of 
privatisation should be adapted to suit the needs and circumstances of various 
implementing owing to the fact that they each have peculiar economic, social, political 
or other features, including different public enterprise or state ownership problems.412 
Whether there is such adaptation would be a key factor in considering whether 
privatisation in a particular country is well thought out and primarily borne out of 
genuine conviction about its merits. The IFIs have also emphasized the need for 
recognition of national differences in the formulation of solutions to national economic 
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problems.413 With regard to the adoption of market-oriented reforms like privatisation 
and the broader issue of limiting the role of the state in the economy, there has been 
some criticism that they have promoted a cookie-cutter approach to these issues, and not 
fully factoring in national peculiarities, which could affect the effectiveness of proposed 
solutions.414 Privatisation it should be noted was one of the economic policies identified 
as being endorsed under the Washington Consensus, a term that has been used to 
describe the set of market-oriented economic policies said to be broadly accepted and 
recommended by Washington-based institutions like the IFIs and the United States 
Treasury as being vital for actualising economic reform in countries facing downturn in 
their national economies.415 In this regard, some have portrayed IFI-endorsed reforms 
like privatisation as being primarily borne out of the ideological leanings of the IFIs416, 
and noted that they are selective in the presentation of evidence used to backup their 
preferred policy measures.417  Despite the fact that African countries may have some 
common features, they do have their peculiarities, which are variable factors that could 
have impact on the effectiveness of a generic one-size-fits-all privatisation remedy in a 
particular country, including differences ‘... with respect to size, rates of growth, share 
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of GDP in trade, structure of trade, nature of political competition, institutional grids, 
ethnic heterogeneity, and colonial inheritance.’418 Trevor Manuel notes that some of the 
Washington Consensus policy reforms are ‘culturally and historically sensitive’ and that 
‘privatization and deregulation simply do not apply to African countries in the same 
way that they may in Latin American countries.’419 Not factoring in various national 
peculiarities in crafting privatisation policy and legal framework would risk designing 
an ineffective and inflexible remedy that is not in sync with the peculiar problems 
facing specific enterprises in respective countries and the peculiarities of the political, 
economic, social and cultural environment in which they operate, thereby creating an 
enabling environment for various privatisation implementation problems to germinate, 
some of which will be examined later using the analytical framework of the thesis. Such 
implementation problems could create a gap between privatisation legal reforms and the 
economic development objective of privatisation. Noting the divergence between the set 
policy goals of IFI pre-determined ‘“correct” development policies’ like privatisation 
and the realities of implementation, Christopher Clapham makes the case for a 
development learning process that involves:  
 
... adapting societies, states and the international settings in which they 
operate in ways which ultimately serve the welfare of the people who 
live in them. ... The means by which the universalities of successful 
economic transformation can be meshed into the specificities of African 
political structures and social values remain to be elucidated.420 
 
 
It should be noted however that there is a limit to which the IFIs could be blamed for 
generic policy recommendations, given the earlier noted point that some African 
countries that have adopted privatisation may not have been coerced into doing so and 
accordingly, bear primary responsibility for reflecting national peculiarities in the 
design of the policy, including determining how privatisation fits in with other policy 
reforms that may be required in the country including governance reform, tax reform, 
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financial sector and capital market reform, trade policy reform and business and 
investment law reform.  
 
 The last point to discuss on the issue of privatisation policymaking is that a defacto 
assessment of the implementation of privatisation in Africa indicates that some of the 
implementing countries did not appear to have a mechanism for effective stakeholder 
consultation and participation especially regarding the citizens, including workers. 
Erastus Wamugo notes that ‘In most sub-Saharan countries ... privatisation was 
undertaken without adequate debate.’421 As noted in Chapter 2, this is a key part the 
process of adapting privatisation to suit a countries peculiarities, and accordingly, 
increasing the likelihood of realising its economic development benefits.422 The issue 
will be analysed further when examining the issue of whether the national environment 
in some Africa countries is conducive to embarking on privatisation and attracting 
private investments. 
 
3.1.2.      THE PRIVATISATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN AFRICA  
 
Regarding the legal framework for privatisation, Chapter 2 discussed the fact that there 
are two broad categories of laws required in an implementing country, the first set being 
required to pave way for the privatisation programme, while the second set is required 
to regulate the conduct of privatised enterprises in the market.423 While a broader 
critique of the privatisation legal framework will be undertaken in the chapters that 
specifically focus on Nigeria, some legal issues should be generally noted with regard to 
Africa, although the discussion will not go into specific analysis of specific laws, but 
will rather seek to outline the nature of these issues. Regarding the first set of laws and 
regulations, there is some evidence of inadequate legal reforms in some African 
countries prior to the commencement of privatisation. Accordingly, in some countries, 
the body of laws do not provide clarity on the issue of ownership rights to landed 
property, with the result that the state and its citizens sometimes have confusing 
coexisting rights in land under the land tenure system, which has created room for legal 
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challenge regarding the rights acquired by private investors in such property.424 The 
need to ensure the consistency of privatisation with the constitution was noted in 
Chapter 2.425 In this regard, the commencement of privatisation has sometimes triggered 
legal challenge in the courts on the basis that this was inconsistent with constitutional 
provisions that vested direct public ownership of public enterprises in the people, thus 
making it unlawful and unconstitutional to transfer them to private entrepreneurs.426 
Sometimes, privatisation has proceeded without any enabling legislation, raising both 
legal and transparency concerns, with the government sometimes proceeding to hastily 
enact such laws afterwards and give them retroactive effect.427 Such hasty drafting of 
privatisation laws raises concerns about whether these laws adequately factored in the 
peculiarities of the social context in which the privatisation programme would be 
implemented, including the adequacy of the institutions tasked with law implementation 
and the political environment in which they operate.428 Hasty legal drafting has also 
been blamed for significant transparency loopholes, for instance leaving the methods of 
privatisation open-ended, not adequately providing for how enterprises will be valued or 
how privatisation bids will be conducted or how the privatisation process will be 
supervised, which paved way for opaque transactions and for malfeasance to infiltrate 
the privatisation process429 But even where such supervisory mechanism is provided by 
relevant laws, this could create bureaucratic bottlenecks as well as room for political 
meddling in the privatisation process, which as earlier noted was also one of the issues 
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that plagued many public enterprises now being sought to be privatised.430 Such 
bottlenecks have also been noted where the legal framework for privatisation provided a 
diffused structure for undertaking privatisation transactions with different governemnt 
departments having different responsibilities in the process, which could be confusing 
to a prospective investor and may also raise accountability concerns.431 The above 
lapses should give considerable concern to a prospective investor that is about to make a 
long term investment in a country since the legal foundations of the investment could be 
subject to challenge and inadequate safeguard provisions could result in unplanned 
financial losses. The fact that some privatisation laws failed to provide a dispute 
settlement mechanism would heighten such concerns, because even if the privatisation 
contract between the government and a successful investor provides such a mechanism, 
disputes may arise prior to this point, of which an unsuccessful investor may not have 
clear channels of redress, including an expeditious way of resolving issues in countries 
with inefficient judicial systems. 432      
 
Regarding the second set of laws that deal with various issues regarding the conduct of 
privatised enterprises in the market, some African countries undertaking privatisation 
have various laws governing commercial activities that could hinder the attainment of 
the objectives of privatisation legal reform. Gerald Tanyi notes that: 
 
... these laws must be completely reviewed and, where necessary, revised 
in order to bring them in line with modern trends. Of particular relevance 
are the general company law, competition law, securities regulation, 
environmental law, foreign investment law, and labor legislation.433    
 
Similarly Nsongurua Udombana has noted that:   
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African states must take mutually reinforcing actions to accelerate 
growth and end years of aid dependency. As a starting point, they should 
streamline and strengthen their domestic legal frameworks for doing 
business, mindful that legal uncertainties discourage investors and that a 
weak legal system undercuts efforts to develop a modem, market-
oriented economy. Many of the laws regulating business transactions in 
Africa are not just outdated but antediluvian.434 
 
Provisions regulating corporate governance sometimes pose implementation difficulties, 
fail to provide adequate protection to minority shareholders, and have loopholes and 
inadequacies that undermine the accountability of directors or reduces the scope of 
liability for deriliction of duty.435 Inadequate secured transaction laws or efficient 
institutional mechanism for enforcement could heighten the concerns of prospective 
investors about adequate access to credit on reasonable terms to facilitate their 
operations.436 Inadequate legal reforms have also paved way for inconsistent laws to 
exist in the statute books, for instance the Kenyan competition law that exists side by 
side with prior legislation that restricts market entry, which has not yet been repealed, 
with both laws effectively working at cross purposes.437 Some of the countries that have 
implemented or are implementing privatisation do not even have competition laws in 
place, which paves way for the implementation of privatisation to lead to private 
monopolies dominating key sectors.438 Regarding regulatory laws for 
utility/infrastructure services, sometimes their enactment and the creation of an 
enforcement mechanism was pursued after privatisation had already been undertaken.439 
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This could give rise to legal action at the instance of the investor since earlier licence 
conditions could conflict with later regulatory provisions. As noted by Francois Serres: 
 
Regulatory reforms and privatization processes should be therefore 
closely co-ordinated. Investors might react negatively in case the 
operating rules of a sector are changed after privatization.440 
 
Being wary of this potential problem which make it difficult to completely assess 
regulatory risk in a particulr jurisdiction, some investors may decide not to invest at all. 
A final point to be made is that sometimes inadequacies in laws are noted at the point 
where the rubber meets the road, of which it has been noted that market regulatory laws 
often adopted within the context of IFI reforms, sometimes replicate similar laws in 
some developed countries without adequately factoring in the socio-cultural context in 
which the laws will be implemented in the African country.441  
 
 
3.2.         ENSURING PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIVATISATION 
 
Where privatisation does not lead to desired outcomes and a gap appears to exist 
between the privatisation law and policy objectives on the one hand, and the actual 
implementation reality or practice of privatisation on the other, it is necessary to find 
out why. An appraisal of the privatisation outcomes in some African countries shows 
that while some blame for poor outcomes could be attributed to some flaws in the 
design of the policy or legal framework as discussed above, there are also some other 
problems that have been observed in the course of actually implementing the 
programme in various countries, which could thwart even the best crafted policies, laws 
and regulations. Thus the design and implementation problems are mutually reinforcing, 
reduce the probability that privatisation would advance economic development in these 
African countries and therefore should be avoided in the public interest or remedied 
where they have already arisen.  
 
Based on the analytical framework of the dissertation, 4 key implementation questions 
will be posed and analysed regarding the implementation of privatisation in various 
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African countries namely, is the national environment conducive to embarking on 
privatisation and attracting private investments?; secondly, is the institutional 
framework for implementing and monitoring the outcome of privatisation robust?; 
thirdly, will the strategic approach to the implementation of privatisation lead to the 
realisation of set policy objectives?; and finally, is the privatisation process accountable, 
transparent and free from corruption? 
 
 
3.2.1.     IS THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO EMBARKING  
            ON PRIVATISATION AND ATTRACTING PRIVATE INVESTMENTS? 
 
In many African countries, the implementation of privatisation has not led to the 
expected massive influx of qualitative foreign investors seeking to buy up their public 
enterprises, despite the enactment of various laws and the conclusion of investment 
treaties aimed at promoting and protecting foreign investments, and Africa as a whole 
has only gained marginally from global privatisation investments of which the spread is 
uneven within the continent.442 Sometimes the stipulation of various investment 
incentives443, have still not persuaded investors to invest. This could be attributed to the 
fact that some enterprises slated for privatisation are so run down and enmeshed in 
various problems that investors may have decided to stay clear. However, it has been 
noted that ‘the domestic policies of the State are only one factor among many affecting 
its relationship with foreign investment.’444 It would appear that various factors in the 
underlying investment climate in these countries adversely impact on the capacity of the 
private sector to thrive and accordingly increase investment risk, making potential 
investors wary about making the long term commitment that foreign direct investment 
necessitates.445 NEPAD  notes the need to address a host of policy, legal and 
                                                             
442 K Anan, ‘Kofi Anan on Africa's Development Problems’ (1998) 24 Popul Dev Rev 411, 414; S 
Onyeiwu and H Shrestha, ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Africa’ (2004) 20 Journal of 
Developing Societies 89, 90; F Pamacheche and B Koma, ‘Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa - An 
Essential Route to Poverty Alleviation’ (2007) 1(2) African Integration Review 1, 7-8; Economic 
Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2003: Accelerating the Pace of Development 
(Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa 2003) 35; J Selvam, A Meenakshisundararajan and T 
Iyappan, ‘Privatisation and Capital Accumulation: ‘Empirical Evidences from Ethiopia’ (2005) 12 AJEP 
61, 74-78, 80. 
 
443 Note for instance, OO Akinla, ‘Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Changing Business and 
Legal Environment’ (1987) 7 BC Third World LJ 19, 30. 
 
444 FC Beveridge, ‘Taking Control of Foreign Investment: A Case Study of Indigenisation in Nigeria’ 
(1991) 40 ICLQ 302, 333.  
 
132 
 
institutional issues that drive up investment risk in Africa.446 As noted in Chapter 2, the 
research focuses on three key issues that could adversely impact on the underlying 
investment climate and create a gap between legal reforms and expected outcomes 
namely, socio-political concerns resulting from the implementation of privatisation, 
general socio-political instability in the country and pre-existing systemic problems 
affecting the private business sector in a country.447  
 
Regarding the issue of socio-political crisis resulting from the implementation of 
privatisation, in some African countries, the governments have often relied on brute 
force to deal with some of the fallouts of the privatisation process such as protests by 
citizens regarding the increased cost of privatised goods and services or protests by 
workers fearful about job cuts or non-payment of severance benefits.448 The 
combination of such protests and government counter measures to deal with them, 
would likely contribute to the general socio-political instability existing in some of 
these countries, of which some have noted the human rights dimension to such issues.449 
The unwillingness or inability of some governments to plan ahead and develop or utilise 
clear channels of consultation in resolving adverse privatisation fallouts, and the 
pervasiveness of local opposition to reforms could undermine the investment security 
that investors seek, given that citizens including workers and potential customers could 
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transfer their aggression to them.450 In the instances where the adoption of privatisation 
may owe more to coercion than conviction, it is possible that there could be limited 
room for adequate consultation with various stakeholders in the country, given that the 
government is itself operating within a highly constrained policy environment, thus 
creating an enabling environment for protests. Even when privatisation is primarily 
driven by conviction, this does not necessarily mean that the government will consider 
it necessary to have adequate consultative processes. In either case it could still be a 
coterie of top government officials that take key decisions on the implementation of 
privatisation and other market reforms, with little or no input from, or consultation with 
various stakeholders who would ultimately be affected by the implementation of 
privatisation, which would detract from the broad national ownership of the 
privatisation policy.451 Although the IFIs have called for citizens’ consultation and 
participation in the formulation and implementation of economic reform measures as 
well as measures designed to cushion their adverse effects, as a way of further ensuring 
the national ownership of such policies452, as earlier noted, they have also indicated that 
governments should have the political will to overcome stakeholder opposition to 
reform efforts, of which such stakeholders including trade unions and citizens groups 
are often portrayed as reform opponents who have vested interest in continued state 
dominance of national economies.453 Some governments could take this to mean that 
consultation is a mere formality that they do not need to take too seriously, and the 
widespread protests by various stakeholders against the implementation of privatisation 
and other economic reform measures in many African countries is indicative of 
ineffective consultation and limited participation in reform planning, undermines reform 
legitimacy and potentially paves way for avoidable conflict between these stakeholders 
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and privatisation investors.454 It should be noted however that some African countries 
appear to have undertaken serious negotiations with key stakeholder groups like trade 
unions and also utilised measures like share purchase schemes and job security 
provisions to win their support.455    
 
On the issue of general socio-political instability in a country, in some African 
countries, there are very high levels of violence and crime and there have been 
occurences of military coups, civil conflicts, wars and ethnic clashes.456 
 
Regarding the issue of systemic problems affecting the private business sector, various 
African countries to varying degrees are beset with a host of problems that significantly 
drive up transaction costs, hinder the productivity and profitability of private 
enterprises, increase business risks and generally make them less competitive as 
investment destinations. These include the absence of qualitative utility/infrastructure 
services such as stable power supply and an effective transport network457, the existence 
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of an unpredictable law and policy environment including tax, trade liberalisation and 
regulatory laws and policies458, the prevalence of governance institutions and legal 
system riddled with inefficiency and corruption, including bureaucratic delays and 
corruption associated with excessive regulation459, the absence of readily available and 
reliable information on the enterprises slated for privatisation and the current business 
environment in the country460, lack of robust capital markets461, and high interest 
rates.462  
 
Not only could these problems have deterent effect on foreign investors, but their 
adverse impact on locally-based entrepreneurs already operating in some privatising 
African countries could have affected their ability to make effective bids for the 
acquisition of privatised enterprises. It is not suggested that these are the only problems 
that affect businessses in Africa but it should be noted that some of them have been 
identified as contributory factors to the collapse of some privatised enterprises soon 
after privatisation.463  
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3.2.2.    IS THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING AND 
             MONITORING THE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION ROBUST? 
   
As earlier noted, a key consideration in assessing whether privatisation law will 
facilitate economic development is whether the implementing country has a robust 
institutional framework for undertaking privatisation and various privatisation-related 
tasks and ensuring that the policy objectives of the programme are met.464 In addition to 
possibly failing to deliver on privatisations’ benefits for the citizens, weak institutions 
also increase regulatory risk for investors.465 NEPAD recognises that ‘state capacity-
building is a critical aspect of creating conditions for development’466, and it lists 
various key areas that should be the focus of reforms aimed at improving the 
institutional capacity of African states namely:  
 
... administrative and civil services; strengthening parliamentary 
oversight; promoting participatory decision-making; adopting effective 
measures to combat corruption and embezzlement; undertaking judicial 
reforms.467  
 
By implication, African countries suffer institutional weaknesses in these areas at a time 
when they are trying to implement or have already implemented a reform as 
institutionally demanding as privatisation.468 In this regard, the IFIs recognise the 
institutional weaknesses in many developing countries and note that:  
 
... achieving the public interest objectives of privatization will take 
longer than has elapsed since such reforms were introduced in most 
developing and transition economies.469 
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Although the IFIs have undertaken capacity building programmes in some of these 
countries, this should have taken place long before they attempted the huge task of 
privatisation and some countries have simply tried to muddle through the privatisation 
process without a robust institutional framework.470 However, key privatisation tasks 
such as vetting of potential investors to ensure that they are technically and financially 
capable of running privatised enterprises, organising transparent and competitive 
bidding and undertaking detailed technical and financial audit of enterprises slated for 
privatisation to ensure their accurate ;  are too vital to be muddled through.471 In some 
African countries, winning privatisation bidders ultimately fail to pay for their 
acqusitions or could not efficiently manage the enterprises they bought, indicative of an 
inadequate shortlisting proccess for bidders and vetting of the financial and technical 
records by the authority charged with conducting privatisation.472  
 
Sometimes, despite clear legal provisions on the conduct of privatisation bids, 
allegations emerged that the bidding process had been compromised in some way or the 
other or that legal provisions designed to ensure transparency, accountability and checks 
and balances had been disregarded.473 Many enterprises have also been sold through 
private sales and other similar arrangements as opposed to public offers, in part due to 
the earlier noted problem of lack of robust capital markets, and this has also undermined 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Growth: A Fragile Consensus’ (1988) 26 J Mod Afr Stud 179, 204; R Sandbrook, ‘Bringing Politics Back 
in? The World Bank and Adjustment in Africa’ (1995) 29 Can J Afr Stud 278, 278. 
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the earlier noted privatisation benefit of broadening of the ownership base of privatised 
enterprises and creating popular capitalism in a country.474 
 
Many African countries have tax systems that suffer from institutional weaknesses, 
which limits the extent to which tax revenue could be used to facilitate economic 
development.475 Thus in African countries where privatisation has been implemented 
when they do not yet have an effective system to ensure proper tax collection, 
remittance and accounting, this could provide ample opportunity for investors to 
successfully avoid or evade tax or collude with tax officials, leaving the government 
with insufficient tax revenue to pursue other social objectives that enhance national 
economic development.476 The pervasive problems of corruption and tax evasion have 
continued to manifest even in the African countries that have undertaken legal reforms 
of their tax regimes.477 Sometimes the governemnt could grant special tax favours to 
cronies.478 The uncertainties posed by a defective tax system could also be a 
disincentive to privatisation since prospective investors could face multiple taxes and 
arbitrary tax hikes after commencing operations.479         
 
The judicial system also suffers from institutional weaknesses in some African 
countries, including corruption, which would be of concern to any prospective 
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investor.480 Even where the investment agreement provides for arbitration, the fact 
remains that there are many other business relationships that the investor may need to 
enter in the course of doing business, which may not all be subject to the investment 
arbitration clause, including supply and employment contracts and recovering debts fom 
defaulting customers, or initiating action against regulators for improper exercise of 
regulatory power.481 As noted in a report: 
 
Contracts are of value only if they can be properly enforced. If contract 
enforcement is not possible, businesses will be reluctant to enter a 
contract with businesses they do not know, reducing the scope of 
economic activities. They will operate only on a cash-and carry basis—
or even ask for advance payment. ... Enforcing contracts in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is among the most difficult in the world, with an average of 35 
procedures and 434 days required to enforce a contract.482 
 
 
Despite the emphasis in NEPAD for African countries to have policy, legal and 
institutional structures in place for competition and market regulation483, many African 
countries still do not have adequate institutional structures in place for undertaking 
these responsibilities, without which it will be difficult to ensure enterprise and market 
efficiency, adequate private investments in privatised enterprises and reasonable pricing 
of privatised goods and services.484 As noted in Chapter 2, these institutions are very 
vital for supervising the free market and deriving optimum benefits for the state, its 
citizens and private investors, and are necessary compliments of any shift from public to 
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private ownership and/or control.485 Regarding competition authorities that have been 
set up in some sub-Saharan African countries, it has been noted that:  
 
Undoubtedly, the operation of formal competition laws and institutions 
poses unique difficulties for countries in SSA. ... financial and human 
resource constraints facing countries raise concerns about the 
sustainability, effectiveness, and credibility of competition monitoring 
institutions. ... These problems are exacerbated by the weak legal 
information processing and dissemination infrastructures that exist in 
several countries.486 (footnotes omitted)  
 
Simply achieving private ownership without strong competition and other 
complimentary regulatory/supervisory institutions will likely leave many stakeholders 
in various African countries with the short end of the stick.487 In the case of regulatory 
bodies, where the government has cut its investments in public enterprises as a result of 
privatisation and the new private investors, owing to ineffective regulation, do not make 
necessary investments to improve productivity, the consumers would be at the receiving 
end as the private investors could simply raise the costs of their goods and services to 
boost profits. In this regard, it should be noted that some independent regulatory bodies 
have been set up after, rather than before privatisation in some African countries.488 
Regarding corporate governance, many corporate scandals involving high profile 
companies like Enron in recent years show that private companies may be as prone to 
failure as public enterprises,  and could also adversely impact on economic growth and 
investor confidence in absence of adequate regulation.489 If these scandals could occur 
in developed Western countries, they are even more likely to occur in African countries 
where the market regulatory infrastructure is not yet robust, of which it has been noted 
that ‘Lack of appropriate institutions means that potential participants in the financial 
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markets lack information and are exposed to undue risks. As a result, markets fail to 
grow and/or deepen.’490 
 
On a more general note, the point has been made that there is some inconsistency in the 
IFIs indicating that African states are institutionally incapable of spearheading 
development efforts but at the same time expecting them to be institutionally robust 
enough to undertake privatisation and complex functions like market regulation.491 
 
 
3.2.3.     WILL THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE IMPLEMENTATION  
              OF PRIVATISATION LEAD TO THE REALISATION OF SET  
              POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
  
 
It has been noted that ‘African states have not always adopted the right policy mix and 
strategies for sustainable economic development.’492 Regarding privatisation, the 
strategic approach to many privatisation transactions by many African countries, 
sometimes at the behest of the IFIs has sometimes been at odds with the economic 
development objectives of the programme and the public interest, giving rise to some 
avoidable problems in the privatisation process. These strategic flaws have imposed 
various economic and social costs on these countries and their citizens, resulted in some 
transaction stalemates and helped to create room for inefficient post-privatisation 
performance. The following strategic issues will be analysed: 
 
 The pace and sequencing of privatisation 
 
 The strategy for engaging foreign investors  
 
 The approach to socio-cultural issues in privatisation  
 
 Weighing the cost of implementing privatisation against the expected benefits 
 
 Balancing the economic and social issues in privatisation in the interest of the 
citizens 
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3.2.3.1.       THE PACE AND SEQUENCING OF PRIVATISATION 
 
 
Speed and targets have sometimes been unduly emphasized in the IFIs approach to 
privatisation, both generally and with respect to Africa in a bid to quickly cede the 
ownership and/or control of public enterprises to private entrepreneurs.493 The IFIs 
acknowledge the difficulty in undertaking public sector reforms and have emphasised 
the need to carefully manage the privatisation process and also implement key 
institutional reforms like regulatory reform and introduction of competition prior to 
privatisation.494 However, regarding their financial support to privatising countries, a 
World Bank report report notes that ‘... big cuts in financing can be triggered by a 
failure to meet governance standards or structural benchmarks (such as the privatization 
of a given company by a certain date)’495 Another World Bank report notes that:  
 
... aid intended to promote SOE reform can be counterproductive in 
several situations. ... some reluctant governments were slow to privatize, 
then rushed into bad bargains to meet deadlines set by external assistance 
agreements.496 
 
The key issue then is that speed and careful management of privatisation appear to be 
inconsistent strategies. Some African countries have sought to speed up the privatisation 
process to keep within set timeframes and continue to have access to donor funding497, 
but in such haste, could exercise poor judgement in deciding what needs to be 
privatised, why it needs to be privatised and how it will be privatised. In pressing for 
speed and targets, the IFIs appear to assess privatisation success in numerical terms i.e. 
the number of transactions concluded in a given time frame, rather than in economic 
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development terms which factors in the verifiable impact of privatisation on the lives of 
the citizens of the country.498  
 
Considering the earlier noted issues of lack of conducive environment for implementing 
privatisation and lack of adequate implementation capacity in some of African 
countries499, speeding to conclude the programme regardless, would likely be a recipe 
for poor implementation outcomes. Sometimes, speed makes it more challenging to 
ensure appropriate sequencing and pacing of privatisation and other market reforms. For 
instance, although a World Bank report acknowledges the need to precede liberalisation 
with improved regulation in African countries500, liberalisation undertaken within the 
context of IFI funded programmes has sometimes been blamed for facilitating de-
industrialistion in Africa of which the inflow of some foreign goods to some local 
markets would also threaten newly privatized enterprises still struggling to gain a 
foothold in the same markets now flooded with competitive foreign goods, and may 
result in job losses.501 This is not a criticism of trade liberalisation per se but of its 
proper planning and timing in the light of the various problems earlier noted which have 
adversely affected the investment climate and local industrial capacity in many African 
countries.502 It should however be noted that even where governments have sought to 
control the inflow of foreign goods to local markets, corrupt licensing regimes have 
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sometimes undermined the effectiveness of such measures coupled with unchecked 
smuggling across the borders.503  
 
Speed makes it more difficult to ensure adequate consultation with relevant stakeholders 
and adequate provision of safety nets for consumers and workers in order to avert 
privatisation-related protests504, and also ensure proper timing of sales where there is 
limited investor interest which could mean that state assets may eventually be sold for a 
pittance or liquidated in a bid to meet set deadlines.505 Proper valuation may also be 
difficult under such circumstances.506 Hasty adoption of market regulatory laws based 
on foreign precedents has been blamed for some law implementation problems which 
could affect the interests of minority stakeholders507, while speedy drafting of 
privatisation law has been blamed for transparency loopholes that pave way for opaque 
deals and privatisation-related corruption.508 Transparency safeguards may also be 
dispensed with in order to keep to preset implemention timelines.509 In this regard, 
despite the benefits of greater transparency associated with undertaking privatisation 
through the stock market510, other less transparent methods of privatisation may be 
utilised to avoid the stress of complying with listing requirements. Given the scope for 
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such malfeasance, some have made the case that ‘Political reform must precede 
economic reform’511 
 
On the issue of regulation and competition especially regarding utilities, speedy 
implementation of privatisation has meant that they have often not been accorded top 
priority in the run up to privatisation. In this regard, it should be noted that arguments 
emanating from the World Bank appear to be both in favour of512, and against513 the 
privatisation of monopoly enterprises, but the implementation approach appears to be to 
frontload privatisation and then address regualtory inadequacies as ‘second generation 
reforms’ in order to ‘... achieving the public interest objectives of privatization’.514 A 
World Bank report notes the sequencing problem many African countries have run into 
regarding competition given the limited number of prospective investors, which has 
sometimes resulted in contracts that provide for monopoly exclusivity periods515, thus 
limiting the benefits of privatisation for the citizens given the problem of weak 
regulatory structures and also adversely impacting on broad based private sector 
development. As noted in another World Bank report ‘Inflexibilities built into 
privatization agreements are often a severe impediment to solving post-privatization 
regulatory problems.’516 Independent regulation as earlier noted has post-dated 
privatisation in some countries, making it difficult to effectively control monopolies.517  
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In concluding the discussion, it should be noted that some arguments have been 
advanced on the merits of speedy implementation of privatisation premised on the 
potential benefits of the privatised era compared with the pre-existing era, the attendant 
costs associated with delayed transititon, the need to gain and sustain public support for 
enterprise reforms and capitalism, the need to limit the opportunity for asset stripping of 
enterprises by current managers, the need to afford little time for vested interests to 
effectively mobilise to frustrate the exercise, and also the view that countries that cannot 
effectively manage pubic enterprises can still gain from privatisation even if there is 
poor regulation.518 What this means is that ultimately, the pace of privatisation is a 
question of capacity, the specific local implementation conditions in any given African 
country and weighing the potential benefits and associated hazards. Thus while making 
the case for speedy privatisation in South Africa, Stephanie Nicolas points out key 
institutional strenghts of the country that would make such a strategy workable519, 
which is not the reality for some other African countries. A final point is that given the 
earlier noted argument regarding the convicion and vested interest viewpoints of 
privatisation520, there is a limit to which IFIs alone can be blamed for speedy 
implemenation, and various African countries may also be primarily responsible for 
such emphasis on speed.  
 
 
3.2.3.2.       THE STRATEGY FOR ENGAGING FOREIGN INVESTORS 
  
The strategic approach to foreign investments in some African countries raises concerns 
about whether it is in consonance with key economic development objectives of 
privatisation. To some extent some of the concerns would be applicable to private 
investments generally whether foreign or domestic, but the fact is that many large 
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transactions with huge development impact have involved foreign investors521, of which 
it is necessary to see whether the implementation of privatisation factors in an 
appropriate strategy for deriving optimum benefits from these investments. In enacting 
laws to promote foreign investments and in allowing foreign participation in 
privatisation, it is intended that such investments will be a source of much needed 
resources and expertise in the host countries.522 A key issue to consider is the issue of 
risk allocation.523 Some African countries, in the face of limited investor interest which 
could be attributable to some of the earlier discussed systemic issues affecting 
businesses in Africa, have sought to attract foreign investments using various forms of 
incentives and bearing all sorts of risks relating to these investments. Commenting on 
infrastructure privatisation in Africa, a World Bank report has also noted that  
 
… despite the increasing participation of private firms in infrastructure, 
the public sector still bears a significant part of market risks. Most 
contracts—power, water, railways—are of the affermage (lease contract) 
type, with investment still the responsibility of the state.524 
 
While contined investment in public utilities is very vital525, if the public sector still 
bears respnsibility for investment costs, this could undermine the budgetary savings 
argument for privatisation as well as the argument about foreign investors bringing in 
much needed capital to a privatising country. In the same vein, some African countries 
have entered into dollar-denominated power purchase agreements with Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) for the generation of electricity, which create binding 
obligations to purchase all the electricity at predetermined rates for several years (up to 
25 years in some cases) regardless of whether or not they actually require the electricity, 
effectively ensuring that the IPPs have a guaranteed market and profits for the entire 
concession period, do not need to compete for customers and are insulated from demand 
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risk.526 With African countries disproportionately bearing market risks, still responsible 
for investments after privatisation, and responsible for making long term preset 
contractual payments to investors, the costs of utility/infrastructure services could 
remain high as the government seeks to recoup its expenses from consumers.527 The 
monopoly element in some of these contractual arrangements could also undermine 
future market expansion and broad-based private sector development in key sectors in 
these countries, especially given the earlier noted weak regulatory structures in some 
African countries.528 
 
A second key consideration regarding foreign participation in privatisation is how this 
affects local participation in privatisation, which is a sensitive issue that could could fan 
the embers of nationalism in a privatising country if not handled well, and could trigger 
protests that undermine the overall investment climate in a country.529 In many African 
countries, privatisation has been implemented at a time when the nationals of the 
privatising country including indigenous capitalists were too financially incapacitated 
and weighed down by various systemic problems to fully partake in the exercise, with 
foreign entrepreneurs being the only viable bidders for some key enterprises.530 The 
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scope for indigenous participation is further diminished by the earlier noted absence of 
viable capital markets, which has reduced the scope for public offer of privatisation 
securities on the stock exchange that would have permitted the citizens to acquire 
minority stake in privatised enterprises thus actualising the privatisation objecive of 
broadening the ownership base of privatised enterprises and promoting popular 
capitalism. Rather, private sales, asset sales and various contractual arrangements 
including leases noted above have been utilised a lot.531 Some African countries have 
however been able to utilise stock market floatations to give their nationals a chance to 
participate in the privatisation process, although poverty and low domestic savings 
sometimes continue to pose stumpling blocks to effective participation.532   
 
A further consideration is the nature of competition that exists between foreign and 
local investors in African countries. It has been noted that ‘With a few exceptions, 
African countries have always provided elaborate and generous incentives to the foreign 
investor, sometimes to the disadvantage of the local investor.’533 Essentially tax laws 
and other market support laws sometimes accord significant advantages to foreign 
investors over local investors.534 Where incentives, including tax breaks are deployed as 
a way of attracting foreign investments could ultimately give rise to investment 
enclaves in some African countries where only foreign investors exist, which could 
effectively skew free market competition - on the one hand, all other foreign investors 
in certain sectors could make their investments conditional on the receipt of such 
incentives in other to compete on equal footing and on the other hand, foreign firms that 
benefit from incentives would be placed in a more advantageous position than their 
local competitors that are struggling to survive due to the earlier noted unfavourable 
investment climate in many African countries.535 This argument is essentially a reversal 
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of the state aid issue seen in Europe where the focus of state aid control by the European 
Commission generally and within the context of privatisation is to prevent local 
enterprises in Member States from having competitive advantage over foreign 
competitors where they benefit from various forms of subsidies.536 In the African 
context however, where foreign competitors are aided by incentives to take over public 
enterprises and where there is also absence of effective competition authorities to 
supervise the market place, they could easily force smaller local competitors out of the 
market, which could further exacerbate the unemployment problem in some of these 
implementing countries. In this regard, the World Bank has noted that ‘competition can 
only be effective if government transfers and subsidies are eliminated.’537 Considering 
the fact that some of the multinationals operating in Africa have been convicted of 
paying bribes to secure privatisation contracts538, it is possible that some of these 
incentives are the products of corrupt deals with public officals in these countries. By 
way of analogy, it has been noted that the abilty of foreign companies to pay larger 
bribes to public officials in China has led to their being accorded more favourable 
treatment and ultimately be more competitive than their local competitors.539  
 
In addition to undermining competition, incentives could also undermine the need for 
investors to be efficient in order to be profitable, of which efficiency improvement 
features as one of the justifications for undertaking privatisation. The World Bank notes 
that:  
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One advantage of privatization is that it taps the efficiencies generated by 
incentives associated with private profitmaking. But if guarantees cover 
most or all of the risks, private investors will have little incentive to run 
the enterprise better than bureaucrats did before privatization.540   
 
It should also be noted that where foreign investors are able to successfully bribe local 
officials, the latter may not be keen on enforcing relevant regulations aimed at ensuring 
such efficiency, especially within the context of utility/infrastructural services, an issue 
that will be explored further later. 
 
In summary, the above strategic approach to privatisation, even if it makes some 
contribution to economic growth, is less likely to be in the best interest of the citizens, 
including local investors or facilitate broad-based private sector development, which are 
some of the key economic development considerations of privatisation earlier noted.541  
 
A final point to consider is the issue of IFI involvement in foreign investment 
promotion in Africa, regarding which some have criticised them for appearing to 
promote foreign investments at the expense of indigenous control of key economic 
sectors, and using their financial leverage to secure commitments in this regard.542 Also, 
the fact that the World Bank that gives investment advice within the context of policy-
based lending is a co-investor in some of the private investments in developing 
countries potentially presents a conflict of interest since regulatory restriction of profits 
or sanctions for inefficient performance would affect its earnings.543 However, a more 
accurate portrayal of the issue of IFIs and foreign investments in Africa should be more 
nuanced. In the first place, unlike the earlier African development policy initiative, the 
Lagos Plan for Action, that largely saw globalisation as threat to Africa’s development, 
NEPAD expresses the desire for Africa to embrace globalisation and international 
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competition.544 It embraces both domestic and foreign investment. On the one hand it 
expresses the need to promote foreign investments and on the other it stresses the need 
for the creation of conducive environment for foreign as well as domestic investors.545  
It particularly emphasizes the role of foreign investment in developing the continent and 
also the need to sustain close collaboration and partnership with the IFIs.546 NEPAD 
also notes the need to adopt incentivising measures like credit guarantee schemes, 
insurance schemes and other financial devices that mitigate investment risk for foreign 
investors in Africa.547 Regarding the issue of the World Bank co-investing in some 
private investments, such arrangements are authorised by the Articles of Agreement of 
World Bank Group members and also endorsed by NEPAD as a way of attracting 
private investments.548 It should also be noted that some African countries appear to 
have embraced foreign investments because they perceive this to be in their economic 
interest.549 Also to be considered is the fact that some of the foreign investors that have 
invested in Africa have done so through business arrangments with politicaly influential 
people in these countries550, although in some instances the IFIs have been accused of 
complicity in such potentially illegitimate arrangements.551   
 
In the light of the above points, it would not be entirely correct to portray the IFIs as 
somehow compelling all African countries to accept foreign investors against their will. 
However, whether or not African countries have acted out of compulsion or some other 
reasons, the bottomline is that a poor strategic approach to foreign investments within 
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the context of privatisation exercise may fail to actualise key economic development 
objectives of the country.  
 
3.2.3.3.        THE APPROACH TO SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES IN  
                    PRIVATISATION 
 
The multiplicity of ethnic groups in many African countries poses a key problem in 
planning for and successfully executing privatisation programmes. It has been noted 
that forging such diverse socio-cultural groups in a country into one nation ‘requires 
more than geographic proximity or political and economic necessity.’552 Some of these 
countries have already experienced civil wars, communal tensions, riots or military 
coups and sometimes the citizens still regard fellow  citizens with suspicion and real or 
imagined fears of economic and/or political domination still persist.553  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, issues pertaining to ethnicity, including other cultural differences 
like  race and religion could create a gap between market–related legal reforms like 
privatisation and expected outcomes.554 In some African countries, such issues have 
shaped national politics and affected how political leaders view the state, especially its 
use as a means of facilitating  patron-client networking and advancing narrow interests, 
with resulting conflicts over appropriation of state resources by competing groups 
which has adverse impact on broad-based national development efforts.555 In this 
regard, it has been noted that ‘divestment does not so much free markets as extend 
political struggles for control of key elements of the national economy from the state 
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into the private sector.’556 Opposition to privatisation has sometimes been influenced by 
these concerns and some governments have been perceived to press for privatisation, 
delay or shape the implementation of privatisation as the case may be, premised on how 
it could advantage or disadvantage specific sociocultural groups in the country.557  
 
There are at least three possible implications where cultural considerations affect the 
implementation of privatisation in Africa. In the first place, privatisation could suffer 
from a legitimacy deficit, which could pave way for heightened tensions among 
different cultural groups in some African countries that already regard themselves with 
some suspicion. This may contribute to sociopolitical crisis in these countries558, further 
dampening the investment climate, and where the balance of political power shifts 
among these groups in the future, the stage may be set for probes and nationalisations. 
Secondly, competence may not be the key selection criterion for privatisation investors 
under these circumstances, in which case the expected efficiency improvements may not 
materialise. Thirdly, privatisation law implemented under these circumstances could 
provide a legal basis for further widening the inequality gap in some African countries 
to the extent that it is used as a strategy for consolidating economic power in some sub-
groups in these countries, at the expense of others, of which such a zero sum calculation 
would be at the expense of broad-based national economic development.559  
 
In summation, there are no easy ways for resolving cultural issues stemming from 
privatisation in some African countries. Some countries have used the strategy of stock 
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market flotation of privatisation shares, with limits on the maximum stake that can be 
acquired by any individual, as a means of ensuring the even spread of property rights 
among citizens in the country560, but as earlier noted, privatisation has often been 
conducted through private sales and other similar arrangements in some African 
countries which are not as transparent, in part due to the weaknesses in the capital 
markets in these countries. But even then, poverty and low domestic savings could limit 
cultural groups that are already economically challenged from effectively participating 
in stock exchange listings, unless special provisions are made for them.561  
 
A final point to be made on this issue is that speedy implementation of privatisation, 
which was discussed earlier, may not adequately factor in the time that may be need for 
creating a suitable framework for addressing these sensitive issues that may undermine 
the attainment of the ends of privatisation and threaten its long term sustainability.   
 
 
3.2.3.4.   WEIGHING THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING PRIVATISATION 
               AGAINST THE EXPECTED BENEFITS 
 
Many African countries that embarked on privatisation, in part due to the projected 
fiscal benefits attributed to it, including revenue from privatisation sales and savings 
from non-subsidisation of public enterprises, have been confronted with the mounting 
costs associated with its implementation, and unless these costs are kept in check, 
privatisation is not likely to play a role in restoring fiscal balance to their ailing 
economies or generating revenue for undertaking various social development 
programmes of the government, but may likely result in a net revenue loss for some 
countries.562   
 
These privatisation-related expenses include the cost of organising privatisation bids, 
paying severance benefits to retrenched workers and settling the internal and external 
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debts owed by the enterprises slated for privatisation563, maintaining loss-making public 
enterprises or operations after the profitable ones have been sold off564, and setting up 
and maintaining the various market regulatory institutions earlier mentioned.565 Defaults 
in payment coupled with the fact that some enterprises have been sold on credit despite 
massive public investment in them, further contribute to the financial losses associated 
with privatisation, of which it has been noted that where these losses are intended to be 
a form of subsidy to promote private sector development being one of the economic 
development benefits of privatisation in this thesis, there should be careful structuring 
and administration of such matters, rather than the issue being handled in an arbitrary 
way or used for political patronage purposes.566  
 
Sometimes instead of reaping tax revenue from profitable privatised enterprises, the 
reverse is the case given the earlier noted issues about the provision of various 
privatisation-related incentives to investors either in the form of direct financial support 
in the case of private subsidies and contractual payments to infrastructure service 
providers or forgone income in the case of tax breaks and duty exemptions.567 Undue 
emphasis on incentives where the underlying investment climate is not conducive to 
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long term investments will seriously drain public resources.568 Regarding the issue of 
contractual payments, the point was earlier made about African countries entering into 
dollar-denominated long-term contracts with private providers of utility/infrastructural 
services569, of which defaults under similar contracts in other countries stemming from 
unexpected economic downturn have triggered massive contractual claims that could 
sink a country deep into debt, a case in point being Argentina.570 
 
Regarding the issue of taxes, as earlier noted, some African countries do not have 
effective systems for ensuring proper tax collection, remittance and accounting, making 
it difficult to realise post-privatisation tax revenue.571  The private operator could evade 
taxes or maximise earnings through corporate governance sharp practices including 
transfer pricing and false accounting572, and there may also be little or nothing to tax 
where there is continuation of inefficient operations and losses after privatisation.   
 
The key point being made here is not that privatisation is costly to implement, of which 
some expenses may be unavoidable, rather, the point is that the expenses could inhibit 
the use of privatisation as a means of delivering the economic development benefit of 
enhanced revenue for the government. Besides, many African countries have had to 
borrowed extensively from the IFIs to finance the implementation of privatisation, 
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including the cost of paying off massive debts in enterprises slated for privatisation, and 
consequently are saddled with the huge cost of repaying these loans that have added to 
their debt profiles.573 Indeed sometimes a significant part of privatisation earnings are 
used for external debt servicing or repayment, leaving limited funds for social 
development initiatives.574  
 
3.2.3.5.        BALANCING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN 
                    PRIVATISATION IN THE INTEREST OF THE CITIZENS 
 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that privatisation often presents a connundrum regarding how 
to achieve its economic and social objectives both of which are essential for the 
realisation of the full spectrum of economic development benefits relating to 
privatisation. As discussed in Chapter 2, privatisation has been associated with a range 
of benefits for citizens in implementing countries, and within the categorisation of 
citizens, the research primarily focuses on how privatisation impacts on consumers and 
workers. Thus, the focus of the discussion here is not simply whether enterprise 
efficiency and profitability have been attained through privatisation, or whether 
privatisation has contributed to economic growth, but rather the distributional impact of 
privatisation on the citizens. Given the earlier noted point about some conflicts within 
the economic development objective of privatisation, is there a strategy for safeguarding 
the public interest, ensuring that privatisation’s benefits are broadly distributed  and 
ensuring that privatisation does not result in greater poverty and inequality for the 
citizens of a country?575  
 
In the African context, there is some concern that some African countries may not be 
able to deliver some privatisation benefits to their citizens. In this regard, it should be 
noted that in various African countries, the social objectives of extending affordable 
goods and services to as many citizens as possible, providing jobs for them and 
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reducing poverty and inequality formed part of the justification for establishing public 
enterprises in the first place.576 
 
On the one hand many public enterprises largely proved to be inefficient in discharging 
these responsibilities but on the other hand profit-driven private firms, whether or not 
they are efficient, may still not be able to meet the needs of majority of the citizens in 
these countries if social concerns are not effectively addressed. As noted earlier, key 
social indicators show that poverty, inequality and unemployment have remained quite 
prevalent, and economic development elusive, in many privatising African countries577, 
and while these problems may not all be attributable to privatisation, the 
implementation of privatisation legal reforms does not seem to have effectively 
contributed to their solution yet. As noted earlier, a World Bank report considers that:   
 
... achieving the public interest objectives of privatization will take 
longer than has elapsed since such reforms were introduced in most 
developing and transition economies.578 
 
Some aspects of the social concerns relating to privatisation have already been analysed 
under various headings, and the analysis here pulls these different concerns together, of 
which their cumulative effect is that the citizens may have to wait very long for the 
realisation of privatisation-related benefits. Thus regarding the issue of robustness of the 
institutional framework for implementing privatisation and monitoring its outcome, the 
point was made that some African countries do not have adequate institutional 
structures in place for undertaking regulatory functions579, with the result that regulators 
have often been unable to set and ensure compliance with performance standards, 
prevent unjustified price increases by monopoly utility providers or impose sanctions 
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where appropriate.580 It was noted in the discussion on the pace and sequencing of 
privatisation that poor sequencing has often led to monopoly contractual arrangements 
for utilities581, of which the above noted inadequacies of regulatory authorities, coupled 
with the weaknesses of competition authorities582, could limit key benefits for 
consumers.  
 
In the discussion on the cost implications of privatisation, the point was made that 
privatisation-related expenditure often leaves African countries with limited funds for 
pursuing social development programmes that could be beneficial to the citizens583 The 
point was also made that various invcentives including guarantees granted within the 
context of privatisation in Africa could undermine the need for private investors to be 
efficient. 
 
Evidence points to serious equity or distributional losses for some consumers in some 
African countries,  especially regarding utility/infrastructural services for poor people 
who constitute a significant proportion of the population in various African countries.  
 
Privatisation, including pre-privatisation sectoral reforms, often results in the upward 
review of tariffs with a view to assuring private service providers that their investments 
would be profitable of which the increased charges have sometimes resulted in fewer 
people having access, and for those that do, a significant amount of household income 
could be devoted to paying for utility/infrastructural services, further driving them into 
poverty.584 Where the private provider operates a monopoly, there would be no 
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alternative supplier to turn to. Poor rural dwellers sometimes bear the brunt most, owing 
to the fact that profit-driven private companies may not extend services to them in the 
first place or may even terminate services which were previously available in order to 
focus on the more affluent urban dwellers.585 Although some African countries have put 
in place some mechanism for controlling prices, tariffs usually seek to cover the cost of 
provision, with some margin for profits, and such controlled prices are still unaffordable 
in many African countries that do not have effective systems of social security that 
provide poor and unemployed people with reasonable resources to pay for basic 
supplies, of which it should also be noted that subsidies have sometimes been phased 
out within the context of fiscal reforms.586  
 
Ultimately, while the citizens of various African countries may have been ill served by 
inefficient public enterprises, privatisation as currently implemented may not offer real 
hope to many of them even if service quality has improved. 
 
The impact of privatisation on workers in Africa will be considered next. Employees of 
public enterprises billed for privatisation in Africa are often concerned about the fate 
that awaits them as a result of the exercise because the implementation of privatisation 
in Africa has often been accompanied by significant downsizing often referred to as 
right-sizing, undertaken in a bid to contain costs, increase efficiency and 
competitiveness and maximise stock market value.587 Statistical calculation of jobs lost 
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or gained as a result of privatisation would also need to factor in workers laid off as part 
of enterprise restructuring prior to privatisation, which has been done in some African 
countries as part of the process of preparing some enterprises for privatisation.588 
Without factoring in such pre-sale lay offs, one may have the impression that no jobs 
were lost as a result of privatisation since the new owners may not have actually sack 
anyone and in fact may have employed a few people after taking over the enterprise.  
 
There are a number of problems associated with privatisation-related downsizing. The 
severance pay for the sacked of workers, apart from the fact that it is often too meagre, 
is sometimes not forthcoming, which poses a major problem given that many poor 
countries also do not have social security systems that ensure regular payment of 
unemployment benefits to those that are out of work.589  The fact that privatisation 
primarily involves the takeover of exising enterprises and operations in a country rather 
than the establishment of new greenfield investments, coupled with the lack of effective 
competition especially regarding utilities, limits the ability of laid of workers to seek 
alternative employment with other competing enterprises.590 Sometimes foreign 
investors in Africa prefer to employ workers from their home jurisdictions rather than 
employ local staff, further lmiting the options available to the later.591 The point was 
also made earlier that despite the potential benefits of market reform policies like trade 
liberalisation, it has sometimes been blamed for contributing to enterprise closures and 
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resulting job losses in Africa, generally as well as with respect to privatised enterprises 
especially when improperly timed.592  
 
It should be noted that some legal and contractual provisions in some African countries 
could be of some use in tackling some of adverse fallouts of privatisation that 
undermine key economic development benefits for citizens, including consumers and 
workers. Some of them such as South Africa, Malawi and Nigeria, have codified some 
of the social ends of development as enforceable constitutional rights.593 Properly 
utilised and creatively interpreted, it could be an avenue for compelling the government 
for instance to provide adequate severance benefits and social security  for workers 
sacked as a result of privatisation, provide adequate subsidies to ensure that most 
citizens are still able to afford basic utility/infrastructural services and compel 
regulatory bodies or regulated enterprises to ensure the provision of privatised goods 
and services of adequate quality.594 However, just like privatisation law, sometimes 
implementation issues, including legal interpretation of the scope of the rights could 
limit the effectiveness of such rights and guarantees595, coupled with other factors like 
cost of litigation and judicial inefficiency or corruption. Dennis Davis notes regarding 
South Africa for instance that:   
 
The fact that poverty and homelessness still plague many South Africans 
is a painful reminder of the chasm that still needs to be bridged before 
the constitutional ideal to establish a society based on social justice and 
improved quality of life for all citizens is fully achieved.596 
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Besides the constitutional guarantees, in some African countries, the governements did 
a trade-off between receiving low prices for privatised enterprises with securing 
contractual undertaking from the new investors to retain the whole workforce and make 
necessary investments in the enterprises.597 Also to be noted is that some African 
countries put in place schemes for assisiting workers to buy shares, however 
mechanisms like share voucher or loan schemes which would have promoted popular 
capitalism and provided some measure of compensation for rising prices do not appear 
to have been utilised, of which poverty and limited domestic savings, as earlier noted 
are key hindrances to effective participation.598  
 
A final issue to be analysed is how the IFIs have approached issues pertaining to the 
welfare of consumers and workers in the privatisation process. The IFIs have often 
made the case that in order to attract investors especially those that will invest in 
utility/infrastructural services, ‘cost-reflective tariffs’ would need to be charged, which 
would allow investors to earn reasonable profits on their investments.599 They have also 
emphasised the need for countries to scale back subsidies to public enterprises and 
harden their budgets, noting that the subsidy savings should rather be chanelled to social 
sectors like education and health600, and also noting that ‘cutting off access to subsidies, 
privileges, and soft credit is crucial to making privatization a true economic change and 
not just a transfer of title.’601 They have also argued that it is often necessary to reduce 
the staff strenght of enterprises slated for privatisation to position them for greater 
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efficiency and make them attractive to prospective investors, and have also made the 
case for greater labour market and wage flexibility to enhance efficient job creation.602 
 
In the light of the above, the IFIs have often been perceived to have adopted a narrow 
economic perspective on privatisation within the context of aid and development 
assistance, which does not sufficiently factor in some of the social concerns discussed 
above.603 This also links up with the earlier discussed concern about undue focus on 
speedy implementation of privatisation and target setting as opposed to adopting a 
broad economic development perspective on privatisation.604    
 
Regarding the perception of social insensitivity, it should be noted that the poor 
performance of many public enterprises in Africa was partly attributed to excessive 
employment and tariffs kept low due to political intereference in the operation of the 
enterprises.605 Given that the status quo appeared unsustainable, it would make sense to 
put enterprises in the best position to attract foreign investment in a competitive global 
market. The IFIs have also played a role in the setting up of some social safety net 
mechanisms and job creation schemes in some African countries606 Where they do not 
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work well or appear ineffective, it may owe more to the poor local administration for 
which the IFIs may not necessarily be blamed. Equally, the poor functioning of 
regulatory bodies that are expected to protect consumer’s interest may also owe more to 
local implementation issues.607 Also, the sustainance of social safety nets including 
consumer subsidies and the creating of alternative employment opportunities may rest 
more on the overall  improvement of the economy, premised on which the private sector 
will be positioned to create new jobs and the state would have more resources to address 
social issues.608 But there is a catch 22 situation here – privatisation is expected to 
facilitate such economic improvement, yet if there are flaws in its implementation as 
noted regarding Africa, it will be less able to do so failing which it will be difficult to 
address the negative fallouts of privatisation. Also to note is that the implementation 
problems of privatisation are also likely to affect overall private sector development. 
The next  and final section in the chapter, which explored the issue of corruption shows 
that a government that does not act in the best interest of the citizens may not be in a 
position to address their social concerns as discussed above.       
 
 
3.2.4.      IS THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS ACCOUNTABLE,  
              TRANSPARENT AND FREE FROM CORRUPTION? 
 
  
Endemic official corruption is one of the key problems that has undermined economic 
development in many African countries, and often involves not just political leaders but 
also their relatives and political allies.609 Corruption, especially deep rooted official 
corruption is antithetical to economic development since state resources that should be 
utilised for various social ends that would benefit the wider population illicitly ends up 
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in much fewer pockets.610 NEPAD recognises that corruption has been one of the 
contributory factors to Africa’s underdevelopment and makes its eradication, a top 
priority in Africa.611 One of the reasons frequently given as justification for privatisation 
is its expected role in curbing corruption in implementing countries including the use of 
public enterprises for political patronage and various other forms of corruption.612 
However, the fact that the privatisation programmes of some countries, including 
African countries have been beset with various allegations of corruption, cronyism and 
nepotism, raises doubt about whether privatisation is an effective corruption remedy in 
these countries or whether it has become part of the problem by paving way for new 
forms of corruption.613  
 
Some of the forms of privatisation corruption that have been identified include the ilicit 
purchase of privatised enterprises by political leaders or their cronies or relatives at 
giveaway prices with questionable funds614, and granting licences, concessions and 
regulatory approvals to cronies or in exchange for bribes.615 Through these forms of 
corruption, the government could illicitly control the access to, and composition of the 
emerging private sector in many African countries, shape its direction and promote 
crony capitalism at the expense of the real reforms that should have informed the 
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privatisation exercise.616 This could give rise to a new class of private entrepreneurs ill-
suited to pilot the affairs of the privatised enterprises and ensure efficient performance 
given that they were not primarily selected on the basis of competence but rather 
emerged through compromised privatisation processes.617 Such illegitimate 
beneficiaries of the privatisation process are sometimes more interested in stripping the 
assets of enterprises to the detriment of minority shareholders, rather than in investing 
in them and improving their performance, particularly where the institutional 
framework for regulating the market is weak.618 Thus although privatisation could 
facilitate broad based private sector development, this objective is less likely to be 
realised where cronyism permeates the implementation process.619  
 
Where the award of privatisation procurement contracts is influenced by corruption and 
cronyism, the likelihood is that these contracts may not be satisfactorily executed given 
that the integrity of the contracting process has already been compromised, and tainted 
public officials may have no incentive to insist on adequate contractual performance 
given their complicity.620 In the case of utility/infrastructure enterprises, where political 
leaders in a country own or have interest in the private service providers that take over 
the supply of public services or granted these concessions in exchange for bribes, they 
may not be concerned about ensuring the reasonable pricing of tariffs or punishing 
regulatory breaches, and where privatisation is influenced by corruption, various 
regulatory institutions could be captured by vested interests rendering them ineffective 
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to discharge their assigned regulatory tasks.621  The scope for regulatory capture and 
other forms of corruption is enhanced where the remuneration of public officers is poor, 
as is the case with many African countries.622    
   
It would appear that 2 key factors have encouraged these forms of corruption namely, 
the inadequacy of the methods or procedures adopted for implementing privatisation in 
some countries and secondly, the disregard of procedural safeguard measures enshrined 
in various privatisation rules and regulations to guarantee the transparency and integrity 
of the privatisation programme even when they are clear and unambiguous.623 
Sometimes the design of anti-corruptions laws makes adequate enforcement difficult 
especially where they provide ample loopholes for offenders and also the ability of anti-
corrution institutions to enforce relevent laws could be affected by their lack of 
independence.624 Rigged bidding processes are sometimes facilitated by loopholes 
created in the privatisation legal framework for special interests.625 Methods of 
privatisation such as private placements and negotiated sales, which are not as 
transparent as capital market privatisation have been utilised in some African 
countries626, in part due to the earlier noted problem of absence of robust stock 
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markets627, and this has also created room for allegations of corruption to infiltrate the 
implementation of privatisation.628 It bears noting however that since they have also 
been used in some other countries without triggering corruption concerns, the problem 
may lie less with the method of privatisation and more with the personal motivations of 
those implementing the programme and the effectiveness of the legal and institutional 
constraints within which they operate.629   
 
The IFIs recognise the adverse impact that corruption could have on development and 
the need for greater transparency in the privatisation context630, and have taken various 
steps aimed at curbing corruption especially regarding projects in which they are 
involved. Recommendations that have been made include undertaking necessary legal 
reforms, reforming the civil service, strenghtening various government agencies, setting 
up anti-corruption bodies, reforming the tax system and undertaking necessary judicial 
reforms.631 Nevertheless, they have been criticised for treating corruption in a simplistic 
way, as something that could be cured by enhancing the administrative and technocratic 
quality of governance in a country through capacity building initiatives, enacting more 
laws and setting up formal institutional structures to deal with corruption, and placing 
greater reliance on market forces, while reducing the role of the state in the economy.632 
In some of the African countries where corruption is rampant however, some of these 
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formal reforms have been carried out to varying degrees, but perpetrators are still able 
to escape sanction.633  
 
It has been noted that ‘... the erratic deployment of reform campaigns in cultures with 
high levels of corruption and weak legal regimes operates to reinforce control by the 
group in power ...’634 One of the features observed in some African countries is the 
seeming blurring of the dividing line between the public and private domains, which has 
often made political leaders to treat public office as private estates to be exploited, 
including theft of public funds, thus undermining the public interest.635 Where 
corruption is endemic, the mere existence of anti-corruption laws and institutions may 
be ineffective to deal with the problem, particularly where it is deeply rooted in national 
political and cultural systems and structures.636 It has been noted that the IFI approach 
to reforms like privatisation and institution-building does not fully factor in this specific 
political feature of corruption in African states637, of which the point has been made that 
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any effective anti-corruption measure should factor in such specific national 
circumstances.638 Indeed the IFIs have been accused of showing tolerance for corruption 
where a state has shown willingness to embrace market forces and overlooking it under 
the guise of maintaining investor confidence where private investors get embroiled in 
corruption allegations resulting from their privatisation investments.639 As earlier noted, 
the World Bank is a co-investor in some of these private ventures, a fact that may 
compromise its objectivity in giving privatisation advice to privatising countries, or 
dealing with privatisation-related corruption, and it has been accused of partnering in 
some cases with private investors that have already been found guilty of corrupt 
practices.640  
 
It would not be right to solely focus on the failings of the IFIs on the issue of corruption. 
there is a limit to what an international organisation can do where there is no political 
will to address the problem within a country or the political leaders do not have the 
incentive to enforce transparency requirements in privatisation laws and regulations.641  
 
It should also be noted that although NEPAD recognises the adverse effect of corruption 
on development, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption does not stipulate sanctions for corruption.642 This substantially weakens its 
effectiveness in actually checking corruption in the continent.643 Even at that, more than 
a third of the members have not yet ratified it.644   
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In summation, where privatisation is synonymous with corruption, besides the fact that 
it is unlikely to promote economic development, it would also lose legitimacy from the 
perspective of the citizens. While some investors may still seek to invest in a corrupt 
environment, som others may also decide to stay clear given the general legal, 
regulatory and other uncertainties involved in operating in such an environment plus the 
possibility of future probes.645  
 
 
3.3.          EVALUATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
A critical appraisal of the case for privatisation in Africa was undertaken in this chapter, 
which also examined the design and implementation problems that militate against the 
realisation of the full economic development benefits that should flow from legally 
changing the ownership and/or control structure of public enterprises from public to 
private. These problems indicate that the various prerequisites for effective privatisation 
outcomes discussed in Chapter 2 were not adequately factored in while designing or 
implementing the programme in various African countries. Owing to the fact that issues 
pertaining to the policy and legal framework of privatisation, its institutional structure 
and implementation strategy and the motivations of political leaders that undertake its 
implementation are variable factors that could differ from country to country, various 
implementing Africa countries are likely to realise the benefits or experience the pitfalls 
of privatisation to varying degrees. In the next chapter, problems associated with the 
adoption and implementation of privatisation in Nigeria will be examined, which will 
also shed further light on the way the IFIs have influenced the privatisation policy and 
process in the African continent.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruptio
n.pdf> accessed 2 May 2009. 
 
645 PD Ocheje, ‘Refocusing International Law on the Quest for Accountability in Africa: The Case against 
the “Other” Impunity’ (2002) 15 LJIL 749, 759; J Nellis, ‘The World Bank, Privatization and Enterprise 
Reform in Transition Economies: A Retrospective Analysis’  (2002) World Bank OED Working Paper 
<http://www.worldbank.org/oed/transitioneconomies/docs/privatization_enterprise.pdf> accessed 6 June 
2005 51. 
 
174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA 
 
 
 
Having critically appraised the case for privatisation as an economic development 
policy tool for Africa, this chapter narrows the focus to Nigeria, one of the African 
countries that adopted this reform option, and has consequently, put in place the legal, 
regulatory and institutional framework for implementing the legal transfer of the 
ownership and/or control of public enterprises to private entrepreneurs. Nigeria is 
among the 25 countries in the Low Human Development category of UNDP’s Human 
Development Index rankings646, and according to a report, ‘Nigeria is one of the world’s 
poorest countries, with more than 60% of its population in deep poverty.’647  
 
Like many other African countries did after gaining political independence, Nigeria 
pursued a statist development strategy that included the formulation of national 
economic development plans and enacting of laws to implement policy measures like 
indigenisation and nationalisation of foreign enterprises, setting up of new public 
enterprises, import substitution industrialisation as well as continued state ownership 
and operation of various public utility/infrastructural enterprises that pre-dated the 1960 
political independence.648 In the case of indigenisation, the aim was to curb the 
dominance of foreign entrepreneurs and personnel in key sectors of the national 
economy.649 The World Bank endorsed the expansion in public sector investments even 
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as it recognised the need for private investments.650 These measures largely failed to 
deliver the expected economic development to the country and its citizens and various 
enterprises were plagued with a host of problems including poor definition of their 
goals, excessive political interference, excessive and inefficient staffing, insufficient 
funding for operations and excessive dependence on the government for financial 
support, overall inefficient performance and poor productivity stemming in part from 
the monopoly operation of some enterprises, maladministration, corruption and 
cronyism and lack of accountability 651 In subsequently adopting and implementing 
privatisation, the country now seeks to give greater economic role to the private sector 
and foreign investments, of which privatisation has been described as the ‘centrepiece’ 
of its structural reforms.652 The conception of privatisation guiding national 
policymakers, utilised in practice and reflected in the privatisation law fits within the 
broader perspective of privatisation articulated in Chapter 2 i.e it encompasses the 
outright and permanent sale of some enterprises, partial privatisation of some 
enterprises and various contractual arrangements for ceding control of public enterprises 
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to private investors, and also encompasses public enterprises that produce goods as well 
as those that produce services such as utilities.653 
 
An analysis of the stated objectives of the Nigerian privatisation programme shows that 
its implementation is expected to contribute to the actualisation of various benefits that 
tally with the key economic development benefits of privatisation noted in this thesis, 
namely benefit to the public sector, benefit to the privatised enterprises, contribution to 
overall private sector development, benefit to the citizens of the country, and finally, its 
usefulness as a conduit for beneficial foreign investment inflow.654 Given that 
privatisation has now been implemented for many years in the country, the key question 
for the purposes of the research is whether the economic development objectives behind 
the new policy and legal framework for private ownership and/or control of public 
enterprises have been achieved or are in the process of being achieved, and accordingly, 
whether privatisation has played the expected contributory role to economic 
development in the country. If they have not yet been achieved, why not? 
 
Akin to the broader verdict on African privatisation, the case study of the Nigerian 
privatisation programme, which involved a critical analysis of the outcome of 
privatisation in the country, reveals a mixed bag of results. According to a report, 
Nigeria has realised some financial benefits being the proceeds of some privatisation 
privatisation transactions, and there has been a reduction in public subsidies as well as 
some efficiency improvements.655 A news report cites the Bureau of Public Enterprises 
(BPE), the implementing body for privatisation in Nigeria as stating that ‘from the 
standpoint of performance of privatised enterprises, the Nigerian privatisation 
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programme has been hugely successful so far’, referring to some enterprises where there 
has been increased turnover and productivity and employment of new staff.656 Some 
others have also credited privatisation with some efficiency and profitability 
improvements and also noted that some of the listed companies in which the 
government sold off the remainder of its shares are doing well on the stock market.657  
 
However, despite these noted benefits of privatisation to the country, it cannot be said 
that the full spectrum of economic development benefits of privatisation have now been 
conclusively realised. While the instances of progress cannot be overlooked, they 
cannot form the basis for a comprehensive verdict that the privatisation programme has 
definitely succeeded, and in the same way a gap existed between the economic 
development rationale for setting up many public enterprises and the actual reality of 
their existence, some gaps have also been noted between the stated economic 
development rationale for embarking on the Nigerian privatisation programme and the 
actual reality observed from the implementation of the programme so far, owing to 
various factors. Especially regarding the second privatisation programme that 
commenced in 1999, some published articles as well as contemporaneous news reports 
on key transactions have noted key instances of failed or problematic transactions that 
detracted from the realisation of set privatisation objectives, despite the fact that the 
country has detailed laws, regulations, policies, procedural guidelines aimed at 
advancing the objectives of privatisation and minimising implementation pitfalls.658 
Some aspects of the implementation process also reveal unresolved conflict between the 
economic and social goals of privatisation. In Chapter 3, various design and 
implementation concerns were analysed regarding the implementation of privatisation 
in Africa and using the same analytical framework, this chapter will analyse how these 
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concerns have manifested in the adoption and implementation of privatisation in Nigeria 
and bridging the gap between privatisation law and policy and the actual practice of 
privatisation will depend on how these concerns are addressed. The importance of the 
case study is underscored by the fact that the privatisation programme is still on-going 
including the reform of the electricity sector discussed in the next chapter, and lessons 
learnt from past mistakes could lead to vital reforms in the way the government pursues 
the programme going forward.  
 
4.1.        DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK   
 
4.1.1.     THE PRIVATISATION POLICY FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
 
As noted earlier, the way the privatisation policy is adopted in a country plays a crucial 
role in determining its effectiveness in achieving stated objectives, and flaws in the 
adoption of the policy could lead to various implementation problems or negative 
outcomes. The focus here is on whether the decision of the Nigerian government to 
embark on privatisation was simply a pragmatic reaction by the government to the 
failure of Nigerian public enterprises as some have noted659 or whether other issues or 
motives were at stake. Was the privatisation policy measure borne out of clear 
conviction about its merits over other reform alternatives, as a tool for reforming public 
enterprises and facilitating the various economic development ends of privatisation? In 
Chapter 3, 3 viewpoints were examined on why African countries that earlier pursued 
public ownership of enterprises eventually decided to adopt the privatisation reform 
option, namely the conviction, coercion and vested interest viewpoints.660 Based on the 
reasoning in Chapter 3, the effectiveness of the privatisation legal framework in 
delivering exepected economic dividends in  Nigeria would depend on the extent to 
which it is anchored on a well thoughtout policy adopted by national policy makers 
genuinely convinced about the merits of privatisation. The Nigerian case study revealed 
elements of the 3 view points in the adoption of privatisation in the country of which it 
is not clear that conviction was the primary deciding factor.  
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Generally speaking, it have been noted that the economic policy making process in 
Nigeria appears to suffer from some systemic problems, often leading to lack of clear 
policy articulation and considerable volatility in economic reform policies adopted by 
governments in the country.661 Abdullahi Shehu further points out that ‘generally, there 
has been no consistency in government policy making and implementation in 
Nigeria’.662 Commenting on Nigeria’s poor economic performance over the years, Paul 
Collier attributes the country’s economic policy flaws to the fact that ‘the political 
institutions which govern economic policy have been ill-suited to their task’663 Bola 
Dauda notes that Nigeria’s ‘industrial policies, which are products of weak political and 
administrative structures, are characterized by inertia and confusion’664, and further 
notes with respect to the era of statist development strategy as follows:  
 
If policy has a declared objective, it is simple to measure the outcome by 
relating such output to the objectives. In Nigeria, however, industrial 
policy objectives were encapsulated in vague phrases or slogans such as 
self-reliance, even development and regional balancing, diversification 
and expansion of the economy, import substitution, export drive, 
increase in income from manufacturing activity, and creation of 
employment opportunities. From the ...  review of the evolution of 
industrial policies, it is clear that these objectives were motivated by 
national self-interest and for that reason they were symbolic phrases 
which had deeper political meaning and functionality in the political 
quest for legitimacy than in real industrial policy terms.665  
 
Specifically regarding privatisation, the position of the Nigerian government is that the 
decision to embark on privatisation was premised on conviction that this was the most 
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appropriate way of overcoming various problems associated with state ownership, 
positioning the country for inflow of foreign direct investment and associated financial 
resourses and managerial and technical expertise, delivering fairly priced qualitiative 
utlity services to the citizens and positioning both the public and private sectors for 
greater efficiency.666 President Obasanjo, under whose leadership many enteprises were 
privatised noted that ‘We are privatizing for the benefit of our economic recovery and 
our social life.  We are not embarking on this exercise to please the World Bank or the 
IMF.’667 He was also one of the key driving forces in the adoption of NEPAD which 
endorsed privatisation and close collaboration with the IFIs as noted in Chapter 3.668 
Some of the bodies set up in the past in Nigeria to look into the problems of public 
enterprises also made a number of reform recommendations, including privatisation.669  
 
It should be noted however that some of the official government policies that endorsed 
the privatisation of some key sectors, such as the electricity sector, the broader energy 
sector and the industrial sector, actually post-date the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 
that scheduled enterprises in these sectors for privatisation, which begs the question – 
on what basis were they scheduled for privatisation?670 As earlier noted, Douglas Was 
points out that some of the arguments advanced in favour of privatisation constitute a 
priori justification of privatisation that may not stand up to close scrutiny.671 Crafting 
policies after a law as already been enacted is indicative that the law informed and 
influenced the policies rather than the other way round, essentially placng the cart 
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before the horse. The industrial policy also notes that ‘The trend worldwide is towards 
liberalisation and privatisation in manufacturing industry. Nigeria has taken an initial 
step at deregulating the industry through privatisation and commercialisation.’672 This 
gives the appearance that privatisation in the country is premised more on conformity 
with the global trend rather than conviction as to its specific utility for advancing the 
economic interests of the country.   
 
Considering the coercion viewpoint however, although Nigeria was not indebted to the 
IMF, it had to agree to adopt and implement its programmes of which privatisation was 
one of the key conditionalities, owing to the fact that the IMF’s endorsement was a 
basic prerequisite before other official lenders of the country like the Paris Club or the 
London Club could enter into debt relief/ rescheduling negotiations, which the country 
urgently needed.673 Premised on this leverage, official documentation from the IMF 
usually contains information on the government’s compliance with target dates set for 
completing key privatisation transacions as well as privatisation related law reform.674 
The view has been expressed that for domestic political acceptability, the economic 
reforms endorsed by the ifis, including privatisation, have been presented to the citizens 
as home-grown reform programmes, of which both the first privatisation programme 
that ended in 1993 and the second one that commenced in 1999 fit within this 
scenario.675 In this regard, it should be noted that the current development paradigm in 
                                                             
672 Federal Ministry of Industry, Nigeria, ‘Industrial Policy for Nigeria: Targets, Policies, Incentives, 
Guidelines and Institutional Framework’ (November 2001) <http://bpe.dev.bsh-
bg.com/NR/rdonlyres/E16B257D-99C8-46EA-B792-A339893D7107/0/IndustrialPolicy.pdf> accessed 30 
June 2006 21. 
 
673 A Kolo, ‘Managing Post-Privatisation Political and Regulatory Risks in Nigeria – a Law and Policy 
Perspective’ (2004) 22 J Energy & Nat Resources L 473, 477-478; V Akpotaire, ‘The Nigerian 
Indigenisation Laws as Disincentives to Foreign Investment: The End of an Era’ (2005) 26 BLR 62, 67; 
NM Ogubunka, Elements of Privatisation in Nigeria (Rhema Enterprises, Lagos 2000) 51-52; J Herbst 
and CC Soludo, ‘Nigeria’, in S Devarajan, D Dollar and T Holmgren (eds), Aid and Reform in Africa: 
Lessons from Ten Case Studies (World Bank, Washington DC 2001) 650; JD Fearon, ‘International 
Financial Institutions and Economic Policy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1988) 26 J Mod Afr Stud 
113, 122; W Reno, ‘Old Brigades, Money Bags, New Breeds, and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria’ 
(1993) 27 Can J Afr Stud 66, 72; R Mowoe, ‘The World Bank and the IMF in External Debt 
Management’ in IA Ayua and B Owasanoye (eds), External Debt and Financial Management in Nigeria 
(NIALS, Lagos 1997) 71. 
 
674 IMF, ‘Nigeria: 2001 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information 
Notice on the Executive Board Discussion’ (Report) (August 2001) IMF Country Report No 01/131 24, 
52, 59, 62-63, 67-72. 
 
675 OC Okafor, ‘The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movements in Nigeria’s Dual Economic and 
Political Transition, 1999–2005’ (2007) 51 JAL 68, 74-75; P Lewis, ‘From Prebendalism to Predation: 
The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria’ (1996) 34 J Mod Afr Stud 79, 83, 103; PM Lewis, ‘State, 
Economy, and Privatisation in Nigeria’ in JL Upper and GB Baldwin, Public Enterprises: Restructuring 
183 
 
Nigeria called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(NEEDS), which was developed under the auspices of the Nigerian National Planning 
Commission, places emphasis on privatisation and has also been presented as a home-
grown reform programme.676 However it should be noted that this policy document is 
also Nigeria’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a key document in IFI 
financing/debt relief arrangements, of which Nigeria has been updating the IMF on its 
implementation.677 As earlier indicated, some have noted that PRSPs are usually 
prepared within very narrow confines to tally with IFI pre-endorsed policies.678 In 
addition, the World Bank has also provided significant funding for executing the 
privatisation programme.679 
 
Regarding the vested interest viewpoint of the Nigerian privatisation programme, the 
concern is whether the undertaking of privatisation, rather than being genuinely 
motivated by the need to facilitate economic development, has rather being influenced 
by the rent seeking and patronage opportunities it presents. By way analogy, Morris 
Szeftel writes regarding Zambia, another African country that:  
 
On the one hand, there is the demand by northern donors and the Bretton 
Woods institutions that international capital must have an attractive and 
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secure environment for investment; and, on the other, there are those in 
Zambia's ruling party for whom privatisation is an opportunity for 
personal accumulation. For those concerned with 'rolling back the state', 
who care little about how selling off public assets shapes Zambian 
society, the privatisation process has been exemplary. For those involved 
in private accumulation or perhaps more specifically, for the much larger 
number excluded from it, the programme is, indeed, less about 
liberalisation and more about looting.680 
 
Issues pertaining to corruption in Nigeria’s privatisation will be analysed later in the 
chapter, but what can be discerned from Morris Szeftel’s observation above is the point 
earlier made that the different viewpoints of privatisation are not necessarily mutually 
inconsistent. However, to the extent that Nigeria’s privatisation programme may not be 
solely or primarily driven by conviction about its economic development utility, and 
may not be a true home grown programme as claimed, which fully factors in the 
peculiarities of the social context of implementation, legal reforms undertaken to 
implement it may be less likely to facilitate such economic development in the country.   
   
4.1.2.        THE PRIVATISATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
 
Some aspects of the legal and regulatory framework for the implementation of 
privatisation in Nigeria gives cause for concern, and the concern relates to both 
categories of laws and regulations noted in Chapter 2 as being vital for successful 
implementation of privatisation.681 Specifically at issue are some legal and 
constitutional issues relating to the privatisation programme and the nature of some of 
the substantive provisions of the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 and other market-
support legislations. Regarding the issue of legal and constitutional basis for some 
aspects of the privatisation programme and some transactions, there are some areas of 
conflict between the constitution of the country and the Public Enterprises Decree 1999. 
According to section 16 of the Nigerian Constitution: 
 
The State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which 
provisions are made in this constitution: (c) without prejudice to its right 
to operate or participate in areas of the economy, other than the major 
sectors of the economy, manage and operate the major sectors of the 
economy; (d) without prejudice to the right of any person to participate 
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in areas of the economy within the major sectors of the economy, protect 
the right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the 
major sectors of the economy.682 (emphsis added) 
 
It further provides that: 
 
The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that the economic 
system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of 
wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of few 
individuals or of a group.683  
 
The above provisions appear inconsistent with the current privatisation agenda of the 
Federal Government, because while the Constitution stipulates that the state shall 
manage and operate the major sectors of the economy, the Public Enterprises Decree 
1999 authorises the privatisation of many public enterprises that also fall within the 
major sectors of the economy, with the consequential takeover of management and 
operation by private investors.684 Also, while the Constitution seeks to ensure that the 
means of production will not be concentrated in a few hands, the Public Enterprises 
Decree 1999, coupled with the current absence of a competition law or enforcement 
authority in the country, creates avenue for such concentration and the creation of 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures because the privatisation strategy of 
selling enterprises to core/ strategic investors provided under the decree, would mean 
fewer participants in the privatisation exercise particularly where such investors acquire 
full ownership of enerprises in which minority shareholders do not have effective means 
of participating in.685 This has been noted to be the end result of privatisation in some of 
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the Africa countries and detracts from the privatisation objective of actualising popular 
capitalism.686 Although the government indicated that privatisation would not be an 
instrument for the concentration of enterprise ownership in a few hands687, this may not 
have been reflected in the actual implementation process as will be seen later, and 
although the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 and Guidelines on Privatisation of 
Government Enterprises contain provisions for the general public to be able to acquire 
shares in various enterprises scheduled for privatisation, a key institutional mechanism 
for actualising this, the Share Purchase Fund Scheme, has still not been put in place 
several years after the commencement of the programme.688 It should be noted however 
that section 16 noted above falls within Chapter 2 of the Constitution, which contains 
the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. These are policy 
objectives that should guide the government in policymaking and are non-justiceable by 
virtue of section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution, although the Nigerian Supreme Court has 
ruled that the parliament could enact legislation to make Chapter 2 provisions 
enforceable.689 However, the fact that the same military government that enacted this 
Constitution equally enacted the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 buttresses the point 
earlier made that about insufficient consideration of the policy goals of the privatisation 
programme. Also regrettably, former President Obasanjo appeared to endorse such 
economic concentration based on a trickle down philosophy in an interview, and even 
referenced Russia where privatisation resulted in similar wealth concentration.690 It 
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should be noted that a future government may yet decide to use section 16 as a basis to 
push for the nationalisation of some of the enterprises that have been privatised. In this 
regard, it could utilise the constitutional provision that says that:  
 
A body shall be set up by an Act of the National Assembly which shall 
have power to review, from time to time, the ownership and control of 
business enterprises operating in Nigeria and make recommendations to 
the President on same.691 
 
 
Another constitutional question has been raised regarding whether the National Council 
on Privatisation (NCP), the lead policymaking organ established under the Public 
Enterprises Decree 1999, can legally amend any of the schedules to the decree or sell to 
a core/ strategic investor, a stake that is more than the percentage of shares stipulated in 
the decree. Under the decree, the NCP is given the power to alter, amend, add to or 
delete from the privatisation and commercialisation schedules detailing the enterprises 
to be privatised.692 Acting in exercise of this power, the NCP has made orders switching 
some enterprises from one list to the other or increasing the ownership stake to be 
acquired in some enterprises scheduled for partial privatisation.693 Further, although the 
decree provides for the sale of privatisation shares to Nigerians on the basis of equality 
of states, the NCP has now decided that it should rather be done on the basis of equality 
of Federal Constituencies.694 Although some have expressed the view that the NCP 
could validly exercise this power to alter or amend schedules to a legislation695, it 
should be noted that the Constitution vests all federal law making powers in the 
National Assembly, which is the federal legislature of the country.696 Thus the 
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Chairman of the legislative committee on privatisation and commercialisation has 
argued that such alteration of legislative schedules ‘is unconstitutional, void, ultra vires 
and without legal backing whatsoever. An action can be maintained in court at any time 
to declare it so.’697 The issue here is that the Public Enterprises Decree 1999, which was 
enacted during the era of military rule, became an ‘existing law’ upon the coming into 
force of the Constitution in 1999 and is now deemed to be an Act of the National 
Assembly, and thus cannot be amended by the NCP which the Constitution does not 
recognise as a law-making body.698 This also applies to the power to ‘approve the legal 
and regulatory framework for public enterprises to be privatised’ conferred on the NCP 
by the Public Enterprises Decree 1999, which power falls squarely within the domain of 
the National Assembly.699 The legal conflict explored above may later result in the legal 
challenge and invalidation of some privatisation transactions premised on the 
unconstitutionality of some of the actions of the NCP.   
 
Some legal challenges may also result from issues stemming from the country’s land 
tenure system. BPE has already been contacted by communities seeking substantial 
payment representing unpaid accumulated rent and compensation for land which the 
government used in bulding some enterprises that it now seeks to privatise.700 In this 
regard, it should be noted that in some European countries for instance, the privatisation 
programmes provided for the compensation of, or reversion of title to previous owners 
of nationalised enterprises.701 Unless BPE clearly resolves this issue and clarifies the 
property rights being acquired by private investors, the latter are likely to be wary about 
getting entangled in pre-existing conflicts and potentially facing lawsuits.      
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Besides the above issues, the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 does not appear to have 
adequate provisions for checks and balances to ensure proper accountability of the 
privatisation process. While it provided for the NCP to oversee the activities of the BPE 
in implementing privatisation, members of both bodies are appointees of the President, 
who is also the person to whom the NCP renders account to under the decree.702 Given 
the legal, economic, social and other implications of privatisation especially where it 
involves enterprises in key sectors of the economy, it would have been better if there 
were an independent mechanism for overseeing their functioning. Efforts by the 
National Assembly to introduce such oversight mechanisms in a new legislative bill for 
privatisation were resisted by the former President until the last legislative session 
ended, although contemporaneous news reports indicate that the National Assembly still 
made effort to hold BPE and the President accountable.703 Nevertheless, some of the 
flaws that have been observed in the implementation of privatisation in the country 
including transparency concerns, which will be examined later, may have resulted from 
absence of adequate checks and balances in the Public Enterprises Decree 1999. 
 
Further on the issue of accountability as well as transparency, the methods of 
privatisation provided under the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 are open-ended, 
encompassing the sale of privatisation shares ‘by public issue ... or private placement ... 
through a willing seller and willing buyer basis or through any other means.’704 In this 
regard, the point was made earlier that privatisation through the capital market, which 
has been noted to offer greater transparency relative to other methods of privatisation, 
has not been predominantly used in Africa, partly due to the lack of robust capital 
markets in some African countries.705 However, the Nigerian capital market, which has 
existed since the early 1960s is better developed than most of its counterparts in other 
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African countries and was extensively used during the first privatisation programme.706 
The earlier noted privatisation strategy of selling enterprises to core/ strategic investors 
coupled with the discretion afforded under the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 to utilise 
other methods of privatisation besides public offer, created openings for some of the 
non-transparent deals that emerged, as will be seen later in the chapter.707 In this regard, 
it is curious that the privatisation decree does not have an ‘offences’ section that 
stiulates offences relating to privatisation and the punishment thereof.708 Inded it even 
seeks to place a limitation on law suits against members of the NCP and officers and 
staff of the BPE. Given the potential for conflict of interest in the discharge of 
responsibilities associated with selling multibillion dollar worth of national assets, the 
omission is quite regrettable. Regarding potential criminal prosecutions, it has also been 
pointed out that gaps in the old criminal procedure laws in the country could impact on 
the prosecution of corruption given that they have not been updated to take account of 
new and evolving forms of corrution.709   
 
Beyond the completion of privatisation transactions, the legal framework for continued 
monitoring of privatised enterprises to ensure that their performance is in consonance 
with set objectives has some defects. Although the Guidelines on Privatisation of 
Government Enterprises state that a core/ strategic investor’s post-privatisation plans for 
the management, development and financing of the enterprise, as well as plans for 
employing local managers, technology transfer and staff welfare, retraining and 
development are some of the critical issues to be taken into consideration in negotiating 
with the investor710, the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 does not provide a post-
privatisation monitoring mechanism  to ensure that there is no post-contractual breach 
by the core/ strategic investor regarding these considerations which have significant 
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economic development implications.711 There is also the risk of malfeasance such as 
asset stripping which has been noted in countries like Russia712, which would be 
particularly detrimental to the interests of ordinary citizens where they own minority 
shares, and same for the government where it still retains some stake in a privatised 
enterprise or has continuing financial commitment to it under the term of the 
privatisation contract. Unless such a mechanism is provided through privatisation 
contractual stipulations, the government will be constrianed in its ability to effectively 
ensure that privatisation law achieves intended effects.  
 
In absence of specific legal or contractual provisions for the post privatisation 
monitoring of privatised enterprises, the general legal provisions for regulating private 
enterprises in the country would have to be relied on. In the case of privatised 
enterprises listed on the stock exchange, they would be under the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, by virtue of the Investment 
and Securities Act 2007, while those that are non-listed, as is the case with many 
core/strategic investors, can be monitored by the  Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC), the statutory body that administers the Company and Allied Matters Act 1990 
which generally deals with corporate governance issues in Nigerian companies.713 
Issues relating to the effectiveness of these laws will be discussed later within the 
context of examining the robustness of the institutions charges with administering them.  
 
A final point to consider is the legal requirement for foreign investors to incorporate 
their businesses as separate entities under Nigerian law before they can operate in the 
country.714 Some have viewed this as an unnecessary bottleneck that does not 
particularly confer any benefit on the country, could cause bureaucratic delays and raise 
transaction costs for a prospective investor who may decide to turn to other jurisdictions 
with lesser procedural bottlenecks.715    
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4.2.   ENSURING PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIVATISATION 
                
             
The view taken in the thesis is that while the above discussed design problems of the 
programme resulting from the inadequacy or insufficiency of the privatisation policy 
and legal provisions contributed to its problematic implementation, they may not fully 
account for the fact that key aspects of the economic development objectives of 
privatisation have not yet been realised. Following the analytical framework of the 
dissertation, 4 key implementation questions, answers to which have impact on the 
attainment of the key economic development objectives that informed the privatisation 
legal framwework will be analysed namely, is the national environment conducive to 
embarking on privatisation and attracting private investments?; secondly, is the 
institutional framework for implementing and monitoring the outcome of privatisation 
robust?; thirdly, will the strategic approach to the implementation of privatisation lead 
to the realisation of set policy objectives?; and finally, is the privatisation process 
accountable, transparent and free from corruption?  
 
4.2.1.    IS THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO EMBARKING  
           ON PRIVATISATION AND ATTRACTING PRIVATE INVESTMENTS? 
 
Although the Nigerian government, like many other African countries, has enacted 
various laws that seek to promote foreign investments and stipulate various guarantees 
against various political risks that could erode the contractual rights and property rights 
of foreign investors716, this has not yet led to the expected massive investments in the 
country outside the oil and gas sector especially in the manufacturing sector.717 Tunde 
Ogowewo notes that:  
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… countries are in a market for foreign investment where success is 
dependent on three variables: (a) country-specific factors ... (b) the 
foreign investment policy of the country ... and (c) the state of factors (a) 
and (b) of countries similarly situated.718 (footnotes omitted)  
 
Regarding such country-specific factors, the analysis here as in preceeding chapters, 
focuses on three key issues namely socio-political concerns resulting from the 
implementation of privatisation, general socio-political instability in the country and 
pre-existing systemic problems affecting the private business sector in a country.  
 
On the issue of socio-political concerns resulting from the implementation of 
privatisation, protests by key stakeholders and reprisal action by the government has 
dogged the implementation of privatisation in the country. Although the Nigerian 
government noted the necessity for ‘mass participation, involvement and support of all 
stakeholders’ in the privatisation programme719, it has been noted that ‘there is a gap 
between the leadership and the people particularly in privatisation.’720 
Contemporaneous news reports indicate that force has sometimes been used to quell 
demonstrations by workers protesting their arbitrary sacking and the non-payment of 
their terminal benefits, and workers and other tenants have sometimes been forcibly 
evicted from public accommodation in readiness for privatisation, sometimes in 
defiance of court orders.721 The government has also utilised new legislation to curb the 
abiliy of trade unions to embark on industrial action, thus substantially narowing the 
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scope for challenging its implementation of key economic reforms.722 Former President 
Obasanjo was quoted as saying that ‘One should really pity those that are against 
privatisation because one can even pass them as enemies of the society.’723, and this 
mindset perhaps reflects how the governement percieved the issue of workers protests, 
and also echoes the earlier noted position articulated in a World Bank report that:  
 
Leaders must have the means to implement change and to withstand 
opposition to reform ... the leadership must be able to withstand 
opposition to reform from potential losers, these may be SOE employees, 
especially when such groups are organized, numerous, and ready to 
engage in demonstrations, work stoppages in strategic industries, and 
other actions that might be costly to the government.724 
 
The prevalence of protests as earlier noted is indicative of the absence of an adequate 
framework for the consultation and participation of key stakeholders in a privatisation 
programme, which is a key part of gaining broad-based local support for a reform 
measure, adapting it to suit local circumstances and ensuring genuine national 
ownership of the reform.725 Commenting on the restrictions placed on workers’ rights in 
Nigeria in order to facilitate the implementation of economic reforms acceptable to the 
IFIs, Obiora Okafor notes as follows:  
 
If, as the World Bank has recently shown, ‘‘within-country’’ and 
‘‘global’’ inequities are key obstacles to economic development in third 
world states, then the equitable distribution of resources among a 
country’s population is also necessary for such development to occur. 
...Real and meaningful popular participation, enabled by the exercise of 
basic civil/political rights, in the shaping of economic reform agendas is 
key to ensuring that economic policies lead to an equitable distribution 
among the population of the available resources of that country. As is 
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often the case, the economic policies that are appropriate to a particular 
society cannot be properly identified and implemented by relying solely 
on the technocratic wisdom of either the IMF/WB, the government in 
question, or both.726 (footnote omitted) 
 
It should be noted that although the NCP has a labour representative, this has not 
prevented the shabby treatment of staff of public enterprises slated for privatisation, of 
which it has been noted that the top hierachy of the official labour movement appears to 
be too close to the government and supportive of its policies to adequately represent the 
interests of workers727, who have continues to resort to protests to press fo their 
entitlements. On  a broader note, the fact that the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 was 
enacted by a military regime and hence did not pass through the process of legislative 
drafting by an elected parliament would have contributed to the problem of ineffective 
consultation and participation.  The key point however is that the pervasive cycle of 
protests and reprisals would likely make potential investors wary that they could inherit 
such issues from the government and commence business on a hostile and volatile 
note.728  
 
There are also key concens regarding general socio-political instability in the country, 
which also has impact on privatisation. It has been noted that:  
 
A peaceful environment is a sine qua non to the attraction of foreign 
investment. The restiveness in the host communities makes the 
environment hostile and repulsive to investment, both in the maintenance 
of existing investments and the attraction of new ones. Potential new 
investors are apt to stay away from volatile host states.729   
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Such peaceful environment has been largely undermined in Nigeria by reports of 
general insecurity and widespread prevalence of criminality, and the ineffectiveness of 
the Nigerian police.730 There have also been rising instances of armed bandits attacking 
or kidnapping investors in the country, including privatisation investors.731 This has 
been particularly prevalent in the Niger Delta region of the country where several 
militant groups have sprung up and are creating an increasingly hostile situation for 
foreign investors operating in the region, partly as a result of environmental degradation 
stemming from oil production, which has persisted despite the laws, regulations and 
institutional structures designed to address such matters.732 The fact that legal redress 
through the courts has often been time consuming and unsuccessful may have played a 
role in driving people towards unlawful ways of airing grievances.733 These issues come 
within the categorisation of host community hostility risk, which is distinct from the 
political risks that investors usually fear, on account of the fact that whereas normal 
political risks stem from fear of government intervention, host community hostily risk 
could be as a result of non-state actors and may even pit the host community against 
both the investor and the government.734  
 
With local communities threatening to frustrate the operations of some of the enterprise 
located there, and also stop the privatisation of some public enterprises based there735,  
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many potential investors would be concerned about getting entangled in pre-existing 
squabbles or lawsuits which could undemine the profitability of their investments. The 
above scenario could also play out in other host communities outside Niger Delta facing 
related issues.  
 
The last issue to consider  is the issue of systemic problems affecting the private 
business sector in Nigeria, which have resulted in the country having a very unfriendly 
business environment.736 The country frequently ranks very low amongst other 
countries within and outside Africa in surveys that assess various hinderances to 
commencing and conducting business in various countries, of which a recent study 
shows that it is slipping further in the rankings.737 Some of the problems facing the 
Nigerian private sector which affect productivity and profitability and have been noted 
to make foreign investors unwilling to invest include inconsistency in, and faulty 
implementation of business policies738, inadequate and inefficient utility/ infrastructural 
services739, multiple taxation740, public sector corruption and rent seeking741, and 
prevalence of fraud.742 
 
                                                             
736 See generally KUK Ekwueme, ‘Nigeria’s Principal Investment Laws in the Context of International 
Law and Practice’ (2005) 49 JAL 177, 204-206. 
 
737 World Bank/IFC, Doing Business 2009: Comparing Regulation in 181 Economies (World 
Bank/IFC/Palgrave Macmillan, Washington DC 2008) 6, 83. Also see Economic Commission for Africa, 
Economic Report on Africa 2002: Tracking Performance and Progress (Economic Commission for 
Africa, Addis Ababa 2002) 180. 
 
738 TI Ogowewo, ‘The Shift to the Classical Theory of Foreign Investment: Opening Up the Nigerian 
Market’ (1995) 44 ICLQ 915, 926; Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2002: 
Tracking Performance and Progress (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa 2002) 180; T 
Forrest, ‘The Political Economy of Civil Rule and the Economic Crisis in Nigeria (1979-84)’ [1986] (35) 
Rev African Polit Economy 4, 19.  
 
739 EI Kachikwu, Nigerian Foreign Investment Law and Policy (Mikzek Law Publications Limited, 
Lagos, 1988) 125-126; O Obayomi, ‘Nigeria's New Investment Laws’ [1997] JBL 593, 604; A Olukoju, 
‘”Never Expect Power Always”: Electricity Consumers’ Response to Monopoly, Corruption and 
Inefficient Services in Nigeria’ (2004) 103 Afr Aff 51, 60; AF Adenikinju, ‘Electric Infrastructure 
Failures in Nigeria: A Survey-Based Analysis of the Costs and Adjustment Responses’ (2003) 31 Energy 
Pol’y 1519, 1523. 
 
740 O Arowolo, ‘Eti-Osa Local Government v Jegede: A Fillip for Responsible Tax Administration in 
Nigeria’ (2008) 19 ICCLR 25, 25, 27-28. 
 
741 EI Kachikwu, Nigerian Foreign Investment Law and Policy (Mikzek Law Publications Limited, 
Lagos, 1988) 127-128; PD Ocheje, ‘Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Nigeria’s 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000’ (2001) 45 JAL 173, 173-176, 184-185, 188-189. 
 
742 CA Malgwi, ‘Fraud as Economic Terrorism: The Efficacy of the Nigerian Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission’ (2004) 12 JFC 144, 147-148  
 
198 
 
Some multinational investors it should be noted, have closed their operations or 
divested from the country in recent years according to news reports743, of which some 
other competing investment destinations within and outside Africa appear more 
competitive than the country in key sectors.744  
 
 
 
4.2.2.   IS THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING AND 
            MONITORING THE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION ROBUST? 
 
 
It has been noted that Nigeria suffers from the problems of weak institutions and limited 
technical capacity in the implementation of economic reforms.745 As the administrative 
body charged with implementing the Nigerian privatisation programme, BPE is tasked 
with undertaking various preparatory tasks that precede privatisation, overseeing the 
privatisation sale itself and ensuring that the privatisation programme is a success, and 
the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 places it under the supervision of the National 
Council of Privatisation (NCP), which is itself charged with making various approvals 
regarding the sale price and time of sale, the method of privatisation, the valuation 
criteria for enterprises and selection criteria for core/ strategic investors.746 There are 
also various provisions in the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 as well as the Guidelines 
on Privatisation of Government Enterprises and the Blueprint of the Privatisation 
Programme that explain how the above tasks will be undertaken aimed at ensuring the 
                                                             
743 K Ebiri, R Chikwreuba and S Salau, ‘U.S. Firm Quits Nigeria as Militants Kidnap more Oil Workers’ 
The Guardian (Lagos 11 August 2006) <http://odili.net/news/source/2006/aug/11/52.html> accessed 15 
August 2006; E Amaefule, ‘Foreign Investors Exit Caused Stock Market Crisis – Soludo’ Punch (Lagos 4 
October 2008) <http://www.punchng.com/> accessed 4 October 2008; E Onu, ‘Dunlop Shuts Down 
Factory, Records N2bn Loss’ Daily Independent (Lagos 3 December 2008) 
<http://www.independentngonline.com/> accessed 4 December 2008. 
 
744 EA Witten, ‘Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?’ (2008-2009) 4 Tex J Oil, 
Gas & Energy L 55, 84; G Tyler, ‘Nigeria: Public and Private Electricity Provision as a Barrier to 
Manufacturing Competitiveness’ (2002) 221 Findings (World Bank) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find221.pdf> accessed 2 December 2005. 
 
745 IMF, ‘Nigeria: 2004 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the 
Executive Board Discussion’ (Report) (August 2004) IMF Country Report No 04/239 33.  
 
746 Public Enterprises Decree 1999 ss 11, 13(1). See also O Arowolo, ‘Nigeria's Downstream Sector 
Deregulation Crisis: What are the Unresolved Issues?’ [2005] IELTR 10, 14.  
 
199 
 
predictability of the privatisation process, ensuring that qualitative investors emerge 
from it and ensuring that the country will not be short changed in the process.747  
 
As noted by some scholars and also seen from contemporaneous news reports, the 
actual implementation of privatisation has in many instances been defined by errors and 
mishaps that undermined the predictability that prospective investors usually seek and 
raised questions about the capability of the above institutional mechanism for 
implementing privatisation.748 Some of the major errors that have been recorded with 
regard to various privatisation transactions include the arbitrary and inconsistent 
extension of deadlines for receipt of Expression of Interest (EOI) by prospective 
investors as well as the deadline for payment by winning bidders749; non-disclosure of 
huge debt owed by a public enterprise to another public enterprise prior to 
privatisation750; arbitrary cancellation of some transactions either before or after  the 
conclusion of bidding751; non-transparent short listing of bidders and introduction of 
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Akintunde, ‘NITEL: NCP Waives Deadline for Transcorp’ The Punch (Lagos 14 August 2006) 
<http://www.punchontheweb.com/articl.aspx?theartic=art200608141542436> accessed 14 August 2006; 
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new rules mid-way into some transactions752; non-transparent selection of core/ 
strategic investors or management contractorsfor some enterprises753; transfer of some 
enterprises to financially weak core/strategic investors that could not pay the bid price 
or technically incompetent core/ strategic investors or management contractors that did 
not have verifiable track records754; disqualification of a bidder on basis of 
incompetence after the bidder successfully emerged from the ‘rigorous’ pre-
qualification process and won the bid, and subsequently selling the same enterprise to a 
previously disqualified company755; changing the method of privatisation midway into a 
transaction756, adopting an inconsistent approach to failed transactions, with the BPE 
sometimes publicly re-advertising the enterprise and commencing the process again, 
and sometimes failing to do so and rather resorting to the non-transparent ‘negotiated 
sale’ method.757  Although the BPE has sought to blame its technical advisers for some 
of the above failures, it appeared to have disregarded sound advice in some cases, only 
to proceed to make clearly avoidable blunders.758 In some instances, it failed to 
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undertake basic tasks such as getting ready the fully audited accounts of some of the 
enterprises including detailed reports on the state of their facilities.759 These  issues 
would give any serious investor cause for concern, and the very broad disclaimer on the 
BPE website will do little to inspire investor confidence.760 
 
At least 2 key issues appear to have contributed to the above errors and mishaps. The 
first is the inadequate staffing of BPE prior to the commencement of the privatisation 
programme, of which it has continued to undergo staff restructuring several years after 
the programme commenced761, and this might account for its inability to undertake 
basic due diligence to ascertain the competence of some of the prospective corestrategic 
investors.762 The second is political interference in its functioning including frequent 
replacement of the head of BPE.763 The issue of political interference will be examined 
in greater detail later within the context of analysing the influence of corruption in the 
privatisation programme.  
 
There are a number of concerns regarding the adequacy of market support institutions 
needed to regulate the conduct of privatised enterprises after the conclusion of 
privatisation. In the first place, the point was earlier made that the country does not yet 
have a competition law or competition enforcement authority764, and the BPE has been 
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criticised for implementing the privatisation of enterprises in certain sectors in a way 
that way aimed at creating private monopolies765, despite the emphasis placed on 
competition in the privatisation blueprint and the government’s emphasis that ‘We are 
not about to replace public monopoly with private monopoly’766   
 
There are also some questions about the ability of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Corporate Affairs Commission to effectively  supervise the 
conduct of privatised companies. It has been noted that ‘successful privatisations and 
the development of vibrant private sectors depend to a significant extent on the 
existence of effective systems of corporate governance.’767 In this regard, there have 
been increasing reports of the asset stripping of some privatised enterprises contrary to 
the contractual agreement to effectively manage and infuse new investments in such 
enterprises, with the government sometimes stepping in to revoke the transaction after 
such pillage had gone on for sometime.768 Although the Corporate Affairs Commission  
is empowered, in the shareholders’ interest as well as the wider public, to monitor 
corporate governance compliance in incorporated companies by investigating where 
necessary how they are run769,  these instances of corporate governance failures have 
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nevertheless occurred, and it has been noted that there no history of such corporate 
investigation even by the predecessor to the Corporate Affairs Commission.770 
According to reports, in some cases the BPE sold or concessioned some enterprises to 
investors that were not registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission as required by 
law771, making it impossible for the Corporate Affairs Commission to effectively 
monitor them given that it does not even have any record of their existence.772 
 
Regarding the Securities and Exchange Commission which has oversight 
responsibilities regarding the Nigerian capital market including to ‘prevent fraudulent 
and unfair trade practices relating to the securities industry’773, a number of corporate 
scandals involving unethical or fraudlent transactions on the stock exchange have 
occurred under it watch, and where investors do not have full confidence in the 
oversight capabilities of the capital market regulator, they will be less inclined to invest, 
which would affect the ability of privatisation investors to raise funds in the capital 
market.774 There were also some allegations of insider trading with regard to the first 
priatisation programme.775 In one major scandal that occured a few years ago duringthe 
current privatisation programme, a privatisation investor, after acquiring majority shares 
as a core investor in a company privatised through the stock exchange discovered that 
the company was substantially more indebted than was reflected in the audited accounts 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.776 Also to note is that regarding the 
use of other forms of privatisation by the BPE besides public issue as earlier noted, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has not been involved in most of these 
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transactions, of which some have opined that it should have been involved in private 
placements by the BPE, as a way of instilling confidence in the privatisation 
programme.777 Although the supervisory jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission  primarily covers sale of securities to the public and the Investment and 
Securities Act does not expressly subject private placement of shares to the oversight of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 778, opinion has been expressed that it could 
still within the ambit of its powers oversee securities privately issued by the 
government.779 
 
It should be noted that the country does not appear to have a robust tax system, of which 
it was earlier noted that the economic development potential of privatisation is also 
hinged on having such a system in place to ensure the proper assessment and collection 
of taxes from privatised enterprises.780 Nigeria’s tax system is plagued by severe 
administrative weaknesses, corruption, and non-transparently granted waivers, which 
have created ample room for privatised companies to avoid or evade taxes that the 
government could utilise in pursuing the social objectives of national economic 
development.781  
 
Finally, the judicial system in Nigeria has been criticised for inefficiency and very 
limited capacity, with case often dragging on for several years, which potentially 
undermines privatisation benefits for the government, the citizens and privatisation 
investors given that disputes stemming from privatisation, including issues pertaining to 
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exercise of regulatory powers and enforcement of privatisation rights and guarantees 
may take an inordinate period of time to resolve.782 
 
4.2.3.       WILL THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE IMPLEMENTATION  
              OF PRIVATISATION LEAD TO THE REALISATION OF SET 
               POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
 
The Nigerian government’s strategic approach to many privatisation transactions, 
sometimes at the behest of the IFIs has often been at odds with the economic 
development objectives of the programme and has given rise to some avoidable 
problems in the privatisation process. Following the analytical structure of the thesis, 
the following 5 key strategic issues will be analysed:   
 
 The pace and sequencing of privatisation 
 
 The strategy for engaging foreign investors  
 
 The approach to socio-cultural issues in privatisation  
 
 Weighing the cost of implementing privatisation against the expected benefits 
 
 Balancing the economic and social issues in privatisation in the interest of the 
citizens 
 
 
4.2.3.1.       THE PACE AND SEQUENCING OF PRIVATISATION 
 
In Chapter 2, the point was made that the pace of implementing privatisation should 
factor in a country’s peculiarities, including institutional capabilities, and in Chapter 3, 
the point was made that some African countries have speedily pursued privatisation 
even though they have considerable institutional weaknesses, sometimes due to the 
influence of the IFIs.783 With regard to Nigeria, the discussion above on the robustness 
of key institutions for implementing privatisation and monitoring its outcome reveals 
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various weaknesses, which would have meant emphasis on careful gradual 
implementation as opposed to speedy implementation.784 However right from the onset 
of the programme, the National Council on Privatisation had prepared an elaborate 
privatisation timetable premised on which most of the enterprises would have been 
privatised within a 3-4 year period including the telecommunications and power utilities 
and other enterprises with huge capitalization and heavy staffing.785 As earlier noted, 
correspondence between the country and the IMF also shows that it agreed on certain 
target dates for completion of various privatisation transactions as well as privatisation 
related law reform786 Contemporaneous news reports also shows the BPE striving to 
meet various privatisation targets787 while acknowledging the weakness of  Nigeria’s 
institutions and its limited technical capacity in the implementation of economic 
reforms, the IMF still noted the need for ‘the privatization program … to be 
accelerated.’788 Although it acknowedged the need for transparency in the privatisation 
programme and for ‘putting in place the necessary regulatory and legal frameworks to 
ensure a level playing field, so that the public can begin benefiting from the fruits of 
privatization’789, the key question is whether this can be accomplished within the limits 
of an accelerated privatisation programme.   
 
A number of issues pertaining to poor pacing and sequencing have already been touched 
on. For instance while the privatisation blueprint recognises the need for legal reform to 
usher in market competition, it was noted earlier that the implementation of 
privatisation has proceeded without waiting for the competition legislation to be passed 
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or for a competition authority to get set up, of which some monopolies/ oligopolies have 
been the end result especially in the area of ports management and the steel sector.790 In 
its haste, BPE has sometimes deferred privatisation due diligence till after the 
conclusion of some transactions, which begs the question – on what basis did it confirm 
that the investor possessed the managerial, technical and financial capacity noted under 
the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 and the Guidelines on Privatisation of Government 
Enterprises.791 In some cases, the BPE proceeded to wrap up transactions within 
arbitrarily set deadlines, only for such privatised companies to plunge into avoidable 
crisis soon afterwards.792 
 
In fixing the privatisation timetable, it does not appear that careful thought was given to 
the earlier noted problem of absence of conducive or enabling environment for 
sustainable investments.793 One of the manifestations of this problem is the issue of 
inadequate investor financing for purchasing privatisation shares, of which BPE has 
sometimes pressed on to conclude transactions within the allotted timeframe even in the 
face of apparently limited investor interest and very low bids.794 Sometimes such 
winning bids ended up being rejected for being too low795, and sometimes, successful 
bidders ultimately could not come up with the funds to pay for their acquisition.796  
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Finally it should be noted that the speedy implementation timetable in many cases did 
not factor in adequate time and resources for effectively resolving various issues 
regarding stakeholders of which the point was made earlier about the protests by labour 
groups and reprisal action by the government, further undermining the investment 
climate. While transactions could be speedily concluded, such urgency has not been 
adopted with regard to the issue of workers’ welfare797, and while the Guidelines on 
Privatisation of Government Enterprises recognizes the need for a Share Purchase Fund 
Scheme to allow poor people to be able to purchase privatisation shares that are sold on 
the stock exchange798, the scheme as earlier noted, has not yet become operational 
several years after the privatisation exercise commenced.  
  
4.2.3.2.        THE STRATEGY FOR ENGAGING FOREIGN INVESTORS 
 
Although Nigeria initially enacted laws aimed at restricting foreign ownership and 
control of enterprises in the country after independence and boosting indigenous 
ownership and control799, these laws have now been repealed and replaced with a legal 
regime receptive to foreign investments.800 The Nigerian government hopes that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
796 L Juwah, ‘Privatisation of Nigerian Telecommunication (NITEL) PLC: The Perspectives and 
Challenges’ (2003) 9 CTLR 229, 231, 232-233. 
 
797  S Amadi, ‘Contextualizing NEEDS: Politics and Economic Development’ in S Amadi and F Ogwo 
(eds), Contextualizing NEEDS Economic/Political Reform in Nigeria: Report of Civil Society Policy 
Dialogue on the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 
(HURILAWS/CPPR, Lagos 2004) 25. 
 
798 Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises para 9.4. 
 
799 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (Act) No 4 of 1972; Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
(Act) No 3 of 1977 (repealed the 1972 decree but further enhanced indigenous ownership and control of 
enterprises at the expense of foreign ownership); FC Beveridge, ‘Taking Control of Foreign Investment: 
A Case Study of Indigenisation in Nigeria’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 302, 308, 315-317; RO Ekundare, ‘The 
Political Economy of Private Investment in Nigeria’ (1972) 10 J Mod Afr Stud 37, 44-47.  
 
800 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (Act) No 54 of 1989 (repealed the 1977 decree); Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion (Repeal) Decree (Act) No 7 of 1995 (repealed the 1989 decree); Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission Decree (Act) No. 16 of 1995 (established the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission, s 1); The Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 
(Act) No. 17 of 1995 (amongst other things, permitted both Nigerians and non-Nigerians to invest and 
transact in securities in the capital market or via private placement, s 26); PT Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2007) 185-186; V Akpotaire, ‘The Nigerian 
Indigenisation Laws as Disincentives to Foreign Investment: The End of an Era’ (2005) 26 BLR 62, 62-
67; KUK Ekwueme, ‘Nigeria’s Principal Investment Laws in the Context of International Law and 
Practice’ (2005) 49 JAL 177, 177-182; TI Ogowewo, ‘The Shift to the Classical Theory of Foreign 
Investment: Opening Up the Nigerian Market’ (1995) 44 ICLQ 915, 915-919. 
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privatisation programme would be a key gateway for foreign investors to invest in the 
country and bring in much needed technical and managerial skills as well as investment 
capital.801 Two key issues will be analysed here namely, the extent to which the 
expected resource inflow from foreign investors has materialised and secondly the 
extent to which foreign investment is in consonance with the interests of some other 
stakeholders in the privatisation proocess. Regarding the first issue, the point was earlier 
made about the need to establish criteria for assessing the quality of prospective 
investors.802 Commenting on the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Decree 
(Act) 1995, Khrushchev Ekwueme notes that: 
 
It is striking that the NIPC Act does not contain a list of criteria which a 
proposed investment must satisfy before its admission into Nigeria. 
Ideally, investment codes tie the admission of foreign investment to the 
ability of the potential investment to meet the developmental needs of the 
relevant host States. The omission of specific criteria in the NIPC Act for 
the admission of investment into Nigeria allows the Commission to 
screen applications for the registration of business enterprises on a purely 
discretionary basis803 
 
As earlier noted however, the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 and the Guidelines on 
Privatisation of Government Enterprises both contain provisions on what is expected of 
any core/strategic investor, namely adequate financial resources as well as technical and 
managerial competence to run the enterprise, and the negotiation with the investor will 
also include issues like technology transfer, participation by indigenous managers and 
workers’ welfare.804 Some of the observations regarding foreign investment in Nigeria 
however give cause for concern.  
 
Reports indicate that some foreign investors, rather than bringing in much needed 
foreign exchange into the country, have largely relied on funds sourced from local 
banks in the country to pay for their privatisation acquisitions and finance their 
operations, which could limit the pool of funds available for local investors to borrow 
                                                             
801 Public Enterprises Decree 1999 s 13(1)(i); Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises para 
2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
802 Also see EI Kachikwu, Nigerian Foreign Investment Law and Policy (Mikzek Law Publications 
Limited, Lagos, 1988) 62-75.  
 
803 KUK Ekwueme, ‘Nigeria’s Principal Investment Laws in the Context of International Law and 
Practice’ (2005) 49 JAL 177, 184. 
 
804 Public Enterprises Decree 1999 s 34; Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises para 13 
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from local banks.805 Further, objectives such as efficiency improvement, transfer of 
technology and development of linkages with the local economy do not seem to be high 
priority for some of these foreign investors given the fact that there are mounting 
allegations of asset stripping regarding some of the privatized enterprises that have been 
handed over to foreign investors.806 Contrasting Nigeria’s approach to foreign 
investments with the Taimanese approach, Deborah Brautigam notes that:  
 
The state in Taiwan took an active ro1e in creating backward and 
forward linkages between foreign and domestic capital. Local sourcing, 
sub-contracting, and worker-training targets were mandated and 
frequently revised, and the Government monitored and enforced them, 
threatening (and carrying out its threats) to remove protections and 
incentives for firms that failed to meet their targets. ... In Nigeria, by 
contrast, although the same targets are frequently part of the investment 
package, the Government fails to monitor and take action early when 
targets are clearly not being met. In the motor-vehicle assembly industry, 
for example, foreign firms agreed to progress in stages towards 100 per 
cent local content, but they failed to adopt programmes to implement this 
strategy, and after 30 years of assembly, less than 30 per cent of 
components are locally procured.807 (footnote omitted) 
 
 
Another observation is that rather than qualitative foreign investments flowing into the 
country through privatisation, many foreign investors besides those that are into oil and 
gas production, have opted more for service contracts, such as turnaround maintenance 
(TAM) contracts, management contracts and rehabilitation contracts under which they 
earn foreign exchange for rendering specialised services rather than investing any 
money in the country.808   
 
Regarding the issue of how foreign investment is in consonance with the interests of 
some other stakeholders in the privatisation process, rather than creating opportunities 
                                                             
805 L Juwah, ‘Privatisation of Nigerian Telecommunication (NITEL) PLC: The Perspectives and 
Challenges’ (2003) 9 CTLR 229, 233; E Onyekpere, Privatisation in the Dock (A Case Study on the 
Privatisation of Nigerdock) (Socio Economic Rights Initiative, Lagos 2005) 45; Cf K Appiah-Kubi, 
‘State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation in Ghana’ (2001) 39 J Mod Afr Stud 197, 224.  
 
806 H Igbikiowubo, ‘Alarm over Continued Asset Stripping at Ajaokuta, Monitoring Committee Damns 
Concessionaire’ Vanguard (Lagos 29 August 2006) <http://odili.net/news/source/2006/aug/29/315.html> 
accessed 29 August 2006. 
 
807 DA Brautigam, ‘What Can Africa Learn from Taiwan? Political Economy, Industrial Policy, and 
Adjustment’ (1994) 32 J Mod Afr Stud 111, 134. 
 
808 O Arowolo, ‘Nigeria's Downstream Sector Deregulation Crisis: What are the Unresolved Issues?’ 
[2005] IELTR 10, 11; O Aihe and B Agande, ‘Forged Papers Gave Pentascope the NITEL Contract’ 
Vanguard (Lagos 1 June 2005) <http://odili.net/news/source/2005/jun/1/308.html> accessed 1 June 2005. 
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for indigenous participation in management, some foreign investors have focussed more 
on replacing local staff with employees from their home jurisdications, thus further 
contributing to the unemployment problem in the country.809  Also to note is that rather 
than primarily focusing on making more sustainable reforms to the general investment 
climate in the country, the government has sometimes sought to attract foreign 
investments by structuring privatisation contracts with monopoly elements that put the 
investor at some advantage over local entrepreneurs in the same sector.810  This is at 
variance with the privatisation provision that requires ‘taking into account the need for 
balance and meaningful participation by Nigerians and foreigners’, given that it tilts the 
balance towards the latter. It has been noted that sometimes due to the ability of foreign 
investors to offer large bribes to public officals in developing countries like China and 
Nigeria, they are often accorded higher priority and more favourable treatment than 
their local competitors in states where they invest.811 The issue of privatisation 
corruption will be analysed later in the chapter.  
 
It is not asserted that foreign investors have not made any positive contribution to 
Nigeria, because there is also some evidence that some privatised companies taken over 
by foreign investors are doing well and increasing their productivity.812 What is also 
clear from the discussion above is that the economic development objectives behind 
privatisation laws and foreign investment laws could be undermined where the country 
does not strategise properly in its approach to foreign investments either generally or 
with respect to certain transactions. 
 
 
                                                             
809 E Onyekpere, Privatisation in the Dock (A Case Study on the Privatisation of Nigerdock) (Socio 
Economic Rights Initiative, Lagos 2005) 51; J Ogbodo and T Daka, ‘Reps Probe Foreign Firms over 
Discrimination in Employment’ The Guardian (Lagos 3 June 2009) 
<http://odili.net/news/source/2009/jun/3/12.html> accessed 3 June 2009. 
 
810 Note for instance, the complaints by Airline Operators of Nigeria (AON) regarding monopoly and 
other incentives, including regulatory waiver, given to Virgin Nigeria, the new national carrier. See on 
this, T Oketunbi, ‘Virgin Nigeria Faces Testy Regulatory Hurdle’ The Guardian (Lagos 1 June 2005) 
<http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/business/article01> accessed 1 June 2005; W Shadare and B 
Nwankwo, ‘Minister Decries Suit against Virgin Nigeria, says Govt Loses N2b Yearly’ The Guardian 
(Lagos 1 June 2005) <http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news/article05> accessed 1 June 2005. 
 
811 E Spahn, ‘International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques’ (2009) 18 Minn J Int'l L 155, 221-
222. Also see AY Shehu, ‘Combating Corruption in Nigeria - Bliss or Bluster?’ (2004) 12 JFC 69, 77.  
 
812 Note for instance B Adeyemi, ‘ALSCON commences sale of locally made aluminium products’ The 
Guardian (Lagos 19 June 2009) <http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/> accessed 19 June 2009.  
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4.2.3.3.        THE APPROACH TO SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES IN 
                   PRIVATISATION 
 
It has been noted regarding Nigeria that the ‘definition and operation of the law should 
be contextualy situated to reflect the values, beliefs and practices of the people.’813 The 
country has a multiplicity of states, ethno-linguistic groups and religious groups, has 
been through a bitter ethnic-based civil war and still has periodic flashes of ethnic and 
religious conflicts, with adverse impact on both indigenous and foreign investments and 
the overall development of the country.814 Raymond Vernon notes that in Sub Saharan 
African countries like Nigeria, communal suppression is sometimes a reflection of 
‘political rivalries drawn on tribal and religious lines.’815 Some of the public enterprises 
in Nigeria were geographically cited and staffed based on geo-political, ethnic and other 
cultural considerations, rather than economic and technical considerations and were 
used for political patronage stemming from these extranous considerations with adverse 
impact on economic growth and development.816 According to Peter Lewis: 
 
Privatization policy in particular, and public sector reform in general, 
must be viewed against Nigeria’s history of contentious ethnic and 
regional rivalries, institutional weaknesses, and political instability.817 
                                                             
813 MI Isokun, ‘Law and Development in Nigeria: A Contextual Definition’ (1991/92) 1(1) Bendel State 
University Law Journal 121, 127. 
 
814 AY Shehu, ‘Combating Corruption in Nigeria - Bliss or Bluster?’ (2004) 12 ; F Ezeala-Harrison, 
‘Structural Re-Adjustment in Nigeria: Diagnosis of a Severe Dutch Disease Syndrome’ (1993) 52 Amer J 
Econ Sociology 193, 198; D Abubakar, ‘Ethnic Identity, Democratization, and the Future of the African 
State: Lessons from Nigeria’ (2001) 29 (1/2) African Issues 31, 33-34; P Lewis, ‘Nigeria's Economy: 
Opportunity and Challenge’ (1999) 27(1) Issue: A Journal of Opinion 50, 50; U Ukiwo, ‘Politics, Ethno-
Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’ (2003) 41 J Mod Afr Stud 115, 115-116, 
120-126.  
 
815 R Vernon, ‘Introduction: The Promise And The Challenge’ in R Vernon (ed), The Promise of 
Privatization: A Challenge for US Policy (Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1988) 7. Also see UB 
Ikpe, ‘Public Culture and National Integration in Multi-Cultural States: Comparative Observations from 
the United States and Nigeria’ (2004) 2 Comparative American Studies 91, 92, 107 L Diamond, Class, 
Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic (Syracuse University Press, 
Syracuse 1988) 59-63. 
 
816 NI Ikpeze, CC Soludo and NN Elekwa, ‘Nigeria: The Political Economy of the Policy Process, Policy 
Choice and Implementation’ in CC Soludo, O Ogbu and H Chang, The Politics of Trade and Industrial 
Policy in Africa:  Forced Consensus? (Africa World Press/ International Development Research Centre, 
New Jersey 2004) 353-355; MA Tokunboh, Public Enterprises: The Nigerian Experience (Lantern 
Books, Lagos 1990) 53; B Dauda, ‘Industrial Policy and the Nigerian Bureaucracy, 1900-1988’ (1993) 
21 African Econ Hist 73, 77, 90-92; Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2002: 
Tracking Performance and Progress (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa 2002) 172. 
 
817 PM Lewis, ‘State, Economy, and Privatisation in Nigeria’ in JL Upper and GB Baldwin, Public 
Enterprises: Restructuring and Privatization (International Law Institute, Washington DC 1995) 315. 
Also see 318. 
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Regarding the first privatisation programme which was initiated by a President from the 
Northern part of the country, some have alleged that there was some political 
manipulation in its implementation due to ethnic/geopolitical considerations of which 
some business people from the Northern part of the country were perceived to have 
benefitted from illicit patronage.818 Prior to that, it was also alleged that the 
indigenisation programme carrried out in the 1970s disproportionately favoured the 
Yoruba ethnic group.819  
 
The current implementation of privatisation therefore raises key concerns regarding how 
to aviod perceptions of favouritism based on geo-political, ethnic and other cultural 
considerations, which could undermine its legitimacy and further sow seeds of discord 
that may later blossom into socio-political crisis in the country. It should be noted that 
the Constitution provides that: 
 
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its 
agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a 
manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to 
promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby 
ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few State 
or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in 
any of its agencies.820 
 
Some of the privatisation legal provisions and guidelines are aimed at ensuring equal 
opportunity and participation as well as even spread of the benefits of privatisation 
amongst cultural stakeholders in the country, such as the provision for sale of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
818 W Reno, ‘Old Brigades, Money Bags, New Breeds, and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria’ (1993) 27 
Can J Afr Stud 66, 72-76; P Lewis, ‘From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline 
in Nigeria’ (1996) 34 J Mod Afr Stud 79, 89. 
 
819 PM Lewis, ‘State, Economy, and Privatisation in Nigeria’ in JL Upper and GB Baldwin, Public 
Enterprises: Restructuring and Privatization (International Law Institute, Washington DC 1995) 322. NI 
Ikpeze, CC Soludo and NN Elekwa, ‘Nigeria: The Political Economy of the Policy Process, Policy 
Choice and Implementation’ in CC Soludo, O Ogbu and H Chang, The Politics of Trade and Industrial 
Policy in Africa:  Forced Consensus? (Africa World Press/ International Development Research Centre, 
New Jersey 2004) 352. 
 
820 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 s 14(3). For further discussion of the application 
of the federal character principle, see B Dauda, ‘Industrial Policy and the Nigerian Bureaucracy, 1900-
1988’ (1993) 21 African Econ Hist 73, 90; UB Ikpe, ‘Public Culture and National Integration in Multi-
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American Studies 91, 110; O Fatula, ‘Constitutional Issues in Nigerian Federalism’ (2003) 6 U Maid LJ 
84, 95-96. 
 
214 
 
privatisation shares to Nigerians on the basis of equality of Federal Constituencies in the 
country.821 There is also a maximum limit of one percent of shares, which any single 
individual can acquire in a privatised enterprise and multiple applications are to be 
rejected.822 Although these provisions might have been designed with the best of 
intentions, they are inadequate in some respects and there have already been complaints 
of marginalisation in the implementation of the programme. Firstly, although the 
constitutional provision above notes the need for cultural balance in the composition of 
federal agencies in the country, the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 does not specifically 
provide for this regarding the key privatisation bodies, the BPE and the NCP, which 
could pave the way for cultural imbalance in their composition, whether inadvertently 
or purposely.823  
 
Secondly, the provision for participation of Nigerians on the basis of equality of Federal 
Constituencies does not factor in the fact that within some Federal Constituencies there 
is more than  one ethnic or religious group, with clashed often occuring amongst these 
groups, of which there is no framework for ensuring the full participation of all cultural 
groups especially those that may be in the minority and potentially face marginalisation 
in the process.824 A further complication is that the privatisation guidelines provide that 
Nigerians that wish to participate in any Federal Constituency of the Federation have to 
be indigenes of such constituencies.825 A preliminary problem would be how to 
conclusively prove that one is an indigene of a constituency because many people 
especially those living in rural parts of the country may not have documentary proof of 
identity and address, which could pave way wrongful exclusion from participation.826 It 
                                                             
821 Public Enterprises Decree 1999 s 5(2); Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises paras 
9.3(b), 12.1, 12.4.  Note that the initial provisions under s 5(2) was for the allocation of shares on the 
basis of equality of states rather than Federal Constituencies. 
 
822 Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises paras 9.3(a), 12.3. 
 
823 K Onuoha, ‘The Legal Regulation of Privatisation – A Critique’ in E Onyekpere (ed), Readings On 
Privatisation (Socio-Economic Rights Initiative, Lagos 2003) 15. 
 
824 U Ukiwo, ‘Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’ (2003) 41 J 
Mod Afr Stud 115, 115-116, 120-126; K Onuoha, ‘The Legal Regulation of Privatisation – A Critique’ in 
E Onyekpere (ed), Readings On Privatisation (Socio-Economic Rights Initiative, Lagos 2003) 17.  
 
825 Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises  para 9.3(b). Also see S Adejokun, ‘BPE Allots 
Highest NAHCO Shares to Lagos, Kano’ Daily Independent (Lagos 2 February 2006) 
<http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/paperfrmes.html> accessed 2 February 2006. 
 
826 See for instance Editorial, ‘Yobe Bars Non-Indigenes from Running Schools’ The Guardian (Lagos 3 
May 2006) <http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/paperfrmes.html> accessed 3 May 2006. 
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would also create a logistical nightmare if people that are resident in a particular 
constituency have to travel to other constituencies across the country where they are 
indigenes of, in order to be eligible to participate in the privatisation programme.  
 
Thirdly, given that the privatisation decree as earlier noted provides for the sale of 
public enterprises to core/strategic investors, nothing prevents some Nigerians from 
floating or using existing private companies to acquire the shares of some enterprises as 
core/ strategic investors, contravening the provisions for geopolitical balance and one 
percent maximum individual share allocation, which were both designed to ensure 
broad participation of the citizenry in the programme.827 This would effectively make 
the provision on equal participation by Nigerians meaningless.828 Also noteworthy is 
that unlike the United Kingdom where there has been prosecution and conviction for 
fraudulently making multiple applications for privatisation shares on the stock 
exchange829, the Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises only provide 
for rejection of such applications, but even then there is provision for refund.830  
 
Regardless of the merits of the cultural safeguard provisions in the current Nigerian 
privatisation programme, it has been alleged that its implementation has been aimed at 
consolidating economic control with the Yoruba, the ethnic group of the former 
President under whose tenure many enterprises were privatised.831 It has also been 
alleged that the utilisation of the core/ strategic investor strategy has been 
discriminatory to the Igbo ethnic group.832 Some transactions have also raised tensions, 
                                                             
827 With regard to the first privatisation programme, it has been noted that public issue of privatisation 
shares on the stock exchange coupled with massive publicity of the programme helped in addressing 
concerns about possible geopolitical imbalance in the implementation of the programme, athough as 
noted there were still some allegations of manipulation. See RA Young, ‘Privatisation in Africa’ [1991] 
(51) Rev African Polit Economy 50, 60; W Reno, ‘Old Brigades, Money Bags, New Breeds, and the 
Ironies of Reform in Nigeria’ (1993) 27 Can J Afr Stud 66, 72-76. 
 
828 K Onuoha, ‘The Legal Regulation of Privatisation – A Critique’ in E Onyekpere (ed), Readings On 
Privatisation (Socio-Economic Rights Initiative, Lagos 2003) 17. 
 
829 R v Best, Times 6 October 1987 (CA), R v Griffiths (Ronald Paul) [1989] 11 Cr App R (S) 216 (CA).  
 
830 Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises para 12.3. 
 
831 U Ukiwo, ‘Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’ (2003) 41 J 
Mod Afr Stud 115, 123. Also see Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2002: 
Tracking Performance and Progress (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa 2002) 169.  
 
832 E Ugwu, ‘Privatisation: FG Urged to Drop Core Investor Policy’ Thisday (Lagos 30 August 2004) 
<www.thisdayonline.com> accessed 30 August 2004. 
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of which in one instance some indigenes in a particular locality, for several years, 
resisted the takeover of an enterprise by a successful privatisation investor from another 
geopolitical zone ostensibly due to cultural concerns.833 Other potential cultural flash 
points in the implementation of privatisation in Nigeria include the sacking of workers 
before or after privatisation in the course of restructuring the enterprises for greater 
productivity, and the supply of privatised goods or services where increased prices may 
lead to social exclusion that disproportionately affects some cultural groups in the 
absence of public subsidies.       
 
To the extent that the above issues have not been fully addressed through privatisation 
legal reform, the economic development sought to be actualised may fail to materialise, 
and rather privatisaion may pave the way for heightened tensions and socio-political 
crisis in the country.834 It should also be noted that where core/strategic investors are 
selected based on cultural preferences, the economic development objective of efficient 
enterprise management may be defeated where such investors lack relevant expertise. 
 
 
4.2.3.4.        WEIGHING THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING PRIVATISATION 
                    AGAINST THE EXPECTED BENEFITS 
 
Another strategic flaw with the Nigerian privatisation programme is that the way it has 
been implemented so far could undermine the argument that privatisation yields fiscal 
benefits for an implementing country. As earleir noted, an IMF report indicates that 
some fiscal gains have resulted from the country’s implementation of privatisation.835 
The concern here is that the figures may reveal as much as they do not reveal. While it 
cannot be said with mathematical certainty that privatisation has resulted in  a net 
financial loss for the country, what is clear is that the cost of its implementation is 
mounting by the day, such that it should seriously be asked whether the proposed gains 
of this massive expenditure would really offset the cost. The economic development 
                                                             
833 NM Ogubunka, Elements of Privatisation in Nigeria (Rhema Enterprises, Lagos 2000) 123; S 
Adejokun, ‘Dangote takes over Benue Cement Four Years After’ Daily Independent (Lagos 22 January 
2004) <http://www.dailyindependentng.com> accessed 22 January 2004. 
 
834 Also see AL Chua, ‘Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a  New Paradigm for Law and 
Development’ (1998) 108 Yale LJ 1, 19, 20, 21. 
 
835 IMF, ‘Nigeria: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Supplement and Statement; Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for 
Nigeria’ (Report) (February 2008) IMF Country Report No 08/64 17, 18, 25-27. 
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potential of the programme could be imperilled if the government does not keep close 
tabs on its expenditure in implementing it. A number of factors appear to be responsible 
for the rising implementation cost of the privatisation programme. The budgetary 
projections for implementing the privatisation programme is quite high836 Although it 
has been noted that privatisation through the capital market has on the average lower 
transaction costs than other forms of privatisation like private placement and asset 
sales837, the privatisation programme has primarily utilised these other forms of 
privatisation. There have also been many transaction failures in the implementation of 
privatisation through these other forms of privatisation, with the government having to 
embark on fresh privatisation attempts, with attendant costs.838 
 
The implementation of privatisation has also accelerated the repayment of pre-existing 
debts owed by various public enterprises to foreign creditors and suppliers in a bid to 
sell them debt-free to prospective investors839, of which it should be noted that in some 
other jurisdictions, the strategy has been to transfer both assets and liabilities in order to 
limit the government’s financial exposure840 A lot of workers have also been laid off as 
a result of privatisation, with the government incurring the huge immediate cost of 
settling their terminal benefits at a time when it is still struggling to meet up with 
existing pension payments.841 Also to note is that the government decided to invest huge 
sums of money in service contacts for the rehabilitation of some enterprises it had 
already earmarked for privatisation842, of which it ended up selling them far below the 
rehabilitation cost in many cases.843  
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840 JMP Nelson, ‘Modernisation and Privatisation in Ecuador’ (1994) 5 ICCLR 289, 292.  
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(2006) 17 ICCLR 345, 348-349.  
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The point was made earlier that the nature of some of the contracts the government has 
entered into with foreign investors has seen it paying huge sums to these investors 
rather than the other way round as projected under the privatisation guidelines, and 
some privatisation investors ended up stripping the assets of various enterprises, which 
represents serious financial losses for the country especially with regard to enterprises in 
which the country still had some partial ownership stake.844 There has also been 
considerable off-balance sheet expenditure in the form of tax and duty concessions and 
other kinds of incentives, which constitute significant forgone public revenue.845 In this 
regard. Peter Muchlinski notes that ‘The principal danger with investment incentive 
policies is that they may, in fact, be ineffective in attracting useful long-term 
investment. A foreign investor may be happy to take advantage of the host state’s 
incentives, and as soon as these run out, to divest.’846   
 
Finally, privatisation-related corruption in Nigeria, which will be examined later in the 
chapter may mean that the country has been short-changed in various privatisation 
transactions, and the government has also had problems in satisfactorily accounting for 
the proceeds of privatisation.847   
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retrieve looted equipment, cash’ The Punch (Lagos 26 September 2008) <www.punchng.com> accessed 
26 September 2008. 
 
845 S Adejokun, ‘Nigeria Loses N100b to Tariff Waivers’ Daily Independent (Lagos 25 February 2004) 
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MTN Tax Concession Reversed’ Thisday (Lagos 28 July 2004) <www.thisdayonline.com> accessed 28 
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847 V Akpotaire, ‘The Nigerian Privatisation Laws, Insider Dealing Abuses, and the Regulatory 
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4.2.3.5.          BALANCING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN 
                      PRIVATISATION IN THE INTEREST OF THE CITIZENS 
 
 
The implementation of privatisation as earlier noted raises concern about whether the 
social ends of development can be accomplished in a privatising country or whether 
they will be overshadowed by the economic objectives sought to be achieved.848 
According to the Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises: 
 
… nearly 70% of Nigerians are highly impoverished; having been 
adjudged by the UNDP as living below poverty line. Living on less than 
US$1 a day, most Nigerians cannot sustain themselves …849 
 
An IMF report on Nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy notes the above high poverty 
level as well as the high rate of unemployment in the country, and also notes the 
startegic importance of privatisation in poverty reduction efforts in the country.850 A 
number of issues arising from the implementation of privatisation indicate that 
privatisation legal reform may not necessarily address the problems of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment which need to be effectively adddressed if economic 
development is to be achieved in Nigeria. Some of these issues will be analysed here 
while some others will be analysed in the next chapter specifically dealing with 
electricity privatisation, such as the issues of utility rates and utility regulation .  
 
It has been noted that ‘as a colonial contraption, Nigeria’s relationship with its citizens 
has remained tenuous, abstract and superficial’851, which indicates that issues pertaining 
to the welfare of all the citizens may not be fully factored into the formulation and 
implementation of national economic reforms. As earlier noted, a lot of focus has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Fund Part of 2001 Budget, Says Govt’ The Guardian (Lagos 1 April 2004) 
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Country Report No 07/270 1, 3, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19. 
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on speedy completion of privatisation and meeting target dates.852 One of the key issues 
in assessing how citizens benefit from privatisation is how privatisation proceeds are 
utilised. The Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises notes that the use 
of privatisation proceeds ‘will include the use of the funds for productive investment 
and for the improvement of education, agriculture, health and other social sectors.’853 
However it should be noted that a significant part of privatisation expenditure comes 
from  money that the country borrowed from the World Bank, which means that 
whatever financial proceeds that possibly materialises from privatisation may be used to 
repay this debt rather than to address the above social concerns.854 Besides, as will be 
seen in the later discussion on privatisation-related corruption in Nigeria, it is by no 
means certain that the proceeds of privatisation will be properly accounted for and 
judiciously utilised where privatisation is implemented non-transparently.855  Regarding 
post-privatisation revenue that could accrue to the government through taxation and be 
used for addressing a host of social issues, the point was earlier made that the country’s 
tax system does not appear to be robust, and also has a lot of non-transparently granted 
waivers.856 
 
Another key issue concerning citizens welfare is the issue of how they can effectively 
participate in the privatisation process, of which the point was made earlier that 
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although the Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises recognizes the need 
for a Share Purchase Fund Scheme that will facilitate widespread participation857, the 
scheme has not yet started functioning several years after the commencement of the 
privatisation exercise. An attempt to set up the scheme some years ago ended in 
controversy and allegations of corruption, cronyism and lack of transparency.858  
 
Regarding the strategic approach to issues concerning workers, it is worth pointing out 
that some layoffs may be inevitable for achieving greater productivity and efficiency 
given the poor staffing of many public enterprises859, however the key issue is proper 
timing and strategising, considering that the country has a very high unemployment rate 
and does not have a welfare system that pays unemployment benefits to those that are 
unemployed. Bode Agoro notes that:  
 
… the programme of redundancies must be carried out properly. If it is 
not properly planned and executed, there is the potential not only of 
leading to a spontaneous industrial crisis but also frustrating the entire 
privatisation process. The Government must therefore carefully study the 
existing conditions of service of … staff with a view to evolving a more 
favourable retirement package for those who will eventually be laid 
off.…860 
 
Such careful planning does not seem to have taken place, with the result that 
privatisation related job cuts has proceeded at the same time as massive civil service 
purges, with thousands of workers entering the unmeployment queue at the same 
time.861 Due to the earlier noted problems with the investment climate in the country, 
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including the systemic issues facing the private sector, the ability of these workers to 
find alternative employment is highly constrained, meaning potential long term 
unemployment for thousands of people.862 Workers have challenged the government to 
first deliver on the promise of creating 7 million jobs in the economy (target date of 
2007) before destroying existing jobs863, of which trade liberalisation may also have 
resulted in net job losses from local firms that are unable to compete with cheaper 
foreign goods.864 Although there is usually a six-month moratorium on lay offs by 
privatised enterprises, this is quite limited considering the above noted risk of long term 
unemployment, and sometimes the moratorium deadline has been ignored.865 Severance 
packages are frequently delayed and paid haphazardly.866 Workers that are retained by 
privatised enterprises often lose job security owing to new employment contracts that 
emphasize the flexibility and casualisation of employment.867 Also noteworthy is the 
point made earlier that some foreign investors, rather than facilitating local employment 
creation, have focussed more on employing workers from their home jurisdications.868   
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The implementation of the provision in the Public Enterprises Decree 1999, which 
provides that some shares would be allocated to workers of privatised enterprises in a 
bid to ameliorate the potential adverse impact of the exercise on them869, will give rise 
to one key problem – it is not clear whether workers that are sacked immediately before 
or immediately after privatisation as a result of privatisation-related restructuring would 
also benefit from this provision.870 If sacked workers do not benefit from the provision, 
it severely diminishes its utility, and the government or strategic investor could 
massively sack workers in order to reduce the scope of potential beneficiaries.  
 
As earlier noted, workers have often resorted to strikes and protests to register their 
opposition to the manner and pace of implementation of the privatisation programme, 
and such protests, combined with the government’s reaction could have implications for 
the investment climate in the country.871 It has been noted with reference to Nigeria that 
the curtailment of labour rights in the course of implementing economic reform 
measures often has the tacit support of the IFIs where they consider such reforms 
acceptable, of which the need to implement the reforms is prioritised over the need to 
respect labour rights.872 In this reagrd, the IMF’s view that there is need for ‘the 
privatization program … to be accelerated’873, does not seem to fully factor in the 
implementation reality of privatisation for key stakeholders in the country, such as 
workers.  
 
Although the constitution provides that State policy shall be directed towards the 
provision of ‘reasonable national minimum wage’ as well as unemployment benefits, 
and also ensuring that ‘all citizens … have the opportunity for securing adequate means 
of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment’874, given 
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that these provisions are non-justiceable, they cannot form the basis for citizens that 
have been adversely affected by the implementation of privatisation to maintain action 
against the government.875 Besides, it has also been noted that most poor people cannot 
afford the high cost of litigation in Nigeria, including lawyers’ fees and court fees.876    
 
 
Finally it should be noted that although the Public Enterprises Decree 1999  empowers 
the NCP to periodically review the socio-economic effect of the privatisation 
programme and decide on appropriate remedies877, there is no indication that this has 
ever been done. Ordinarily this would have been a useful means of ensuring that the 
implementation of privatisation remains in consonance with the economic development 
objectives of privatisation in the country.  
 
 
4.2.4.       IS THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS ACCOUNTABLE,  
               TRANSPARENT AND FREE FROM CORRUPTION? 
   
Corruption has been linked to the malfunctioning of public enterprises in Nigeria, the 
massive poverty and unemployment facing the country and the reluctance of foreign 
investors to invest in the country878, and the government considered privatisation as a 
key policy measure for effacing corruption and other problems facing public 
enterprises.879 However despite various safeguard measures contained in the Public 
Enterprises Decree 1999 and the Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises 
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to ensure accurate valuation and pricing of privatisation shares and assets, transparent 
selection of qualitative core/ strategic investors through international competitive 
bidding and proper accounting of privatisation proceeds880, and despite transparency 
assurances by the government881, allegations of corruption and cronyism  have 
characterised the implementation of the programme. This relates to both the sale of 
public enterprises and assets as well as the utilisation of privatisation proceeds.  In one 
instance, public asssets were advertised for sale through public bidding after such assets 
had already been secretly pre-allocated to top government officials and their family 
members.882 Some enterprises have been controversially sold to, and concessions and 
contracts awarded to companies in which top government officials and those connected 
to the ruling political party have financial interests.883 Some of these companies lacked  
technical or financial track record and seemed to have been set up specifically to bid for 
enterprises being privatised.884  
 
On the issue of utilisation of privatisation revenue, news reports indicate that the 
Nigerian government has not been able to satisfactorily explain how much it has 
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realised from the privatisation programme or account for how such privatisation 
proceeds have been utilised, which has given rise to concerns about misappropriation of 
public funds.885 
 
Two key factors appear to have contributed to the vices of corruption and cronyism in 
the implementation of the Nigerian privatisation programme. In the first place, despite 
the merits of various privatisation safeguard measures, concern was earlier raised 
regarding the  open ended methods of privatisation provided under the Public 
Enterprises Decree 1999, which encompasses privatisation ‘by public issue ... or private 
placement ... through a willing seller and willing buyer basis or through any other 
means.’886 BPE, which has manifested institutional weaknesses that have had impact on 
its functioning, has placed considerable reliance on other methods of privatisation 
besides public issue which have been noted to be less transparent.887 Where they are 
used effectively, private sales could be utilised for selecting the most qualified core 
investors to take over and add value to public enterprises and obtaining commitments 
from them regarding future operations and staff welfare, but on the other hand, such 
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arrangements are also open to abuse.888 While some countries have used safeguard 
measures like public disclosure of enterprise valuation889, in Nigeria the secrecy 
surrounding enterprise valuation and negotiations between public officials and 
prospective investors under such arrangements often creates an enabling environment 
for favouritism and the execution of non-transparent transactions.890  
 
The second key contributory factor regarding corruption and cronyism is the earlier 
noted excessive political interference in the functioning of BPE resulting in arbitrariness 
in the conduct of various transactions despite the legal provisions and guidelines 
designed to ensure transparency in its functioning.891  As indicated in Chapter 3, where 
national political leaders that have adopted the policy of privatising public enterprises 
have vested interest in its outcome, it creates an incentive to interfere in the undertaking 
of such a sensitive exercise.892 A lot has been written on the prevalence of massive 
public sector corruption in Nigeria, including corruption in public contracts and misuse 
of public funds, and corruption goes beyond public enterprises and is noted to also 
permeate key institutions of governance in the country.893 This is inspite of the fact that 
Nigeria has various anti-corruption laws and anti-corruption bodies set up to enforce 
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Economy 4, 4-6, 20; PD Ocheje, ‘Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Nigeria’s Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000’ (2001) 45 JAL 173, 173-176, 184-185, 188-189; PD 
Ocheje, ‘Refocusing International Law on the Quest for Accountability in Africa: The Case against the 
“Other” Impunity’ (2002) 15 LJIL 749, 753-757; D Olowu, ‘Bureaucratic Morality in Africa’ (1988) 9 
IPSR 215, 217; M Szeftel, ‘Between Governance & Underdevelopment: Accumulation & Africa's 
“Catastrophic Corruption”’ (2000) 27 Rev African Polit Economy 287, 303; P Lewis, ‘Nigeria's 
Economy: Opportunity and Challenge’ (1999) 27(1) Issue: A Journal of Opinion 50, 51; S Williams, ‘The 
Development of Defence Procurement Policy in Nigeria and the Case for Reform’ [2005] PPLR 153, 
161-162, 169-170, 174.  
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these laws.894 Dubious procurement contracts have also been awarded despite the fact 
that the government has set up a due process office whose duty it is to insist on 
compliance with contract procedural guidelines.895 Akin to the research argument that 
privatisation laws alone cannot facilitate economic development in Nigeria due to other 
issues within the social context of its adoption and implementation, it has also been 
argued that corruption laws alone cannot effectively resolve  the problem of corruption 
in the country where it is embedded in: 
 
 … the larger mix of social and political problems that afflict the country. 
… Once it is recognized that the social environment is the proper arena 
of engagement, then the relatively limited place of law in the grand 
scheme of things becomes evident.896 
   
Within this social context in which corruption manifests, political will is required to 
effectively address it of which it has been noted that ‘Nigerian governments are 
notorious for their lack of political will in the matter of control of corruption.’897 
Although privatisation has been presented as an effective way of reforming public 
enterprises and facilitating economic development, to the extent that the political leaders 
in the country appear to lack the necessary incentive and political will to privatise 
transparently and prevent corruption from contaminating the divestiture process itself, 
privatisation may remain ineffective in actualising these objectives. The influence of 
corruption in privatisation, which stems from the vested interest viewpoint of 
privatisation earlier aticulated, provides a broader framework for understanding why 
                                                             
894 The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 established the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, while the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission Establishment Act 2004 established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. See 
also NS Okogbule, ‘Official Corruption and the Dynamics of Money Laundering in Nigeria’ (2007) 14 
JFC 49, 50, 57; AY Shehu, ‘Combating Corruption in Nigeria - Bliss or Bluster?’ (2004) 12 JFC 69, 69. 
 
895 NS Okogbule, ‘An Appraisal of the Legal and Institutional Framework for Combating Corruption in 
Nigeria’ (2006) 13 JFC 2006 92, 101; CA Malgwi, ‘Fraud as Economic Terrorism: The Efficacy of the 
Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’ (2004) 12 JFC 144, 149. 
 
896 PD Ocheje, ‘Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Nigeria’s Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Act, 2000’ (2001) 45 JAL 173, 184. Also see 185. 
 
897 Ibid 190. Also see 191 – 195. See further AY Shehu, ‘Combating Corruption in Nigeria - Bliss or 
Bluster?’ (2004) 12 JFC 69, 72-73, 75, 77, 81, 83-84; O Arowolo, ‘Nigeria's Downstream Sector 
Deregulation Crisis: What are the Unresolved Issues?’ [2005] IELTR 10, 16; OF Arowolo, ‘In the 
Shadows of the EFCC: Is the ICPC Still Relevant?’ (2006) 9 JMLC 203, 204; NS Okogbule, ‘An 
Appraisal of the Legal and Institutional Framework for Combating Corruption in Nigeria’ (2006) 13 JFC 
2006 92, 100, 103; Lewis, ‘Nigeria's Economy: Opportunity and Challenge’ (1999) 27(1) Issue: A 
Journal of Opinion 50, 52. 
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African countries like Nigeria may be willing to implement privatisation even when 
evidence may show some degree of coercion by IFIs.   
 
  
4.3.           EVALUATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The implementation of privatisation in Nigeria was critically analysed in this chapter. 
Similar to the situation with some other African countries, some obstacles stand in the 
way of fuly actualising economic development through the instrumentality of 
privatisation. While some of the problems may be rooted in deficiencies in the laws and 
regulations guiding privatisation, which may be cured by further legal reform, it is also 
clear that there is a limit to what law can accomplish in the implementation of 
privatisation given that other issues pertaining to the underlying investment climate in 
Nigeria, the functioning of various public institutions, the strategic approach to 
privatisation and the political dynamics inherent in corruption and cronyism in Nigeria, 
could all have impact on its outcome. Essentially, the laws cannot be considered in the 
abstract, without factoring in the social context of the implementation of privatisation in 
Nigeria. The next chapter focuses on how the above issues have manifested in the 
implementation of electricity reforms in Nigeria, which is expected to culminate in 
privatisation.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA 
 
 
Having analysed the case for privatisation in Africa, and examined how privatisation 
was adopted and implemented in Nigeria, this chapter narrows the discussion to the 
Nigerian electricity sector which is one of the key sectors of the economy earmarked for 
extensive reforms including privatisation.    
 
The electricity sector has been under monopoly public sector ownership and control and 
the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was tasked with developing and 
maintaining ‘an efficient, coordinated and economical system of electricity supply for 
all parts of the Federation’ including the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity.898 Although over the years considerable public investment has gone into 
increasing the volume of generated power, extending power coverage in the country and 
upgrading power facilities, the research case study showed that power supply remains 
inadequate for electricity users in the country. As of 2000, the National Electric Power 
Policy estimated that only 36 per cent of the country had access to power from NEPA 
and a big gap exists between the demand for, and supply of power in the country.899 
Increasing industrialisation, unplanned urbanisation and the use of obsolete power 
equipment are some of the issues that have contributed to the power deficit in the 
country, and power rationing and load shedding have been inevitable because of the 
growing energy gap, in a bid to evenly distribute a scarce commodity, but even then, the 
rationing is done in a haphazard manner with frequent and irregularly patterned 
                                                             
898 National Electric Power Authority Act No 24 of 1972, Chapter 256 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990 ss 1(1), 35. Also see Electricity Act, Chapter 106 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, which 
also guided NEPA’s operations; AG Adaralegbe, ‘Are the Energy Laws of Nigeria Sufficient to Promote 
and Preserve Competition?’ [2003] IELTR 251, 252-253; A Adefulu, ‘Nigerian Privatisation Legislation 
and its Implications for the Nigerian Energy Industry’ [2000] IELTR 219, 219-220. 
 
899 Electric Power Sector Reform Implementation Committee, Nigeria, ‘National Electric Power Policy’ 
(October 2000) <http://bpe.dev.bsh-bg.com/NR/rdonlyres/B3AE9394-8383-47E5-8199-
CD1A325A265B/0/ElectricPowerPolicy.pdf> accessed 6 September 2004 paras 1.2, 1.3. Further 
references to this policy shall simply read ‘National Electric Power Policy’, without the full citation. paras 
1.2, 1.3; Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2002: Tracking Performance and 
Progress (Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa 2002) 171.  
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blackouts occurring at both peak and off-peak periods.900 It is fair to say that in many 
parts of the country with access to grid electricity, NEPA has been synonymous more 
with darkness than light, with the availability of electricity power supply being more of 
an exception rather than the rule. From epileptic power supply and frequent power 
outages, the situation has worsened to periodic total systemic failures and blackouts 
throughout the country, affecting homes, businesses, government departments and 
public services.901  
 
The National Electric Power Policy considers that adequate electricity supply will play a 
key role in advancing economic development in the country.902 In seeking to privatise 
NEPA, the government expresed the intention of attracting greater private foreign and 
domestic investment to, and participation in the country’s power sector while limiting 
government guarantees to private investors; making the sector more efficient, profitable 
and competitive; facilitating the development of an electricity market; ensuring 
approprate electricity regulation; extending electricity coverage in the country with a 
view to achieving universal access; ensuring the citizens get qualitative and affordable 
electricity and electricity workers equitable treatment; and accelerating the country’s 
socio-economic development and enhancing the life quality of its citizens.903 The 
President also emphasised the need for utilising privatisation as a policy tool for 
integrating the national economy into the global economy and attracting foreign 
                                                             
900 OU Oparaku, ‘Photovoltaic Systems for Distributed Power Supply in Nigeria’ (2002) 25 Renewable 
Energy 31, 31; J Ikeme and OJ Ebohon, ‘Nigeria’s Electric Power Sector Reform: What should Form the 
Key Objectives?’ (2005) 33 Energy Pol’y 1213, 1215-1216; MA Tokunboh, Public Enterprises: The 
Nigerian Experience (Lantern Books, Lagos 1990) 33; AF Adenikinju, ‘Electric Infrastructure Failures in 
Nigeria: A Survey-Based Analysis of the Costs and Adjustment Responses’ (2003) 31 Energy Pol’y 
1519, 1523-1525. 
 
901 J Ikeme and OJ Ebohon, ‘Nigeria’s Electric Power Sector Reform: What should Form the Key 
Objectives?’ (2005) 33 Energy Pol’y 1213, 1215; G Tyler, ‘Nigeria: Public and Private Electricity 
Provision as a Barrier to Manufacturing Competitiveness’ (2002) 221 Findings (World Bank) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find221.pdf> accessed 2 December 2005; C Ogugbuaja, 
T Alao and S Olumide, ‘NEPA, Still in Shock, Remains Prostrate’ The Guardian (Lagos 8 February 
2005) <http://odili.net/news/source/2005/feb/8/27.html> accessed 10 February 2005; B Anaro, ‘Firms 
Suffer as Power Holding Fails to Tackle Outages Problems’ Businessday (Lagos 15 February 2006) 
<http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/paperfrmes.html> accessed 15 February 2006. 
 
902 National Electric Power Policy paras 1.1, 2.2(b), 17. Also see J Turkson and N Wohlgemuth, ‘Power 
Sector Reform and Distributed Generation in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2001) 29 Energy Pol’y 135, 135; O 
Arowolo, ‘Nigerian Power Sector Reform: Why Distribution Requires a Clear Strategy’ [2005] IELTR 
163, 163; AG Adaralegbe, ‘Are the Energy Laws of Nigeria Sufficient to Promote and Preserve 
Competition?’ [2003] IELTR 251, 252-253; A Adefulu, ‘Nigerian Privatisation Legislation and its 
Implications for the Nigerian Energy Industry’ [2000] IELTR 219, 219-220. 
 
903 National Electric Power Policy paras 1.4, 2, 3.1.4, 4.0, 4.2.5, 5.0-5.5, 6.1-6.2, 10.0, 17.  
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technology, expertise and capital in improving the country’s utilities.904 The wide 
ranging objectives of the privatised electicity sector recognises key potential benefits for 
various stakeholders which reflect the key economic development benefits of 
privatisation noted in this thesis. In the specific context of electicity privatisation, as 
seen above, privatisation would be beneficial for the government and the privatised 
utility/infrastrutural enterprise, it would contribute to the overall development of the 
private sector-led power sector, and will be beneficial to the citizens, including the 
power sector workers, and would provide a conduit for qualitiative foreign investments 
to flow to the country further positioning it as a global investment destination.   
 
The National Electric Power Policy also noted the need for legal and regulatory reform 
in order to actualise the policy objectives of power sector reform.905 The government 
has now put in place the legal and regulatory framework for undertaking extensive 
reform of the electricity sector, of which privatisation forms a key part of the reform 
programme.906 Under the Public Enterprises Decree 1999, NEPA had already been 
placed under the category of enterprises to be partially privatised, meaning that a 
maximum of 40 per cent of the shares would be sold to a core/strategic investor, 20 per 
cent of the shares would be sold to Nigerian citizens, while the government will retain 
the balance of 40 percent of the shares.907  
 
The case study examined the on-going electricity reform programme in order to assess 
whether the above-noted benefits of privatising and regulating the electricity sector in 
the country are likely to be realised, and noted that there are many challenges and 
problems facing the reform programme, which could be formidable obstacles in 
realising these benefits. While some of these problems specifically relate to the 
electricity sector including its law and poliy framework, some others are symptomatic 
of broader problems facing the Nigerian privatisation programme, which were 
                                                             
904 O Obasanjo (President of Nigeria), ‘Statement on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the National 
Council on Privatisation’ in National Council on Privatisation, Nigeria, Privatisation Handbook (3rd edn 
BPE, Abuja 2001) 4-5. 
 
905 National Electric Power Policy para 1.4. 
 
906 Electric Power Sector Reform Act No 6 of 2005. It established the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (NERC). See ss 31-32. 
 
907 Public Enterprises Decree 1999 1st Sch pt I; Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises 
para 1.4.     
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examined in Chapter 4. Following the analytical framework of the thesis, the design and 
implementation concerns of the electricity sector reform programme will be analysed.     
 
5.1.         DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK   
 
5.1.1.      THE ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION POLICY FRAMEWORK IN 
               NIGERIA  
 
 
The case study examined why the Nigerian government decided to embark on electricity 
reforms including the restructuring and privatisation of NEPA and regulation of the 
sector. Three viewpoints were earlier discussed on this issue with regard privatisation in 
Africa generally, as well as with specific reference to Nigeria, namely the conviction, 
coercion and vested interest viewpoints. As reasoned in Chapters 2 and 3, privatisation 
has to be well thought out and primarily driven by conviction before it can be effective 
as an economic development policy measure, however as noted in Chapter 4, the 
adoption of privatisation in Nigeria bears elements of the 3 viewpoints and it is not clear 
that conviction was the primary deciding factor in the decision to embark on 
privatisation.908   
 
Regarding the electricity privatisation programme, conviction does not appear to be the 
primary deciding factor. During the first privatisation programme, NEPA was scheduled 
for partial commercialisation.909 In 1997, a government committee assigned the task of 
examining the various problems besetting the country in the political, socio-cultural and 
economic spheres, making appropriate recommendations and developing a short to 
medium term programme for the development of the country, after noting the 
dilapidated state of the power infrastructure and low power coverage in the country, 
recommended massive power sector investments and the undertaking of legal reform to 
pave way for deregulation and introduction of competition into the power sector. 910 
However, after the submisson of this report that did not recommend the privatisation of 
NEPA, the government announced its decision to reorganise, unbundle and privatise the 
                                                             
908 Chapter 2 para 2.3.1.1, Chapter 3 para 3.1.1; Chapter 4 para 4.1.1. 
 
909 Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree (Act) No 25 of 1988 2nd sch. Pt 1. 
 
910 Vision 2010 Committee, Nigeria, ‘Vision 2010: Main Report’ Vol 1 (Report) (September 1997) 
<http://www.vision2010.org/downloads/main%20report%20(vol1).doc> accessed 7 February 2006 23, 
25, 99-100, 115, 195, 208. 
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power utility to promote competition and efficiency.911 The point was also made in 
Chapter 4 that the National Electric Power Policy, which was adopted in October 2000 
actually post-dates the decision to privatise the electricity utility given that NEPA had 
already been scheduled for privatisation under the Public Enterprises Decree 1999, thus 
the decision could not have been based on the policy.912 The policy itself, in seeking to 
justify the implementation of privatisation, notes that: 
 
Across the world, countries are unbundling their electricity supply 
industries. Only the network elements of electricity transmission and 
distribution are natural monopolies. Both electricity generation and the 
sales/marketing of electricity are potentially competitive activities. … 
Such markets encourage the introduction of private management 
methods and private investment as well as fostering the privatization of 
existing assets. The intention is that the proposed reforms should 
introduce these now widely applied developments to Nigeria, as laid out 
in this policy document.913 (emphasis added) 
  
This above quotation, to some extent, appears like an attempt to justify power sector 
unbundling and privatisation primarily because of the global appeal of the reform 
strategy, rather than by reference to how the strategy fits within the social context of 
Nigeria where it will be implemented. As noted by Adebayo Adaralegbe, ‘while global 
trends tend towards more liberalised energy markets, there is no universal model in 
achieving this, and approaches differ between countries’914 Further evidence of poor 
                                                             
911 —— ‘Nigerian Electric Privatisation Attracts Major Companies’ Alexander’s Gas And Oil 
Connections (Vooburg 4 March 1998) <http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/history/> accessed 2 December 
2004. 
 
912 Chapter 4 para 4.1.1. 
 
913 National Electric Power Policy para 3.0. 
 
914 AG Adaralegbe, ‘Are the Energy Laws of Nigeria Sufficient to Promote and Preserve Competition?’ 
[2003] IELTR 251. Also see F Urban, RMJ Benders and HC Moll, ‘Modelling Energy Systems for 
Developing Countries’ (2007) 35 Energy Pol’y 3473, 3474, 3481; R Pritchard, ‘The IPP Experiment’ 
[2001] IELTR 29, 32. P Andrews-Speed and R Pritchard, ‘Eight Principles of Electricity Industry 
Reform’ [2001] IELTR 11, 11, 12; Other countries that have utilised the power sector reform strategy of 
unbundling, privatisation and regulation include European countries like the United Kingdom and Czech 
Republic see A Mares, I Martinkova and I Zothova, ‘Czech Republic: Electricity and Gas Industry 
Privatisation’ [2001] IELTR N39, N39-N41; MB Hassan, ‘The Utilities Act 2000: Impact on the 
Electricity Industry’ [2000] IELTR 231, 231-232. However, even within Europe, some countries have 
sought to introduce restrictions to some aspects of electricity privatisation, for instance Netherlands. See 
E Van Schilfgaarde and P Verkleij, ‘Netherlands Parliament Adopts Controversial Energy Legislation: 
Energy Companies will have to Split Up and Privatization of Networks is Unlikely’ [2006] IELTR 170, 
170, 172; MM Roggenkamp, ‘Ownership Unbundling of Energy Distribution Companies: The 
Netherlands’ [2006] IELTR 240, 243. Beyond Europe, some other reform variations have been utilised in 
some countries rather than a perceived global model. Note for instance A Bonollo and G Anderson, ‘The 
South Australian Model of Electricity Privatisation’ [2001] IELTR 107, 107, 108-109, 112. Within 
Africa, South Africa for instance has a vertically integrated electricity public monopoly, ESKOM, which 
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policy making includes the fact that after NEPA had already been scheduled for 
privatisation, the former president noted in an interview that the power minister who did 
not keep the promise of stable power supply by the end of 1999 ‘did not fully 
comprehend what the problem with NEPA and with energy in general was.’915   
 
It is important to note that as of February 1999, the government had already agreed with 
the IMF that it would privatise NEPA and agreed the timeframe for taking key steps 
towards this, and power sector reforms including NEPA privatisation fall within the 
funding scope of the World Bank’s Privatization Support Project for the country, of 
which the World Bank favours the electricity reform strategy of unbundling, 
privatisation and regulation.916 The current development paradigm in Nigeria called the 
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) places 
emphasis on accelerating the ‘fast-tracking the restructuring and privatization of the 
[power] sector’, however as noted in Chapter 4, NEEDS is actually Nigeria’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which is a key documentary requirement in IFI 
financing/debt relief arrangements and some have noted that its preparation is often 
done within a very narrow policy space to ensure its conformity with IFI pre-endorsed 
policies.917 Within the context of the PRSP, Nigeria has been updating the IMF on its 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
also operates in other countries within the region. See K Pakendorf, ‘South Africa: Electricity and Natural 
Gas’ [2000] IELTR 202, 203-206.  
 
915 —— ‘People Talking About Hidden Agenda Are Those With Hidden Agenda ––Obasanjo’ Daily 
Independent (Lagos 3 May 2005) <http://www.dailyindependentng.com/> accessed 3 May 2005. 
 
916 IMF, ‘Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria for 1999’ (February 1999) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/022299.htm> accessed 22 March 2006 para 27, 28, Appendix 
2; World Bank (International Development Association), ‘Proposed Project Restructuring and 
Amendment of the Credit Agreements for the Privatization Support Project (Cr 3520-Uni) and 
Community Based Urban Development Project (Cr 3654-Uni) in the Context of the Portfolio 
Restructuring and in Alignment with the Country Partnership Strategy for the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria’ (Report) (June 2005) Report No 32425-NG 5-7, 12-13; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st 
Century? (World Bank, Washington DC 2000) 148-149.   
 
917 Chapter 4 para 4.1.1; IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper — National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy’ (Report)(December 2005) IMF Country Report No 05/433 60, 
61; D Holtom, ‘The Challenge of Consensus Building: Tanzania's PRSP 1998–2001’ (2007) 45 J Mod 
Afr Stud 233, 240-247; T Mckinley, ‘MDG-Based PRSPs Need More Ambitious Economic Policies’ 
(2005) United Nations Development Programme Policy Discussion Paper 
<http://www.undp.org/poverty/publications.htm> accessed 24 October 2005 7-8. See also IMF, 
‘Guidelines on Conditionality’ (September 2002) 
<http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf> accessed 20 March 2004 2. 
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progress in implementing power sector privatisation.918 These are all indicative of a 
privatisation programme that may be party motivated by some coercion.   
 
It should also be noted that the government, having decided to pursue privatisation, 
suddenly decided to also embark on the construction of several new power plants in 
different parts of the country and extensive refurbishing of power facilities and 
equipment.919 This is indicative of some policy confusion and perhaps lack of 
conviction about the effectiveness of the privatisation reform measure. The final 
consideration stemming from the vested interest viewpoint is that the implementation of 
privatisation may also be partly motivated by issues pertaining to corruption, which will 
be examined in some detail later in the work.920  
 
 
5.1.2.      THE ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
               FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
 
The importance of independent utility regulation was noted in Chapter 2.921 The legal 
and regulatory framework for electricity reform in Nigeria, although commendable in 
many respects, could nevertheless give rise to various implementation challenges that 
could jeopardize the attainment of the economic development objectives of the power 
sector reforms. Specifically, there are some concerns about some of the provisions of 
the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, including provisions relating to the 
structure, composition and functioning of the new electricity regulatory body, NERC 
that commenced operations in August 2005. 
 
Although the regulatory framework for the power sector would need to be very robust 
in order to deliver on the key reform objectives of the government, the structure, 
composition and functioning of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission 
                                                             
918 IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  — Progress Report’ (Report)(August 2007) IMF 
Country Report No 07/270 13-14. 
 
919 Ibid 14; M Oduniyi, ‘FG Releases N25bn for New Power Plants’ Thisday (Lagos 24 March 2005) 
<http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=12656> accessed 24 March 2005. 
 
920 Editorial, ‘Obasanjo Holdings and Transcorp PLC’ Daily Independent (Lagos 16 August 2006) 
<http://www.independentngonline.com/news/102/article/9005/2006-08-16.html> accessed 16 August 
2006. 
 
921 Chapter 2 paras 2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2. Also see  T Prosser, ‘Regulating Public Enterprises’ [2001] PL 505, 
506.  
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(NERC) as provided under the Act would likely give rise to various implementation 
problems. Many functions are assigned to NERC under the Electric Power Sector 
Reform Act 2005 and it has also been granted ample regulatory powers in order to 
effectively carry out the assigned functions. A source of concern however is that the 
new regulatory structure under the Act appears to be too monolithic or centralised, 
given the large geographical size of the country. Under the Act, the task of regulating 
the power sector for the entire country is assigned to 7 Commissioners.922 The key 
essence of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 is to unbundle NEPA and pave 
way for many private power companies to take over the functions of NEPA, of which 
the unbundled company now awaiting full priatisation is called the Power Holding 
Company of Nigeria (PHCN). Assigning to one regulatory body the task of regulating 
the activities of all these private power companies may pave way for monopoly 
inefficiencies of the old era to creep into the reformed power sector. Where regulation is 
decentralised, perhaps according to the geopolitical regions in the country, it will be 
possible to generate regional benchmarks and best practices for assessing the 
performance of the electricity regulators. The United Kingdom for instance has a 
smaller population and geographical area that Nigeria and yet there are separate 
electricity regulatory bodies for England, Scotland and Wales on the one hand (Office 
of the Gas and Electricity Markets, OFGEM) and Northern Ireland on the other hand 
(Office for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas, OFREG).923 If such were to be done in 
Nigeria, each regional regulatory body will oversee the activities of the power 
companies located in that region only, which will be a much more manageable task. The 
government would be able to assess whether a particular regional regulatory body is 
functioning well based on the performance of the regulatory bodies in other regions. 
 
The composition of NERC also poses some problems given that both the power 
ministry and the BPE have expressed concern about the lack of adequate local capacity 
for implementation of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005.924 Despite this 
however, in keeping with the federal character principle, regional representation is 
stipulated as a key requirement in the appointment of electricity commissioners, in 
                                                             
922 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 s 34. 
 
923 Also see C Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27 JL & Soc’y 38, 45.  
 
924 C Akwaya, ‘Power Sector: FG Seeks Foreign Experts for Regulatory Commission’, Nnaji To Set Up 
Three IPPS’ Thisday (Lagos 3 April 2005) <http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/paperfrmes.html> 
accessed 3 April 2005. 
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addition to expertise.925 This requirement of geo-political balancing may end up 
according higher priority to political correctness than competence and undermine the 
effectiveness of the regulatory body. It should be noted this was one of the contributory 
factors in the failure of Nigerian public enterprises in the first place.926 There is the risk 
that where some regions lack suitably qualified people to represent them, incompetent 
or poorly qualified people from such regions may ultimately be appointed to serve on 
the Commission owing to political correctness. This would undoubtedly cripple the 
NERC, and since the NERC makes policies for the whole country, regions with suitably 
qualified commissioners would be saddled with the overall inefficiency of the NERC. 
Further, NERC commissioners are to be selected by the President rather than elected by 
their geo-political zones.927 They may not necessarily represent the best interests of their 
zones, especially where they are resident in a zone other than where they are indigenes 
and could feel more beholden to their appointor than the people whose interests they are 
supposedly representing. Commenting on a similar issue wih regard to another 
government commission called the Niger Delta Development Commission set up under 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (Establishment, etc) Act 2000, 
Kaniye Ebeku notes as follows: 
 
The greatest of the problems that the NDDC face relate to its 
composition. Moreover, the NDDC Act lacks other appropriate and 
necessary participatory provisions. In particular, the NDDC Act does not 
make provision for the representation of the indigenous people (for 
whose benefit the Act was made) in the executing body nor is there a 
provision for their participation in the planning and execution of projects. 
Certainly, the provision for the representation of state members in the 
Commission cannot be properly regarded as affording representation to 
the local people, since they have no input in the process of appointment. 
The problem with this situation lies in the fact that such appointees are 
likely to see themselves as representing the state authorities that 
appointed them, and not the people.928   
     
                                                             
925 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 s 34.   
 
926 MA Tokunboh, Public Enterprises: The Nigerian Experience (Lantern Books, Lagos 1990) 53. Also 
see Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 s 14(3). 
 
927 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 s 34.   
 
928 KSA Ebeku, ‘Appraising Nigeria's Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2000’ (2003) 25 Stat 
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Another concern is that although the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 provides 
that the quorum for the meetings of the NERC Commissioners shall be 4929, it also 
provides that,  
 
No decision or act of the Commission or act done under the direction of 
the Commission shall be invalid on the ground that, (a) there existed a 
vacancy or vacancies among the Commissioners; or (b) there existed 
some defect in the constitution of the Commission at the time the 
decision was taken or act was done or authorised. 930 
 
This seems to create a legal leeway for undermining the functioning of the NERC and 
could be a licence for corruption and a cover for underhand dealings, an issue that will 
be further examined later in the chapter. The Chairman/ Vice Chairman of the NERC 
could collude with one or 2 other Commissioners to usurp the powers of the 
Commission and take key decisions to the exclusion of the other Commissioners.  
 
As earlier noted, it may be necessary to subject regulators to some forms of 
accountability, including oversight by political institutions in the country as well as 
legal accountability through the courts.931 It is important however to consider how these 
acountability mechanisms function in the Nigerian context. Some of the other 
provisions of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 that could affect the 
realization of the policy objectives of privatisation and regulation include the provisions 
dealing with the relationship between NERC and the Minister in charge of the power 
sector, the pursuit of legal redress through the courts and penalties for offences under 
the Act. Regarding the relationship between NERC and the Minister in charge of the 
power sector, the autonomy and independence of the NERC is compromised by the fact 
that its annual budget shall be submitted to the Minister, who is also empowered to give 
general policy directions to the NERC.932 By way of contrast, the Georgian National 
Energy Regulatory Commission for instance is not required to present its budget to the 
Ministry of Energy, but is only required to send its annual performance report to the 
                                                             
929 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 s 41(4). 
 
930 Ibid s 44(1). 
 
931 Chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2; A Ogus, ‘Comparing Regulatory Systems’ in D Parker and D Sall (eds), 
International Handbook on Privatization (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2003) 527. 
 
932 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005  ss 33, 51. See also O Arowolo, ‘Licensing of Electricity 
Business in Nigeria: Issues and Comments’ [2006] IELTR 29, 30. 
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Ministry, the President and the parliament933. Given the earlier noted problem of 
political meddling in public enterprises in Nigeria934, this administrative link between 
the NERC and the Minister could potentially undermine regulatory independence and 
could be a conduit for bureaucratic bottlenecks, corruption and cronyism to creep into 
the functioning of the NERC. John Hatchard notes with respect to Africa that ‘National 
institutions must enjoy operational independence through adequate and secure funding 
so as to ensure appropriate staffing levels, premises and resources.’935 Essentially, the 
concept of regulatory capture does not just refer to direct capture by vested industry 
interests but could also mean state capture where the regulatory structure permits the 
central government to have considerable influence over sector regulators, severely 
undermining their independence, of which such influence could even be exerted on 
behalf of industry or other interests in some cases, as has been observed regarding the 
South African telecommunications sector for instance.936  
 
Regarding the issue of pursuit of legal redress through the courts, it is commendable 
that the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 provides an avenue for independent 
examination of orders or decisions of the NERC by the High Court given the point 
made in Chapter 2 about the need to keep regulators accountable for the exercise of 
regulatory powers.937, however, the scope for such judicial examination is curtailed 
given that the Act expressly limits it to questions of law arising from orders or decisions 
of the NERC and also such questions have to be referred to it by the NERC either on its 
own initiative or at the instance of an affected party.938 Further, it should also be noted 
that Section 61 of the Act exempts the NERC, its employees and Commissioners from 
liability for any loss or damage resulting from the bona fide exercise or performance of 
                                                             
933 Georgian Law on Electricity and Natural Gas 1997 clauses 19-21; P Ballonoff, ‘Brief Summary of the 
Revised Georgian Law on Electricity and Natural Gas, as Applied to the Power Sector of Georgia’ [2007] 
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934 PM Lewis, ‘State, Economy, and Privatisation in Nigeria’ in JL Upper and GB Baldwin, Public 
Enterprises: Restructuring and Privatization (International Law Institute, Washington DC 1995) 318. 
 
935 J Hatchard, ‘The Development of New National Institutions in Commonwealth Africa’ (1995) 21 
Commw L Bull 1313, 1317. 
 
936 T Cohen, ‘Rethinking (Reluctant) Capture: South African Telecommunications and the Impact of 
Regulation’ (2003) 47 JAL 65, 81-87 pp 82, 85. 
 
937 Chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2. Also see R Pritchard, ‘Managing Electricity Industry Reform: Responding to 
the Challenge’ [2003] IELTR 149, 150. 
 
938 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 s 49.  
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its statutory functions under the Act. Whether or not a particular act or omission 
purportedly done under the Act is bona fide may be a question of fact but given the 
limitation imposed by the Act, which resembles the limitation in judicial review 
proceedings, the court will not be able to examine the facts.939 In the Nigerian and 
indeed African context, it may be necessary for the courts to be permitted to examine 
facts behind decision rather than be confined to questions of law, owing to the fact that 
the cancellation of a licence or the imposition of a fine by the NERC may not 
necessarily be above board, for instance, where it stems from the refusal to pay a bribe 
or is politically motivated and therefore may require a consideration of surrounding 
facts by the High Court.940 The Act confers power on the NERC to grant, extend or 
cancel licences in the public interest941 but where regulators are corrupt, they are often 
not motivated by public interest considerations in their actions or inactions. Indeed 
recently, all the Commissioners of NERC were suspended from office based on 
corruption allegations.942 It is not unimaginable that regulators that have been 
compromised could take care to ensure that their corruptly induced actions and 
omissions are procedurally above board and hence may not be upturned by the court.  
 
The fact that those affected by the orders or decisions of NERC cannot proceed directly 
to the courts but rather need to request NERC to refer questions pertaining to such 
orders or decisions to the court for determination is both cumbersome and unnecessarily 
limiting given that NERC may have vested interest in frustrating any attempt to 
examine its own actions. Also, since it is the NERC that states the question to the High 
Court for judicial examination, it may frame the question in a way that is most 
favourable to it. Further, given that such referral of questions of law is restricted to 
orders and decision of the commission, its omissions may be outside the purview of 
judicial examination. Under the Electricity Act 1989 of the United Kingdom for 
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940 See for instance I Adams, ‘Atiku’s Intels in the Eye of a Storm’ The Punch (Lagos 23 December 2005) 
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instance, licence holders do not need such permission before going to court943, which is 
also the case with some other regulatory provisions in Nigeria, such as the Nigerian 
Communications Act 2003944   
 
The Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 also provides for an internal review 
mechanism for its actions at the instance of a party aggreived by its decisions, orders 
and refusals pertaining to licences, approvals, authorisations, prices or tariffs.945 This 
would be of little comfort to aggreived customers or licensees and does not adequately 
make up for the limitations placed on recourse to the courts. Where the Commission is 
already compromised or captured or simply incapable of efficiently and effectively 
discharging its assigned functions, its internal review mechanism may not hold much 
hope for aggreived consumers and offers insufficient guarantees to prospective investors 
regarding regulatory risk. It should be noted however that the judicial option itself, as 
earlier seen, is not without its own problems946, of which it may be possible that in some 
cases, neither the internal review mechanism of the NERC nor the external review 
mechanism of courts offers real hope. Regarding the citizens, it should also be noted 
that key weaknesses have also been noted in the legal and institutional structure for 
consumer protection in Nigeria.947 
 
Finally, the punishment for various offences under the Electric Power Sector Reform 
Act 2005 appears inadequate to the extent that the law permits the imposition of meagre 
fines in lieu of imprisonment.948 The maximum possible fine under the Act, which is 
equivalent to about £2,000 pounds sterling, may not be sufficient deterrence against 
regulatory breaches given that such breaches could yield substantial gains for the 
offender, and impose huge costs on the government or the customers as the case may 
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be. This is often the case with many Nigerian laws that seek to punish regulatory 
breaches but which often provide non-deterrent penalties.949  
 
 
 
5.2. ENSURING PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIVATISATION 
        
 
     
5.2.1.     IS THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO  
               EMBARKING ON PRIVATISATION AND ATTRACTING PRIVATE  
             INVESTMENTS? 
 
In Chapter 4, various concerns regarding the general investment climate in Nigeria were 
discussed.950 There are some issues specifically affecting the electricity sector that could 
affect the sustainability of long term investments in the sector and dampen investor 
interest if unaddressed.  
 
The oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria is where many of the power plants that 
should be privatised are located, as well as the gas required by power plants in other 
parts of the country, and as noted in Chapter 4, it has been plagued by violence 
stemming from the activities of various militant groups, of which enviromental 
degradation that has persisted even with the enactment of various environmental laws, 
has been identifed as a key causative factor.951 Some of the environmental problems 
have been attributed to these power plants, of which communities that live around them 
have been complaining bitterly about the discharge of effluents from them with adverse 
impact on the environment as well as the health of the residents and their economic well 
being. Some of them have sent protest letters and petitions to NEPA/PHCN as well as 
government officials requesting immediate abatement of the nuisance, restoration of the 
                                                             
949 For a discussion on the issue of meagre penalties for environmental degradation for instance, see EO 
Nwosu, ‘Petroleum Legislation and Enforcement of Environmental Laws and Standards in Nigeria’ 
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environment and adequate compensation prior to privatisation, failing which they would 
disrupt the exercise.952 To further compound the above problem, some of these 
communities have not yet been connected to the national grid and have threatened to 
damage/ sabotage the power infrastructure in their domain if they continue to remain in 
darkness953 Apart from the issue of socio-poitical instability, legal liability for 
environmental degradation could also be of concern to prospective investors given that 
some of the communities facing environmental degradation caused in part by the 
government owned power plants, could decide to sue the privatisation investors that 
take over these plants. Also, even though the state has been accused of not having the 
political will to enforce environmental laws and regulations954, this does not rule out the 
fact that the laws may yet be enforced in the future by a regulatory agency that is 
determined to do a good job. In the United Kingdom for instance, the issue of liability 
of privatisation successors-in-title for land contamination that occured during public 
ownership has been the subject of litigation and eventhough the House of Lords’ 
decision was ultimately against such liability being imposed on a successor-in-title, this 
seemed to be based on the specific way the relevant legislation was worded, and it 
should be noted that the earlier ruling at the court of first instance was against the 
private investor.955      
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the above issues come within the scope of host community 
hostily risk956, and in absence of sufficient government guarantees957, could disuade a 
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prospective investor from investing in the power plants located there, as well as the 
power plants outside the region which face gas shortages owing to damage to gas 
pipelines within the region. Beyond the Niger Delta  part of the country, the 
downstream electricity sector is still plagued by a host of problems inlcluding the 
problem of old and derilict power infrastructure that gives rise to massive energy losses 
between the point of generaton and point of distribution, as well as the problem of 
vandalising and stealing of power transmission and distribution lines that transport 
generated power to customers.958 This has created a major implementation problem for 
electricity privatisation given that many potential investors in the downstream sector 
will consider that their business will be hampered where power cannot be generated in 
the first place due to vandalised power or gas equipment, and power cannot be 
distributed due to vandalised power cables.  
 
The bottom line is that the electricity sector necessarily requires long-term investment 
and Where the investment climate is not clement and the government is unable to 
effectively address its underlying problems as is presently the case with Nigeria, a 
potential investor may either not invest at all or may insist on very high premium to 
cover the risks and negative eventualities of operating in such a hostile environment.   
 
  
5.2.2.     IS THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING  
              AND MONITORING THE OUTCOME OF PRIVATISATION  
              ROBUST? 
    
 
There are some key concerns regarding the institutional framework for undertaking the 
extensive reform of the electricity sector and regulating the operations of private 
investors in the sector after the reforms have been concluded. As earlier noted, an IMF 
report notes that the country suffers from the problems of weak institutions and limited 
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technical capacity in implementing economic reforms.959 This would be contrasted with 
the position in some developed countries where regulatory systems have been 
functioning and evolving over many years.960 Paul Collier notes that: 
 
Evidently, Nigerian public utilities have the wrong managerial structure 
and some form of privatization seems essential. This is obviously not a 
'stroke of the pen' reform, nor is there a single model to serve as the 
policy goal. Privatized utilities need a framework of regulation, and if an 
established central bank cannot supervize an uncomplicated activity such 
as private banking, the prospects for a new utility supervision institution 
cannot be bright.961 
 
 
As earlier noted, both the power ministry and the BPE have expressed concern about the 
lack of adequate local capacity for implementing the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 
2005.962 Some of the areas of concern regarding the institutional capacity for 
implementing electricity privatisation are the framework for negotiating electricity 
privatisation contracts and the capacity for effectively supervising contractual 
performance and the market competition. It was noted in Chapter 4 that despite the 
detailed requirements in the privatisation guidelines for selecting privatisation 
core/strategic investors, BPE appeared to lack the capacity for undertaking basic due 
diligence on prospective investors, of which there have been many high profile 
transaction failures and instances where the government ended up revoking transactions 
in which the successful investor appeared to lack the requisite technical, managerial or 
financial capacity and sometimes sought to strip the assets of the enterprise.963  The 
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implementation of power sector reforms involves the use of various contractual 
arrangements including sales contracts with core/startegic investors, concessions, 
management contracts, Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) contracts with Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs), contracts with Emergency Power Producers (EPPs) and 
Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer (ROT) contracts.964 Securing adequate value for 
money and firm contractual commitments regarding service quality are very essential 
for protecting the public interest in the negotiation of these contracts. However, 
regarding the service contracts for the building of new government-owned power plants, 
there are reports that some of the contractors abandoned these projects after being 
paid.965 In the case of IPPs, most of them have not yet commenced operations even 
though they have had their licences for some years of which the government is reported 
to be considering revoking some of the licences, and some of the ones that have become 
operational have been reported to be functioning below capacity966  
 
The above problems may be indicative of an inadequate technical and financial due 
diligence on prospective licencees and contractors. Specifically regarding the NERC, 
the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 requires it, in determining whether to grant 
a power licence, to be satisfied that the licence applicant is ‘likely to comply’ with 
licence requirements, of which it has been noted that this requirement is not stringent 
enough and could pave the way for lax vetting of licence applicants.967  
 
Actualising the benefits of electricity privatisation requires the undertaking of key tasks 
of protecting consumers and promoting competition.968 Some other problems posed by 
the regulatory framework for the power sector have already been examined, including 
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its centralised nature, the geo-political considerations in appointment of commissioners 
and the issue of ministerial oversight.969  Regulatory bodies in Nigeria are often unable 
or unwilling to discharge regulatory responsibilities spelt out in various laws and 
regulations, of which inadequate funding , training and expertise and conflict of interest 
have been identified as some of the reasons for this situation.970 In addition, it was noted 
in Chapter 2 that regulatory and competition laws are complementary in the privatised 
sector, of which regulators are sometimes granted powers to promote competition in the 
provision of various utility/infrastrucutral services.971 The National Electric Power 
Policy recognises the importance of competition in the privatised power sector, while 
the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 requires NERC to promote competition and 
private sector participation.972 The country as earlier noted, does not yet have a 
competition law or competition authority973, of which the National Electric Power 
Policy states that NERC will undertake the functions of the competition authority 
regarding the electricity supply industry prior to the establishment of the competition 
authority.974   
 
In the light of the institutional concerns noted earlier, it would appear that the NERC 
may not yet be fully positioned to effectively undertake its core regulatory functions let 
alone functions as a competition authority. Indeed the fact that the government has not 
yet enacted the competition law or set up the competition authority several years after 
adopting the National Electric Power Policy that lays emphasis on privatisation, 
regulation and competition buttresses the point earlier made about possible lack of 
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adequate policy consideration and conviction on the part of the government about the 
merits of privatisation.  
 
Some concern has also been raised about the fragmented nature of the organisational 
structure for electricity reforms, which involves various responsibilities being 
undertaken by the power ministry, BPE, NCP, NERC, PHCN, the Rural Electrification 
Agency, and some special presidential bodies.975 Besides the risk of overlap in assigned 
functions, prospective investors may also find such fragmentation confusing and may 
not be certain about which of these organisations is in a position to make binding legal 
commitments on behalf of the government.  
 
On a final note, it should be pointed out that the World Bank recently approved funding 
for extensive capacity building in the power sector covering both the unbundled 
successor companies of the power utility as well as NERC. While this may play a role 
in positioning the power sector for privatisation, it does reveal that several years after 
the scheduling of the power utility for privatisation (1999), the adoption of the power 
policy (2001) and the enactment of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 (2005), 
key institutional constraints still stand in the way of actualising economic development 
through electricity privatisation.976  
 
 
5.2.3.      WILL THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE IMPLEMENTATION  
               OF ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION LEAD TO THE REALISATION  
            OF SET POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
 
      
In Chapter 4, the strategic flaws of the Nigerian privatisation programme were 
examined.977 In the implementation of various reforms in the electricity sector which is 
expected to culminate in privatisation, a number of strategic flaws can be observed, 
which would have impact on the implementation outcome of the Electric Power Sector 
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Reform Act 2005. The following issues will be analysed following the analytical 
structure of the thesis:  
  
 The pace and sequencing of privatisation 
 
 The strategy for engaging foreign investors  
 
 The approach to socio-cultural issues in privatisation  
 
 Weighing the cost of implementing privatisation against the expected benefits 
 
 Balancing the economic and social issues in privatisation in the interest of the 
citizens 
 
 
5.2.3.1.       THE PACE AND SEQUENCING OF PRIVATISATION 
 
As currently implemented, some of the constituent reforms power sector reform 
programme could be at cross purposes. In the first place, the Electric Power Sector 
Reform Act 2005 provides for the NCP to undertake the unbundling of NEPA into an 
initial holding company and then subsequently into a number of successor companies, 
within statutorily set time limits.978 This has now been completed, of which the Act 
gave the NCP the discretion to commence the privatisation of the successor generation, 
transmission and distribution companies when and how it considers appropriate.979 
However prior to the enactment of the Act, the National Electric Power Policy which 
endorsed speedy privatisation had also endorsed the rehabilitation of PHCN (as it is 
now called. power plants prior to privatisation through Rehabilitate, Operate and 
Transfer (ROT) as well as the negotiation of agreements for the purchase of power from 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Emergency Power Producers (EPPs) to 
provide extra power to bridge the gap between the demand and supply of power.980  
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Having speedily concluded the unbundling process, the government in addition to 
undertaking the rehabilitation of NEPA power plants suddenly embarked on the 
construction of several new power plants in the country, at massive cost, despite the fact 
that the reasoning behind the power sector reforms endorsed under the Electric Power 
Sector Reform Act 2005 is to ‘transform the power sector into one led by the private 
sector’.981   
 
The task of privatising NEPA, which is the biggest public enterprise in the country, is 
quite daunting, of which the government has privatised only 3 out of 18 unbundled 
enterprises.982 Given that the government has decided to privatise the enterprise, every 
institutional and financial resource ought to have been primarily devoted to this major 
project. Rather than spending considerable time and money to rehabilitate and add value 
to power equipment and facilities that will be eventually privatised, this responsibility 
should have been ceded to the new power investors. The massive project of building 
new power plants is at cross purposes with electricity privatisation programme given 
that it will increase the government’s asset ownership and expenditure in the power 
sector while privatisation aims to achieve lesser government presence and financial 
commitment. Prospective investors could be worried about investing in a power sector 
where the government is not only the regulator but also a signifiicant participant.    
 
Due to lack of proper planning and sequencing, it has been noted that the building of the 
new gas-powered plants is going far ahead of the setting up of gas supply infrastructure 
and development of new gas fields to ensure adequate supply of gas to them, meaning 
that the power plants could remain idle for quite sometime after they have been 
completed.983  
 
On the issue of granting licences to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to generate 
and sell power, the role of IPPs in the Nigerian electricity reform programme needs to 
be critically examined due to the fact that some negative attributes have been associated 
                                                             
981 IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper — National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy’ (Report)(December 2005) IMF Country Report No 05/433 60. 
 
982 Also see IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report’ (Report) (August 2007) 
IMF Country Report No 07/270 14. 
 
983 J Tolken, ‘Power Projects: Where will the Gas Come from?’ Businessday (Lagos 20 March 2006) 
<http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com/paperfrmes.html> accessed 20 March 2006; A Adefulu, ‘How Can 
Nigeria Develop a Domestic Market for its Gas?’ [2000] IELTR 99, 101. 
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with them in some countries where they have been introduced in the course of 
liberalising the power sector.984 The problem is not the use of IPPs per se but the 
strategy for using them. The National Electric Power Policy initially envisioned a 
limited supplementary role for IPPs in the liberalised power sector in Nigeria and placed 
annual limits on the amount of IPP power that could be purchased with the backing of 
government guarantee985, however its use has now been massively expanded986  
Premature excessive reliance on IPPs in Nigeria could have implications for both 
privatisation and market competition. This is because IPPs, especially those of the 
single-buyer model sometimes distort competition in a deregulated power sector even 
though the Nigerian government has emphasised the need for such market 
competition.987 The way the deals are structured in the single buyer model means that 
the government would contract to buy all the generated power in bulk over many years 
(sometimes up to 25 years), and now set the tariff for retail sale to power consumers988, 
a strategy also adopted by some other African countries989, and encouraged by the 
World Bank with further risk guarantees.990 Although long-term commitments in the 
energy sector may be needed to persuade prospective investors of the long-term 
                                                             
984 H Nagayama, ‘Effects of Regulatory Reforms in the Electricity Supply Industry on Electricity Prices 
in Developing Countries’ (2007) 35 Energy Pol’y 3440, 3453; R Pritchard, ‘The IPP Experiment’ [2001] 
IELTR 29, 30-31; K Bayliss and D Hall, ‘Independent Power Producers: A Review of the Issues’ (Public 
Services International Research Unit Report) (November 2000) 
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Electricity Regulatory Commission, ‘Licencees’ <http://www.nercng.org/site/383/default.aspx> accessed 
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988 O Arowolo, ‘Nigerian Power Sector Reform: Why Distribution Requires a Clear Strategy’ [2005] 
IELTR 163, 166; M Oduniyi and O Nzechi, ‘Agip’s $450m IPP takes Off, Boost Power Supply by 
300mw’ Thisday (Lagos 25 March 2005) <http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=12749> accessed 
25 March 2005. Also see R Pritchard, ‘The IPP Experiment’ [2001] IELTR 29, 29. 
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viability of their proposed investments991, the ‘take or pay’ obligation under long-term 
Power Purchase Agreements means that the government will continue to purchase 
expensive IPP power at pre-agreed rates even if other power companies are in a position 
to enter the market with better rates.992 Premature termination of such contracts carries 
the risk of legal action and payment of considerable damages.993 Continuing them 
however would limit market competition and the choice it offers to consumers  and 
could foreclose or constrain the market space available to other private power 
suppliers.994  To the extent that the bulk purchase of IPP power is guaranteed by the 
government, IPPs may not have the incentive to seek new customers or compete with 
other power companies since the government is already a captive customer yeilding 
sufficient profits.995  
 
Essentially, single buyer obligations could distort and complicate competition efforts, 
and the retention of elements of monopoly even with private sector participation in the 
power sector could undermine the potential benefits of such participation for the 
country, the citizens and overall private sector development.996 Also to note is that 
                                                             
991 SL Teichler and I Levitine, ‘Long Term Power Purchase Agreements in a Restructured Electricity 
Industry’ (2005) 40 Wake Forest L Rev 677, 691, 701-703. 
 
992 K Talus, ‘Long-term Gas Agreements and Security Of Supply - Between Law and Politics’ (2007) 32 
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993 C Markus, ‘Stranded Costs of Former Electricity Monopolies under E.U. law: Part 1’ [2000] IELTR 
144, 146. Also note the case of Argentina where such termination led to multiple cases at the International 
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afford to pay huge sums for power supply, leaving out poor households, and where they are serving a 
captive area, the people living these wil not have any alternative supplier to turn to. In Nigeria, some IPPs 
are of this type See generally —— ‘Aba Power Plant is a Model — Prof. Nnaji’, Vanguard (3 August 
2005) <http://odili.net/news/source/2005/aug/3/327.html > accessed 3 August 2005. 
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excessive use of IPPs could frustrate the privatisation of the electricity utility itself on 
account of the fact that potential buyers of the existing government-owned power plants 
may be discouraged from doing so unless there is an assurance that the sort of 
incentives or guarantees that are included in power purchase agreements would be 
extended to them as well, in order to level the playing field.997   
 
In some other countries, IPPs have been utilised as a sub-part of the competitive  
electricity market rather than as the predominant providers to a captive market, in which 
case they may actually add value to market competition, for the benefit of consumers.998 
 
Although the NERC is responsible for regulating the power sector in the country and 
promoting competition in the sector999, IPPs could still pose a regulatory problem in 
Nigeria given that some of them had already signed Power Purchase Agreements with 
the government prior to the passing of the EPSRA that ushered in the new regulatory 
framework for the power sector. 1000  Although the EPSRA contains a transitional 
provision that states that any power licence issued under pre-existing legislation would 
continue to have effect as if it had been issued under the EPSRA1001, IPPs could insist 
on the sanctity of their pre-existing Power Purchase Agreements, including the tariffs 
and contractual obligations enshrined in such agreements, and may pursue dispute 
settlement as provided under these agreements to ensure that they do not face greater 
regulatory supervision or end up with lesser earnings than they initially contracted with 
the government.    
 
In the final analysis, it may have been better and more prudent for the government to 
have sequenced the power sector reforms properly and sorted out privatisation, 
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11, 15.  
 
997 K Bayliss and D Hall, ‘Independent Power Producers: A Review of the Issues’ (Public Services 
International Research Unit Report) (November 2000) <http://www.psiru.org/publicationsindex.asp> 
accessed 13 November 2006. 
 
998 J Weller, ‘Macedonia's New Energy Law’ [2006] IELTR 191, 191-193. 
 
999 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 s 32.  
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regulation and tariff issues, and put in place a competition law and competition 
authority, before engaging IPPs, so as to be sure whether they are really needed and if 
so, the volume of power that is actually required from them. The new regulatory regime 
under the EPSRA 2005 should have been the basis for negotiations with all IPPs in the 
country.  
 
 
 
5.2.3.2.          THE STRATEGY FOR ENGAGING FOREIGN INVESTORS 
 
 
The need for appropriate strategising with regard to privatisation investments, especially 
foreign investments was noted in Chapter 2 of which the point was made in Chapter 3 
about imbalance in risk allocation in the foreign investment contracts executed in some 
African countries.1002 As noted in Chapter 4, many of the foreign investors operating in 
Nigeria outside the oil and gas sector where profits are more predictable have often 
entered into  contractual arrangements by virtue of which they earn foreign exchange 
from the country, rather than commit their own funds to the country.1003 As noted 
above, the government has entered into several contracts for the construction of new 
power plants mostly with foreign contractors. Some of these contractors, owing to poor 
regulation, have abandoned their work sites after getting paid.1004  Given some of the 
earlier noted concerns about the Nigerian investment climate1005, attracting long term 
foreign direct investmemt  to the country’s power sector may be difficult. Rather than 
development a coherent strategy for resolving some of the underlying problems with the 
investment climate, the government has focused more on promises of investment 
incentives.1006 According to Nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy paper:  
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… the private sector will be granted incentives to invest in infrastructure 
especially in power generation and supply … Accordingly, new 
strategies for increasing private sector participation such as build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT), build-own-operate-and-transfer (BOOT), 
and rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer (ROT) schemes, will be pursued.1007 
 
Power Purchase Agreements with IPPs owned by some foreign muntinationals, which 
are essentially profit guarantees come within this rubric.1008, and the government has 
also laid strong emphasis on raising of tariffs to ensure profitability as a way of 
incentivising much needed investments in the power sector. In this regard, it has been 
noted that  
 
… there is some possibility that prices may go up in developing 
countries because payment to IPP is guaranteed in PPA contracts in order 
to promote investment. Thus, if payments are guaranteed for foreign 
investors to increase their revenue, general electricity prices will have to 
be raised to meet commitments to foreign investors.1009 
 
The social implications of this approach to investment will be considered in later 
discussion on the economic and social concerns arising from the implementation of 
privatisation.  
 
Regarding the issue of foreign versus indigenous investments, the National Electric 
Power Policy embraces both indigenous and foreign investments, and seeks to facilitate 
technology transfer in the power sector through the electricity privatisation programme. 
Even if foreign multinationals are not yet willing to invest their resources in the 
country’s power sector but rather prefer service contracts as well as IPPs where they 
receive guaranteed substantial payments for power supply, the government could still 
aim to utilise these contractual arrangements to facilitate some benefits of globalisation 
like technology transfer by including social clauses that require the employment or 
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training of indigenous managers and technical staff, but there is no indication that this 
has been the case.1010 Indeed in the award of the service contracts, despite the policy 
stipulation about promoting indigenous participation alongside foreign investment, the 
government’s utilisation of local expertise has been minimal even though some 
evidence indicates that local expertise exists in this area.1011   
 
On a final note, as earlier noted, the Public Enterprises Decree 1999 provides for the 
privatisation of only 40 per cent of the equity in NEPA. Continued government 
ownership of significant equity in the power utility could amount to retention of ‘golden 
shares’ in the enterprise, earlier noted regarding some of the enterprises privatised in 
other countries.1012 While this could be a means of ensuring that the power industry 
continues to function in the public interest, it could also dissuade potential local and 
foreign investors concerned about continued government interference, which was noted 
regarding some of the enterprises privatised under the country’s first privatisation 
programme.1013 This could also be one of the reasons why foreign power investors have 
opted more for IPPs, which they own fully, rather than acquiring part stake in the power 
utility.     
 
5.2.3.3.        THE APPROACH TO SOCIO-CULTURAL ISSUES IN  
                   PRIVATISATION 
    
In Chapter 4, the influence of geopolitical and other cultural factors in the setting up of 
some of the public enterprises in Nigeria was noted.1014 A perusal of the list of 
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companies that were granted IPP licences during the tenure of the last president shows 
that about one third of them are based in Ogun State, the home state of the president and 
about half were based in his geopolitical zone.1015 While this may not be conclusive 
evidence of geo-political favouritism, it does indicate that the granting of these licences 
may not have been purely based on sound economic principles. But the broader concern 
is that if such licences were granted by the independent regulatory body premised on 
non-economic considerations, not only is it possible that the performance of the private 
power provider may not be top quality, but it could also mean that malfeasance could go 
unpunished to the extent that the licencee is seen to enjoy the patronage of the president. 
As will be deen in the broader discussion of corruption in the power sector, corruption 
and cronyism allegations currently pervade the entire sector of which law reform aimed 
at introducing private participation in the electricity sector, may fail to achieve intended 
ends where political leaders utilise these laws to accompish other ends.      
 
5.2.3.4.        WEIGHING THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING PRIVATISATION 
                     AGAINST THE EXPECTED BENEFITS 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the cost of implementing the Nigerian privatisation programme 
has escalated since the programme commenced, raising concerns about whether the 
costs may ultimately eclipse the benefits expected to be derived from it.1016 While the 
government has frequently emphasized its seriousness in dealing with the problems 
facing the power sector by reference to how much has budgeted for, or spent on the 
sector1017, and the structural reforms that are going on in the sector, an assessment of the 
resultant effect of such expenditure and structural reorganisation reveals a worsening 
state of power supply for end users of electricity in the country even as costs are 
escalating. Some aspects of this escalating cost have already been discussed including 
the government’s significant expenditure on the pre-privatisation rehabilitation of power 
equipment and facilities in the country and excessive reliance on long-term dollar-
denominated Power Purchase Agreements with independent power producers (IPPs) as 
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well as a host of other investment incentives. In the case of rehabilitation, the revenue 
realised through the eventual privatisation of rehabilitated power plants may not offset 
the huge rehabilitation expenditure, thus resulting in a net revenue loss for the country.  
 
Regarding the IPPs, they have been presented as a new way of using private sector 
financing for the much-needed investments in the electricity sector in the country and 
relieving the government of the burden of funding much needed investments in the 
power sector. The fact however, is that rather than giving the government financial 
breathing space, commitments under power purchase agreements aimed at assuring 
good returns for the private power providers and often denominated in dollars rather 
than local currency, are very expensive to finance, constitute a massive long-term drain 
on public funds and they have compounded the pre-existing financial problems of the 
power utility.1018 Given that IPPs only deal with power generation, when power 
transmission and distribution costs are also added, the final cost of power supply for the 
government becomes extremely high. 1019 With the federal government and various state 
governments all negotiating these agreements separately, they are not likely to realise 
the benefits of economies of scale that would have resulted from having one negotiating 
platform and one standard framework for these transactions, and different financial 
obligations currently exist under some of the PPAs that have been executed in the 
country.1020 
 
The key concern regarding the mounting cost of power sector reforms is not the 
expenditure per se, but the absence of commensurate quid pro quo given that the 
government is left significantly out of pocket even as the power sector remains in bad 
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shape.1021 This stems from the fact that the agreements are often structured in a way that 
insulates the IPPs from most investment risks and effectively guarantees them long term 
profits even when their performance is below par.1022 In the case of Nigeria, the point 
was made earlier that they have not yet shown better performance than the inefficient 
power plants that are still under government ownership despite benefiting from 
incentives, and some doubt has been expressed regarding whether they actually deliver 
the contractually agreed quantity of power to the government.1023  
 
It should also be noted that the ‘take or pay’ obligation in Power Purchase Agreements 
means that the government will be contractually obligated to continue to pay for IPP 
power even when it is unable to evacuate, transmit or distribute same to consumers in 
the country owing to problems like vandalised power lines or other problems facing the 
downstream power sector.1024 In purchasing the power at pre-set prices over the long 
contractual period, it matters not that later entrants to the power generation sector are 
able to generate and supply cheaper power since this would not affect pre-existing 
contractual obligations, and the power purchase expenditure will continue to constitute 
a charge on public funds long after the privatisation of NEPA has been completed.1025   
 
Nigeria also faces the risk that its regular payment of public sector debts stemming from 
power purchase commitments could be imperilled if the country suffers severe foreign 
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exchange shortage possibly as a result of a future fall in the price of oil that is its main 
income generator.1026 This could ultimately pose a stumbling block to national 
development and completely erode any benefit the country may have realised from 
having a private sector led power sector. It also needs to repay the World Bank loans 
used in financing key electricity reforms, of which it has been noted regarding World 
Bank loan repayment that the county has often repaid more that initially borrowed 
sums, due to a number of factors.1027 Nevertherless, it is still borrowing more funds for 
the power sector1028,  even as it has not been able to satisfactoriy account for the money 
that has been spent so far.1029    
 
 
5.2.3.5.            BALANCING THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN 
                        PRIVATISATION IN THE INTEREST OF THE CITIZENS 
 
The electricity sector has been identified as one of the key sectors that need to be 
reformed in order to reduce poverty and facilitate economic development in Nigeria, 
and ‘fast-tracking the restructuring and privatization of the sector’ has also be identified 
as a vital strategy in this regard.1030 One common thread however that runs through 
Nigerian policy documents and various policy documents of the IFIs is the strong 
emphasis on charging tariffs that adequately reflect the cost of providing  electricity, as 
a way of attracting private investments to the power sector and also reducing 
governments  overall expenditure in the sector.1031 Other African countries pursuing 
                                                             
1026 Argentina suffered similar fate. See H Seriki, ‘Umbrella Clauses and Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
All Encompassing or a Respite for Sovereign States and State Entities?’ [2007] JBL 570, 570-571, 577-
578.  
 
1027 R Mowoe, ‘The World Bank and the IMF in External Debt Management’ in IA Ayua and B 
Owasanoye (eds), External Debt and Financial Management in Nigeria (NIALS, Lagos 1997) 66. 
 
1028 World Bank, ‘Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 134.4 Million 
(US$200 Million Equivalent) to the Federal Republic of Nigeria Along with a Proposed Series of IDA 
Partial Risk Guarantees in the Amount of US$400 Million in Support of Gas Supply and Aggregation 
Agreements of Shell Petroleum Development Company, Chevron Nigeria Ltd and other Oil Companies 
with Power Holding Company of Nigeria for the Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project’ 
(Report) (May 2009) Report No 47945-NG 70, 86-87. Also see 46. 
 
1029 J Ameh and O Ezeobi, ‘Power: Reps Uncover another N10bn Inflated Contracts’ The Punch (Lagos, 
19 March 2008) <http://www.punchng.com/> accessed 19 March 2008. 
 
1030 IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper — National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy’ (Report)(December 2005) IMF Country Report No 05/433 61. Also see vii, xi, xv, 
16, 53, 60. 
 
1031 IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report—Joint Staff Advisory Note’ 
(Report) (August 2007) IMF Country Report No 07/271 6-7; IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy 
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power sector reforms have also implemented tariff increases.1032 As earlier noted, in the 
Nigerian context, the government’s expensive power purchase obligations regarding 
IPPs may make such price hikes inevitable, and given that there is still a big gap 
between the demand for, and supply of electricity in the country which is not the case 
with many developed countries, it is essentially a sellers’ market with resulting upward 
pressure on prices.1033 To the extent that private entrepreneurs may not bother to invest 
if rates are not profitable, it may be plausible to argue that tariffs have to be adjusted in 
a country where they do not cover the cost of supply1034, but the argument does not end 
there. While noting the need to devise ways of safeguarding poor people in the era of 
private provision, including the restricted and targeted use of subsidies1035, the National 
Electric Power Policy curiously notes that based on experience, many Nigerians, 
including villagers are willing to pay higher rates for more efficient services.1036 To 
some extent, this indicates that the policy does not fully factor in the acute level of 
poverty in the country, of which the Guidelines on Privatisation of Government 
Enterprises notes that about 70 per cent of Nigerians live below the poverty line of 
US$1 dollar a day.1037 With a current estimated population of about 148 million, that 
means that up to 100 million Nigerians are living in abject poverty in a country that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Paper — National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy’ (Report)(December 2005) IMF 
Country Report No 05/433 61, 62; IN Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and 
Competition - A World Bank Policy Research Report (World Bank, Washington DC 2004) 2, 3, 14, 16, 
111; National Electric Power Policy paras 4.2.5, 6.1, 6.2. Also see AO Popoola, ‘Consumer Protection 
within the Framework of Economic Liberalisation: The Impact of Privatisation, Commercialisation and 
Deregulation on Consumers’ in IA Ayua and DA Guobadia (eds), Political Reform and Economic 
Recovery in Nigeria (NIALS, Lagos 2001) 392, 417; IO Bolodeoku, ‘The Search for Global Capital: 
What has Privatisation Got to do with it, What are the Challenges for Nigeria’ (2003) 23 JPPL 93, 107-
108  . 
 
1032 CM Haanyika, ‘Rural Electrification Policy and Institutional Linkages’ (2006) 34 Energy Pol’y 2977, 
2985-2986. 
 
1033 H Nagayama, ‘Effects of Regulatory Reforms in the Electricity Supply Industry on Electricity Prices 
in Developing Countries’ (2007) 35 Energy Pol’y 3440, 3453-3454. Also see M Grimston, ‘Generating 
Profits? Can Liberalized Markets Fit the Electricity Bill?’ [2005] IELTR 127, 129-130. 
 
1034 O Arowolo, ‘Nigerian Power Sector Reform: Why Distribution Requires a Clear Strategy’ [2005] 
IELTR 163, 169; A Adefulu, ‘How Can Nigeria Develop a Domestic Market for its Gas?’ [2000] IELTR 
99, 102. 
 
1035 National Electric Power Policy paras 2.2(l), 4.4(v), 6.3, 7.0. 
 
1036 Ibid para 6.0. 
 
1037 Guidelines on Privatisation of Government Enterprises para 9.4. Also see IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report’ (Report) (August 2007) IMF Country Report No 07/270 1. 
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does not have a functional social security system.1038 Poor people potentially face 
exclusion including non-connection or disconnection for non-payment, however as Kate 
Bayliss notes, even when poor people are able to pay for essential utilities, the tariff 
could consume a significant amount of household income, and this could drive them 
into deeper poverty.1039 This point may not be immediately apparent in reports that 
indicate that increased prices have not resulted in reduced demand for a vital utility 
product.1040 
 
One of the functions assigned to the NERC under the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 
2005 is to maximise electricity access for consumers in both rural and urban areas and 
‘ensure that prices charged by licensees are fair to consumers and are sufficient to allow 
the licensees to finance their activities and to allow for reasonable earnings for efficient 
operation.’1041 Such price regulation as earlier noted, is especially important to prevent 
market abuse when full competition is not immediately feasible.1042 To ensure 
predictability of tariffs, NERC has produced a Multi-Year Tariff Order that presets 
tariffs for a five year period1043, and prepayment meters are being introduced all over 
                                                             
1038 AO Obilade, ‘Poverty and the Legal System: The Laws’ Response to Poverty in Nigeria’ in DA 
Guobadia and E Azinge (eds), Poverty, The Nigerian Economy and The Law (NIALS, Lagos 2004) 210, 
218, 220. 
 
1039 K Bayliss, ‘Water and Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in K Bayliss and B Fine (eds), Privatization 
and Alternative Public Sector Reform in sub-Saharan Africa: Delivering on Electricity and Water 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2008) 109-115, 118-120. Also see H Nagayama, ‘Effects of Regulatory 
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Energy Pol’y 3440, 3461; S Karekezi and L Majoro, ‘Improving Modern Energy Services for Africa’s 
Urban Poor’ (2002) 30 Energy Pol’y 1015, 1018; CW Price and K Pham, ‘The Impact of Electricity 
Market Reform on Consumers’ (2009) 17 Utilities Policy 43, 47-48; UNECA/UNEP, Making Africa’s 
Power Sector Sustainable: An Analysis of Power Sector Reforms in Africa (UNECA, Addis Ababa 2007) 
77-78, 85-89, 101.  
 
1040 World Bank, ‘Using Markets in Infrastructure Provision’ in G Yarrow and P Jasinski (eds), 
Privatization: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, Vol III (Routledge, London 1996) 275, 276.  
 
1041 Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 ss 32(1)(b), 32(1)(d).  
 
1042 Chapter 2 para 2.3.1.2, 2.3.2.2; J Vickers and G Yarrow, The British Electricity Experiment’ in G 
Yarrow and P Jasinski (eds), Privatization: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, Vol II 
(Routledge, London 1996) 167; D Thompson, ‘Introducing Competition and Regulatory Requirements’ in 
VV Ramanadham (ed), Privatisation in Developing Countries (Routledge, London 1989) 129-130; G 
Yarrow, ‘The Regulation of a Privatised Electricity Supply Industry’ in VV Ramanadham (ed), 
Privatisation in the UK (Routledge, London 1988) 231-232.    
 
1043 Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, ‘Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) for the 
Determination of Charges and Tariffs for Electricity Generation, Transmission and Retail Tariffs for the 
Period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2013’ 
<http://www.nercng.org/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/Draft%20Tariff%20Order%2012%20June%2008_
revised%20by%20IT_.pdf> accessed 30 September 2008 34-38. 
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the country.1044 It has been noted however that poor utility consumers do not necessarily 
gain most from regulatory reforms that may benefit other consumers generally, 
necessitating the provision of subsidies.1045 In this regard, the Electric Power Sector 
Reform Act 2005 provides for the establishment of a Power Consumer Assistance Fund 
for providing subsidies to underprivileged and special customers.1046 Ordinarily this is a 
good provision that would help in ensuring the need-based supply of a vital 
infrastructural service like electricity, however one of the key concerns here is that it is 
the power Minister that determines who an underprivileged power consumer is, and will 
also give policy directions to the NERC on contribution rates and disbursement from the 
fund1047 Such targetting of subsidies, which is also endorsed by the National Electric 
Power Policy is quite difficult.1048 A World Bank report, while making the case for 
more effective targetting of subsidies admits that:   
 
Many of the infrastructure subsidies in developing countries are very 
poorly targeted. As a result poor people and other vulnerable groups 
capture only a small share of these subsidies1049  
 
The social-political context of implementing government policies in Nigeria, which 
includes concerns about ethnic or other cultural favouritism as seen in this chapter as 
well as Chapter 41050, means that such wide ambit of powers and discretion is clearly 
                                                             
1044 A Godwin, ‘Prepaid Metering System a Rip-Off, say Consumers’ The Punch (Lagos 14 March 2006) 
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open to abuse in absence of adequate transparency safeguards.1051 Another instance of 
wide discretion that could be abused in absence of transparency safeguards is the 
provision that empowers NERC to differentiate customers for the purposes of electricity 
pricing, premised on a number of grounds including location within the country.1052 
Such differentiation could ultimately be done on extraneous grounds and could give rise 
to geopolitical friction and allegations of bias. Besides the concept of targeting 
presupposes that few people will benfit from a measure relative to the rest of the 
country, however given that up to 100 million Nigerians may need support, it would 
appear more prudent to provide for broadbased subsidisation that applies across the 
board as opposed to discretionary targeting. The government has however informed the 
IMF of its intention of scaling down public subsidies, and phasing them out of urban 
areas.1053 In this regard, it has been noted that ‘distribution of income in most countries 
in Africa shows that most urban households are poor’1054, which raises doubts about the 
propriety of any strategy that leads to the exclusion of urban areas from subsidies.  
  
 Also to note is that with the absence of a competition law and competition 
authority’1055 and the earlier noted concern about NERC ability to play the role of an 
interim competition authority as envisioned under the National Electric Power 
Policy1056, the benefits of privatisation to power consumers in Nigeria are constrained 
both with regard to choice and cost of provision.1057 Also to note is that the expenses 
incurred under expensive power purchase agreements which may not have been 
                                                             
1051 For similar concerns about potential abouse of wide discretionary powers in other African countries, 
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efficiently negotiated is eventually passed on to consumers, who have little choice in the 
matter.1058     
 
The National Electric Power Policy also notes the need for ‘developing a strategy for 
the equitable treatment of NEPA’s employees during the reform process’1059, and also 
notes that ‘Government will have due regard for the interest of the staff of the 
companies to be privatised within the provisions of their conditions of service.’1060 On 
the other hand, according to Nigeria’s poverty reduction strategy paper, up to 15 percent 
of the NEPA workforce will need to go.1061 The power sector labour unions, whose 
members may have some insights into the problems of the sector and possible solutions, 
apear to have largely been left out of the loop on the reform plans and have noted the 
need for a special body to undertake a diagnostic study of NEPA problems and 
recommend appropriate solutions, rather than an uncritical pursuit of privatisation.1062 
Also with a labour force of up to 30,000, a 15 percent reduction of the workforce will be 
considerable, which may be part of why the workers are resisting privatisation, 
especially given the experiences of other workers that have been laid off from other 
enterprises without clear plans for disengagement benefits.  
 
 
 
5.2.4.         IS THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS ACCOUNTABLE,  
                 TRANSPARENT AND FREE FROM CORRUPTION? 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, despite assurances from the Nigerian government that the 
privatisation programme will be transparent and despite safeguard provisions in the 
privatisation law and guidelines aimed at ensuring transparency, allegations of 
                                                             
1058 NA El-Rufai (BPE Director-General), ‘The Privatisation Of Nigeria’s Electricity Supply Industry’ 
(The Future of Nigeria’s Power Sector Conference, 2002) <www.bpeng.org> accessed 16 October 2003. 
See generally C Markus, ‘Stranded Costs of Former Electricity Monopolies under E.U. law: Part 1’ 
[2000] IELTR 144, 149-150, 172; MW White, Joskow PL and Hausman J, ‘Power Struggles: Explaining 
Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets’ (1996) Brookings Pap Econ Act 201, 242-244..  
 
1059 National Electric Power Policy para 5.2(vii). 
 
1060 Ibid para 5.6. 
 
1061 IMF, ‘Nigeria: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper — National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy’ (Report)(December 2005) IMF Country Report No 05/433 61. 
 
1062 C Nwachuku, ‘NEPA Privatisation: Workers Reject BPE, NCP’ Thisday (Lagos 22 March 2005) 
<http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=12472> accessed 22 March 2005; F Awowole-Brown, 
‘NUEE Warns against Privatisation of NEPA’, Sunday Champion (Lagos 27 March 2005) 
<http://www.champion-newspapers.com/> accessed 27 March 2005. 
 
267 
 
corruption and cronyism have surfaced in the course of the programme’s 
implementation.1063 A World Bank report notes the corruption that sometimes beclouds  
electricity contractual arrangements between governments and private investors.1064 
Regarding the power sector reforms in Nigeria, allegations of corruption currently 
pervade the entire sector as widely reported in the media. Despite considerable 
expenditure in the sector, especially over the past decade, power outages are still very 
regular, with crippling effect on the economy.1065 According to reports, the national 
parliament recently conducted probes into suspicious power sector contracts that were 
awarded by the last governrnent and privatisation concessions awarded to some 
members of that government1066, but the parliament itself is also now embroiled in 
corruption allegations, including the parliamentary committees on power.1067 In 
addditon to the above, it was noted earlier that the regulatory commissioners of NERC 
were recently suspended from office based on corruption allegations and even the  
power ministry that oversees the NERC appears complicit in some of these corrupt 
transactions.1068 This is the environment in which key power sector reforms that will 
culminate in privatisation are being undertaken.  
 
While allegations, arrests and investigations  do not represent cast iron proof of 
corruption, in absence of criminal conviction, it does appear that there is ample scope 
for malfesance in the electricity sector of which the regulatory and oversight 
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mechanisms for delivering key benefits of electricity privatisation also appear 
compromised. Regulatory controls designed to achieve public interest objectives have 
often been used to extract gatekeeping fees and rents in the country.1069 A multinational 
electricity contractor was recently fined in another country for bribing public officers in 
a number of countries including Nigeria1070, but there is no evidence that Nigeria has 
also investigated or punished the recipients of these bribes.  
 
Regarding the various contractual arrangements for attracting private sector 
participation, including sale to core/ strategic investor, IPPs and Rehabilitate, Operate 
and Transfer (ROT) contracts, as seen in Chapter 4, government officials involved in 
negotiating or approving such expensive contracts in Nigeria sometimes regard it as an 
opportunity to maximise their rents or to award such contracts to companies they have 
personal interest in, regardless of procedural requirements for transparency.1071 In fact, 
the former president in 2005, announced the award of an IPP licence among other 
incentives to a newly-formed company without any track record in building or 
maintaining power plants, but in which he had considerable shareholding, raising 
serious doubts about the transparency of the entire transaction and whether he acted in 
the country’s best interest in granting this licence.1072  
 
Regarding NERC, it may be difficult to abstract it from the corruption that exists within 
the political system under which it acquired regulatory powers, and where electricity 
regulators and those empowered to exercise oversight regarding their operations are 
involved in corruption, actualising the economic development objectives of electricity 
privatisation would be a very daunting task. On this issue, it has been noted that: 
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It is a common feature in Nigeria that individuals and institutions prefer 
to subvert laid down rules rather than comply with them. The assurance 
being that even when they fail to comply, officials from the regulatory 
institutions will always compromise their positions. This brings to the 
fore the pervasiveness of corruption in the country as such officers are 
often “settled” ... to overlook non-compliance with statutory provisions. 
... The end result is inadequate or ineffective enforcement of the rules, to 
the detriment of the Nigerian society. ... a good legislation can be 
meaningless if not properly enforced.1073   
 
 
Even if NERC commissioners want to be effective, it may be difficult to effectively 
press for improved service quality and reasonable pricing or punish regulatory breaches 
in furtherance of the public interest and the development objectives of the privatisation 
programme, when so doing would reduce the profit margins of enterprises owned by top 
political leaders or their cronies.1074 A final comment has to do with the issue of public 
sector remuneration. Given that regulation involves constant interaction between public 
officers and private investors who may sometimes be prepared to offer huge bribes1075, 
the low remuneration of public officers in Nigeria need to be re-examined1076, and even 
if the regulatory commissioners are paid well, those working under them also need 
adequate remuneration to reduce the risk of illicit conduct. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this research, the aim has been to examine the link between privatisation legal reform 
and economic development, specifically with respect to Nigeria, and more broadly, 
Africa. It has been noted that:  
 
Africa continues to face difficult socio-economic conditions and ... the 
effective implementation of privatization programmes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa could be key to increasing the region’s competitiveness, increased 
growth, higher income levels and hence, reduced poverty.1077 
 
However, despite the fact that privatisation has been implemented in the continent for 
several years now, actualising economic development and reducing poverty and 
inequality remains a key challenge for many African countries, including Nigeria. The 
hypothesis or central argument of this research is that the replacement of the policy and 
legal framework for public ownership of enterprises with the new policy and legal 
framework for their private ownership and/or control as a result of privatisation is not 
sufficient in itself to deliver certain economic development benefits that have been 
associated with privatisation, of which the research considers whether privatisation will 
yeild benefits to the public sector of a country, will be beneficial to the privatised 
enterprises, will contribute to overall private sector development in the country, will be 
beneficial to its citizens and finally, will be a conduit for beneficial foreign investment 
inflow to the country. The focus here is not on whether some of these benefits can be 
achieved but rather whether they can be collectively achiveved, of which some of the 
benefits are economic in nature while some are social in nature. The privatisation 
challenge from the economic development perspective is to be able to harness both sets 
of benefits, and this has been a difficult challenge to address in some of the developing 
countries that have implemented privatisation, including African  countries.  
 
The research considered that in Nigeria specifically and more broadly in Africa, the 
inability of privatisation to yeild expected benefits may not simply be for want of laws 
and regulations but that certain challenges of implementation that have arisen in these 
countries should also be factored in. This is not to minimise the role of law in 
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actualising the benefits of privatisation, but rather, laws and regulations appear to 
constitute only a sub-set amongst a wide range of issues that could affect the outcome of 
privatisation in a country. The research created an analytical framework for analysing 
some of these issues and focused on policy and legal inadequacies in Nigeria 
specifically and Africa generally in addition to some implementation inadequacies. 
Regarding the implementation inadequacies, a number of questions were framed and 
addressed namely is the national environment conducive to embarking on privatisation 
and attracting private investments?; is the institutional framework for implementing and 
monitoring the outcome of privatisation robust?; will the strategic approach to the 
implementation of privatisation lead to the realisation of set policy objectives?; and is 
the privatisation process accountable, transparent and free from corruption? It is 
considered that the outcome of privatisation will depend on how the above questions are 
answered in the specific context of implementing privatisation in Nigeria and other 
African countries. Thus while it is not disputed that privatisation could possibly yield 
benefits, the context of its implementation also needs to be factored in.  It is important 
to articulate how the analytical framework of the dissertation views the potential for 
realising key economic development benefits of privatisation in Nigeria and Africa.   
 
6.1.          Designing an Effective Policy and Legal Framework   
 
 
6.1.1.           The Policy Framework of Privatisation 
 
Regarding the policy framework of privatisation, the research identified three 
viewpoints of privatisation policy in Africa namely, the conviction viewpoint, the 
coercion viewpoint and the self interested viewpoint of which the key issues are 
whether privatisation is primarily driven by the conviction of national political leaders 
as to its economic development potential, whether various African countries have been 
coerced by the IFIs into implementing privatisation or whether the implementation of 
privatisation may have been influenced by the vested interest of political leaders in a 
country in personally deriving some illicit benefits through privatisation. Evidence that 
points to each of these viewpoints can be seen in the implementation of privatisation in 
Nigeria and Africa more broadly, of which the research notes that these viewpoints are 
not in separate compartments, and considers that where privatisation is not primarily 
driven by conviction, it is less likely that it would have been well thought out from a 
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policy perspective or that it adequately adresses the specific economic development 
challenges facing a particular country. 
 
6.1.2.           The Legal Framework of Privatisation  
 
Regarding the legal framework for implementing privatisation, it was noted that where 
there are certain inadequacies in the body of laws that pave way for privatisation or 
regulate the market place, potential privatisation investors may be concerned that their 
investments will not be adequately protected,  and if they fail to invest, all the key 
benefits of privatisation will not materise in the first place. Where the laws contain 
insufficient transparency and accountability safeguards, this could pave way for 
corruption to seep into the privatisation process which could mean that   public 
enterprises may not be taken over by those best suited to run them efficiently and hence 
the enterprise may still continue to underperform and the citizens may continue to put 
up with inefficient services. In some cases the problem is one of absence of certain 
laws, such as competition laws as is the case with Nigeria, which could mean that 
privatisation may give rise to private monopolies in which case it will not contributed to 
broadbased private sector development and the citizens may also lose out and may have 
to put up with monopoly inefficiency and monopoly rates for goods and services.  
 
6.2.      Ensuring Proper Implementation of Privatisation 
 
Regarding the implementation concerns arising from privatisation, the view taken in the 
dissertation is that while inadequacies in the policy and legal framework of privatisation 
might have affected the implementation process and outcomes, there are some other 
issues that could have impact on the outcome of privatisation even if the coutry has very 
good laws in the statute books. Although four key implementation questions were 
framed to facilitate the analysis, it is important to note that the dissertation did not 
consider these as the only possible issues that could affect the outcome of privatisation 
of which other scholars may focus on a different set of issues. However that where the 
four implementation questions are not answered in the affirmative, the view taken is 
that privatisation will be less likely to facilitate economic development in the country of 
implementation.  
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6.2.1.      Is the National Environment Conducive to Embarking on Privatisation  
             and Attracting Private Investments? 
 
 Regarding the above implementation question, the view taken is that investors, 
especially foreign investors may fail to make privatisation investments where certain 
underlying issues in Nigeria or other African countries undermine the investment 
climate. Key issues addressed in the thesis include whether there are socio-political 
concerns that arise as a result of the implementation of privatisation such as massive 
protests by workers or citizens In some cases, other sources of instabilty may exist in a 
country and could affect the outcome of privatisation, for instance Nigeria that has a 
problem with militant activities in the Niger Delta region of the country. In addition, in 
Nigeria and some other privatising African countries there are pre-existing systemic 
problems that affect the private business sector which would bother prospective 
privatisation investors including inadequate utility/infrastructural services and an 
unpredictable law and policy environment where taxes and regulations could suddenly 
change.  
 
Where local or foreign investors fail to invest due to concerns about the underlying 
investment climate in a country, the various possible benefits of privatisation to the 
government, the enterprises, the business sector in the country and the citizens may fail 
to materialise. 
 
6.2.2.       Is the Institutional Framework for Implementing and Monitoring the 
                Outcome of Privatisation Robust? 
 
Where the institutional framework for implementing economic reforms like 
privatisation and monitoring their outcome is not robust, it creates room for possible 
implementation flaws that may result in the non-realisation of the policy objectives that 
underpin legal reforms. This includes the administrative body charged with 
implementing privatisation and various institutions charged with different 
responsibilities in a market system. The administrative body may lack the capability to 
undertake proper due diligence on prospective investors as was noted with regard to 
Nigeria, resulting in failed transactions or enterprises being taken over by those not best 
suited to manage them, which would not be in the best interest of the government, the 
privatised enterprises or the citizens that utilise their services. Regulatory capture for 
instance may result in regulatory bodies not functioning as initially envisioned, which 
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could undermine some of the benefits of privatisation for the citizens that are hinged on 
effective regulation. Tax authorities may lack the capability to collect taxes due to the 
government from various private enterprises including the privatised enterprises, which 
would reduce the amount of funds available to the government to address various social 
development needs of the citizens.  
 
6.2.3.        Will the Strategic Approach to the Implementation of Privatisation Lead  
               to the Realisation of Set Policy Objectives? 
 
The research focused on 5 strategic issues that could have impact on the outcome of 
privatisation namely the pace and sequencing of privatisation, the strategy for engaging 
foreign investors, the approach to socio-cultural issues in privatisation, weighing the 
cost of implementing privatisation against the expected benefits and balancing the 
economic and social issues in privatisation in the interest of the citizens. How each of 
these strategic issues is addressed will have impact on the realisation of key benefits of 
privatisation for the public sector, the privatised enterprise, the overall development of 
the priavte sector and the citizens of the country. For instance, where there is 
unbalanced risk allocation between the government and foreign investors as was noted 
with regard to private participation in the utility/infrastructural sector in Nigeria and 
some other African countries, the government may end up making substantial payments 
to the foreign investor, which could be at variance with the privatisation objective of 
reducing government expenditure and attracting foreign investors that will make 
substantial investments of their own funds that would facilitate economic development 
in the country. Also, where the implementation of privatisation is influenced by socio-
cultural issues within a country including ethnic and geopolitical considerations, rather 
than being an instrument for actualising key benefits for the entire country and the 
citizens in general, privatisation could end up being a means of advancing the interests 
of only selected cultural groups in a country at the expense of others. Where this 
contributes to social instability in a country, it could undermine the investment climate, 
making it more difficult for the country to attract sustainable long term investments, 
both local and foreign and potentially undermines priatisation’s use as a contributory 
tool for overall private sector development in the country.  Citizens, including workers 
may not enjoy some of the potential benefits of privatisation where there are insufficient 
arrangements for broad based participation in the privatisation programme through 
share purchase schemes or where workers are laid off without adequate consideration of 
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issues such as alternative job openings and severance benefits.       
    
 
6.2.4.    Is the Privatisation Process Accountable, Transparent and Free from     
             Corruption? 
 
The research took the view that if the political leaders in a country lack the political will 
to prevent corruption from infiltrating the privatisation process or have vested interest in 
using privatisation as a means of advancing their personal interests and a tool for 
patronage. This is the vested interest viewpoint of privatisation earlier identified in the 
analysis of privatisation policy and some evidence indicates that this has had some 
influence in the implementation of privatisation in Nigeria as well as some other 
African countries. Within this scenario, benefits of privatisation may materialise 
primarily for a few politically-connected persons at the expense of broad based benefits 
for the country and its citizens. Also, in this context, the proceeds of privatisation may 
not be adequately accounted for, or effectively utilised in addessing the social 
development challenges facing the citizens of the country. Qualitative foreign investors 
may also decline to participate in a non-transparent privatisation programme, which 
could affect foreign investment inflow to the country and as well as the calibre of 
investors that take over public enterprises.   
 
6.3.             Case Study of the Nigerian Electricity Sector 
 
Using the above analytical framework, the implementation  of electricity reforms in 
Nigeria was analysed, of which the reforms are expected to culminate in privatisation of 
the country’s power utility, PHCN. Policy inadequacies were analysed of which the 
reforms do not appear to be fully grounded in conviction about the merits, which as 
earlier noted is vital for actualising the economic development objectives of 
privatisation.1078 Indeed recent news emanating from Nigeria indicates that the country 
may be on the verge of suspending the implementation of electricity privatisation, with 
the government increasing its role in the power sector.1079 Some of the inadequacies of 
the framework for electricity regulation, which is vital for realising the benefits of 
                                                             
1078 Chapter 2 para 2.3.1.1; Chapter 3 para 3.1.1; Chapter 4 para 4.1.1; Chapter 5 para 5.1.1. 
 
1079 Editorial, ‘PHCN’s Return to Full State Ownership’ The Punch (Lagos 1 August 2008) 
<http://www.punchng.com/> accessed 1 August 2008.  
 
276 
 
privatisation were analysed, of which the monolithic nature of the regulatory 
framework, geopolitical considerations in its staffing, the interface between the power 
minister and the regulatory body, limitations in seeking redress through the courts 
against acts or omissions of the regulatory body, and inadequate penalties for regulatory 
breach are all key factors that could undermine the benefits of electricity privatisation 
for the country and its citizen. The benefit of privatisation as a tool for facilitating 
foreign investments in the power sector could also be undermined where potential 
investors are concerned about undue limitations to the avenues for seeking legal redress, 
which could increase regulatory risk.  
 
The implementation of electricity reforms leading up to privatisation faces some key 
challenges that could undermine the policy objective of facilitating economic 
development through electricity privatisation. While some of the general concerns about 
the implementation of privatisation in Nigeria would invariably affect electricity 
privatisation, there are also some issues of specific concern to electricity privatisation, 
for instance, the fact that many of Nigeria’s power plants are located in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria that is prone to the actvities of militants, and also the issue of potential 
legal liability for environmental damage partly resulting from these power plants. The 
benefits of electricity privatisation to the country as a whole would be adversely 
affected where these issues prevent investors, particularly foreign investors, from 
participating in the power sector. Key institutional constraints could undermine the 
country’s ability to effectively negotiate some of the key contracts that are utilised in the 
power sectors, undertake adequate due diligence on power sector investors, or regulate 
the power sector, of which some evidence points in this direction. The potential benefits 
of privatisation to the power sector could be undermined as a result, and the benefits to 
the citizens would also be adversely affected where privatisation does not deliver 
expected efficiency benefits due to regulatory inadequacies.       
 
Some of the reform strategies adopted in the power sector could create key economic 
development constraints. For instance undertaking electricity privatisation at a time 
when Nigeria does not yet have a competition law or competition authority would limit 
the benefts of privatisation for the citizens. Engaging private power investors through 
contractual arrangements that result in extensive foreign exchange outflow from the 
public purse could undermine the privatisation benefit of attracting private resources to 
the power sector and limiting the government’s expenses in the sector. It would also 
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have impact on the resources available to the government for social development 
initiatives. Inadequate regulation, including insufficient consideration of the ability of 
citizens to afford power tariffs could mean that electricity privatisation may make the 
actualisation of economic development objectives such as povery and inequality 
reduction even more daunting, an issue that will be further elucidated on later in this 
chapter.   
 
6.4.       Key Ideas Distilled from the Implementation of Privatisation in Nigeria  
           and Africa   
 
Some key ideas can be distilled from the way this dissertation analysed the adoption of 
privatisation in Nigeria and Africa, which are key contributions to the existing body of 
work/ knowledge in this area. 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the research does not necessarily dispute that privatisation legal 
reform could possibly play a role in facilitaing the realisation of key economic 
development benefits, based on key benefits for the public sector, the privatised 
enterprises, contribution to overall private sector development, benefits for citizens and 
conduit for foreign investments into Nigeria and other African countries. However, 
what emerges from the work is that a lot of caveats need to be inserted into the 
discourse on privatisation and economic development based on certain policy and legal 
as well as implementation variables that could affect the outcome of privatisation in 
specific countries or regions. The research analysed some of these variable factors using 
the analytical framework created in the dissertation, which is an important contribution 
to the existing frameworks for privatisation analysis.   
 
No doubt some further legal reforms may be necessary in actualising the economic 
development objectives of electricity reforms in Nigeria, for instance to address some of 
the noted flaws of the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, and enact a competition 
law, which the National Electric Power Policy recognises as a necessary compliment to 
successful electricity privatisation.  In the broader African context, some further legal 
reforms may be necessary in some countries to address some social issues, for instance 
enforceable legal or constitutional provisions that guarantee certain core rights to the 
citizens including workers, premised on which they can pursue legal challenge where 
the implementation of privatisation conflicts with their welfare, of which African 
countries like Malawi and South Africa have toed this line.  Also, in the face of 
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regulatory inadequacies noted in the dissertation including issues pertaining to political 
interference and the potential for regulatory capture, which may possibly not be 
addressed soon in some African countries, laws that enhance consumer rights and create 
mechanisms for directly seeking legal redress against regulated enterprises without the 
intermediary of the regulator, may be necessary.   
 
However, unlike the earlier Law and Development movement that appeared to place 
considerable faith in what could be achieved through legal reforms alone, this research 
contributes to the growing body of work that seeks to identify other issues that could 
affect the realisation of developmental objectives in countries that have undertaken legal 
reforms.1080 Although the implementation issues identified and analysed in this 
dissertation may not necessarily be viewed the same way by other privatisation 
researchers, the four implementation questions framed within the analytical framework 
would greatly assist policy and law makers in understanding potential hurdles that stand 
in the way of realising the objectives of policy and legal reforms and devising ways of 
addressing these issues.  
 
It should be noted that these implementation issues may not necessarily present 
themselves in the same way or to the same extent in various African countries, of which 
the research does not seek to seek to make a broad generalisation about the reality of 
privatisation in Africa. Nigeria for instance, may not currently have a competitition 
commission, but this is not the case with some other African countries like Kenya, 
although these institutions may still have their peculiar problems in the countries where 
they exist.1081  Also, the cultural concerns in the implementation of privatisation in 
Nigeria may manifest differently within the specific national contexts of various other 
African countries and their potential impact on privatisation will depend on the peculiar 
cultural dynamics in these countries. Equally the prevalence and impact of corruption 
may differ amongst African countries. Thus the research considers it necessary that a 
‘law plus x’ approach should be adopted to the implementation of privatisation in 
Nigeria and Africa, of which the ‘x’ represents certain peculiarites of each country that 
                                                             
1080 Note for instance KE Davis and MJ Trebilcock, ‘Legal Reforms and Development’ (2001) 22 TWQ 
21, 25-33 pp 32-33; AL Chua, ‘Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a  New Paradigm for Law 
and Development’ (1998) 108 Yale LJ 1, 19, 20, 21. 
 
1081 Also see M Cave, ‘Does the Competition Commission Care Enough about Competition?’ (2006/2007) 
16 Util LR 151, 151-152. 
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may not be adequately reflected in the broader discourse on privatisation, some of 
which were analysed using the analytical framework of the dissertation. For instance, 
while some have suggested that greater parliamentary scrutiny may be a way of 
ensuring the political accountability of regulators1082, in the specific case of Nigeria 
where the parliament as earlier noted1083, has been embroiled in serious allegations of 
bribery and corruption, including the parliamentary committees on electricity, rather 
than being a source of accountabilty, parliamentary oversight may possibly be a source 
of regulatory capture. Similarly, although statutory consumer bodies may be effective 
accountability mechanisms in some jurisdictions as noted in Chapter 21084, the legal and 
institutional structure for consumer protection was noted to be weak in Nigeria.1085 
Adopting a ‘law plus x’ approach to these issues may require identifying or developing 
institutions that have local legitimacy from the perspective of Nigerians citizens, 
including non-governmental organisations, which could be conferred relevant powers to 
undertake key oversight tasks in the public interest. John Hatchard has suggested the 
office of the ombudsman as a key accountability mechanism especially in developing 
countries1086, however, it would be important to consider whether there are institutional 
or other constraints in particular countries that could prevent effective functioning of the 
office, for instance whether some of the cultural considerations noted in this research 
may affect the way the ombudsman responds to particular complaints from some 
members of the public.1087   
  
A vital point to note is that the issues analysed using the analytical framework of the 
dissertation represent only some but not all possible issues that could affect the outcome 
of legal reforms in a country. Attempting to encapsulate all possible issues may not be 
feasible given that many of these issues go well beyond the limits of legal research and 
                                                             
1082 Chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2; N Buttle, ‘Privatisation and Ethics’ in D Braddon and D Foster (eds), 
Privatization: Social Science Themes and Perspectives (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1996) 36. 
 
1083 Chapter 5 para 5.2.4. 
 
1084 Chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2; C Graham, ‘The Regulation of Privatised Enterprises’ [1991] PL 15, 18. 
 
1085 Chapter 5 para 5.1.2; BB Kanyip, ‘Reflections on Consumer Protection Law in Nigeria’ in IA Ayua 
(ed), Law, Justice and the Nigerian Society: Essays in Honour of Hon Justice Mohammed Bello (NIALS, 
Lagos 1995) 303-304. 
 
1086 J Hatchard, ‘Developing Governmental Accountability: The Role of the Ombudsman’ [1992] Third 
World Legal Stud 215, 215-217, 219-221, 222. Also see Chapter 2 para 2.3.2.2. 
 
1087 Chapter 3 para 3.2.3.3; Chapter 4 para 4.2.3.3; Chapter 5 para 5.2.3.3. 
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may also be viewed differently by different scholars as noted above, who may accord 
greater or lesser importance to some issues depending on their specific perspective on 
the issues. Besides, so doing may appear too prescriptive, and still fail to capture all the 
local variables that exist within different countries.   
 
In addition to the above issues, another key point to note is that the conventional 
approach to issues pertaining to privatisation and market reforms has often been to seek 
to lay the blame for poor adoption and outcome on the IFIs, or to blame the state for not 
correctly implementing the reforms or to blame the reforms for being inadequate or 
inappropriate for the implementing countries. These approaches however could 
inadvertently marginalise or obscure some implementation realities that may not neatly 
fit into the framed moulds of criticism, and thus an attempt was made to undertake a 
nuanced analysis of privatisation in this dissertation. In framing three different policy 
viewpoints of privatisation in Africa generally and Nigeria specifically (i.e. conviction, 
coercion and vested interest)1088, which is an important contribution to research in this 
area, the research sought to show that it may not be accurate to simply apportion blame 
without fully appreciating the dynamics of the local context in which privatisation has 
been adopted and implemented. The point was also made that the three viewpoints are 
not in clearly distinct or rigid compartments and it is possible that different 
combinations of elements of conviction, coercion and/or vested interest could be 
distilled to varying degrees from the privatisation programmes of some African 
countries, including Nigeria. In the same vein, the development policy framework of the 
African Union NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development 2001), was 
discussed within the context of the African chapter to show that the African Union has 
also endorsed privatisation as well as partnership with the IFIs in the pursuit of 
economic development.  
 
In instances where privatisation has failed to produce desired results there is need for 
closer scrutiny of the surrounding issues. Sometimes the problem is not with the 
privatisation policy per se but with how it is implemented of which the research 
examined these implementation issues using the analytical framework created. While 
the research noted some instances where the IFIs’ preferred approach to some aspects of 
implementation could be criticised, untangling such approach from the pre-existing 
                                                             
1088 Chapter 3 para 3.1.1; Chapter 4 para 4.1.1, Chapter 5 para 5.1.1. 
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disposition of national political leaders in an implementing country may be difficult in 
practice. For instance while the IFIs may prefer some haste in the implementation of 
privatisation, such haste in Nigeria may also possibly result from the vested interest 
viewpoint of privatisation, where privatisation could be an avenue for personal 
enrichment or political patronage. In this regard, corruption was analysed in some detail 
with regard to Nigeria and Africa because no matter how good the privatisation policy 
is, where those implementing it in a particular country do not appear to have the 
political will to fully implement it in a transparent and accountable way, there may be 
little that the IFIs can effectively do to ensure good outcomes.1089   
 
 It is also important to note that in the same way laws and regulations only constitute a 
sub-set of the factors that determine the outcome of privatisation, they also constitute 
only a subset of possible solutions to the obstacles confronting the implementation of 
privatisation in Nigeria specifically, and Africa in general. For instance, while laws can 
be adopted to tackle privatisation-related corruption in a country, it has been argued that 
corruption laws alone cannot effectively resolve  the problem of corruption where it is 
embedded in: 
 
 … the larger mix of social and political problems that afflict the country. 
… Once it is recognized that the social environment is the proper arena 
of engagement, then the relatively limited place of law in the grand 
scheme of things becomes evident.1090 
 
Accordingly, while this research has sought to make some contributions to greater 
understanding of the gap that exists between privatisation and economic development in 
Nigeria and some African countries, all possible considerations in the plugging of this 
gap cannot be fully articulated within the confines of a law thesis, however the 
dissertation has played a key role in framing some of the key issues that should engage 
the attention of law and policy makers seeking to advance economic development.    
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1089 Chapter 3 para 3.2.4; Chapter 4 para 4.2.4; Chapter 5 para 5.2.4. 
 
1090 PD Ocheje, ‘Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Nigeria’s Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Act, 2000’ (2001) 45 JAL 173, 184. Also see 185. 
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6.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
There are 2 key suggestions that will be made for further research on the issue of 
actualising economic development through the adoption and implementation of 
privatisation, namely, the issue of subsidies for those that cannot afford higher rates 
charged for utility services in the privatised era and secondly, the issue of possibly 
reexamining some of the the economic development underpinings of privatisation in the 
light of recent government bailout of troubed private companies. 
 
Regarding the first issue, Chapter 5 flagged up some of the key concerns in actualising 
the economic and social ends of privatisation specifically with regard to the commercial 
pricing of electricity services in countries like Nigeria with disproportionately high 
number of poor people (about 70 percent living below poverty line of US$1 dollar per 
day).1091 Over a decade ago, World Bank staff acknowledged that ‘most privatisation 
success stories come from high- or middle-income countries. It is harder to privatise in 
low-income settings …’1092 This difficulty is clearly evident in Nigeria. It should be 
noted that some have made the case for possibly discontinuing privatisation where it 
appears inconsistent with social or other considerations in an implementing country1093, 
however, it is important to point out that many utilities were already performing very 
poorly in some African countries like Nigeria, of which continuation of public provision 
may not particularly serve the interests of the poor. As noted in a publication, ‘There is 
plenty of evidence in Africa that state economic controls have had little to do with 
ensuring basic needs provision or promoting development of the local economy’.1094 
 
Continuing with privatisation on the other hand, without efffectively adddressing the 
key concerns about potential social exclusion may not augur well for overall economic 
                                                             
1091 Chapter 5 para 5.2.3.5. 
 
1092 S Kikeri, J Nellis and M Shirley, ‘Privatisation: The Lessons of Experience’ in JL Upper and GB 
Baldwin (eds), Public Enterprises: Restructuring and Privatization (International Law Institute, 
Washington DC 1995) 256.  
 
1093 P Pineau, ‘Electricity Sector Reform in Cameroon: Is Privatization the Solution?’ (2002) 30 Energy 
Pol’y 999, 1009-1010. 
 
1094 R Bush and M Szeftel, ‘The Struggle for Resources in Africa’ [1991] (51) Rev African Polit 
Economy 3, 6-7. 
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development and may lead to increase in inequality. As noted in Chapter 5, current 
solutions emanating from the IFIs and also articulated in Nigeria’s policy documents 
that deal with electricity echo the same solution of targetting subsidies to those that 
need it most. But the point was made that the idea of targetting presupposes that few 
people need assistance relative to the rest of the population, of which in Nigeria for 
instance, the 70 per cent estimate of people living below poverty line equates to more 
than 100 million people in a country of about 148 million people. Besides, such 
targetting within the cultural context of implementing privatisation in Nigeria and some 
other African countries could pave way for favouritism in the disbursement of the 
subsidies. Most poor Afircan countries however may not be able to sustain subsidies for 
the entire country due to their current economic situation, of which privatisation is 
meant to contribute to improvement of economic performance, but to the extent that 
privatisation itself may not be well implemented as seen in the dissertation, it may not 
be able to play an effective role in addressing these challenges. Further research is 
therefore needed on legal and other strategies for ensuring that poor countries with 
disproportionately high number of very poor people are able to meet their utility needs 
whilst retaining the benefits of private provision. A further consideration is the extent to 
which any necessary increase in tariffs can be undertaken in a country like Nigeria 
where power blackouts are still prevalent, in which case those paying higher tariffs may 
still continue to receive poor services until such a time as overall efficiency in the power 
sector can be achieved.   
 
The second issue to consider is the extent to which privatisation especially when it 
involves key national industries may need to be re-examined from the policy 
perspective. Although the tenor of this research did not involve an analysis of whether 
or not privatisation is a better economic development policy tool  relative to state 
ownership, but rather focused on an analysis of factors that could affect privatisation’s 
outcome, the current spate  of government bailouts especially in Europe and the United 
States, which in some cases has involved the acquisition of major ownership stake in 
key private enterprises1095, raises key questions about reliance on the private sector as a 
source of greater efficiency and productivity.  It has been noted that the IMF ‘has urged 
                                                             
1095 N Hood, ‘European Bank Bailouts — If at First you don't Succeed, Just Keep Throwing Money at it’ 
(2009) 2 CR & I 63; A Cohen, ‘Market Movements’ (2009) 5 JIBFL 299; A Clark, ‘General Motors 
declares bankruptcy – the biggest manufacturing collapse in US History’ Guardian (London 2 June 2009) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jun/01/general-motors-bankruptcy-chapter-11> accessed 6 
June 2009. 
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national governments to take “bolder steps” to shore up financial institutions, including 
nationalisation if necessary.’1096 It is remarkable that an organisation that has promoted 
privatisation over the years should recommend nationalisation even in this limited 
circumstance. Some of the key issues that need to be addressed in future research 
include what limits if any, should be placed on such government intervention and what 
are the likely implications of such intervention where the company is foreign-owned but 
the government considers it necessary to nationalise it due to concerns about the 
systemic implications of its collapse which could set back economic development 
efforts. Finally, if privatisation is meant to stimulate new private investments, what is 
the guarantee that some of the companies currently being privatised will not be 
nationalised again in the future within the context of government bailouts which 
necessitate new public investments in such enterprises?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1096 A Cohen, ‘Market Movements’ (2009) 5 JIBFL 299. 
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